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INTRODUCTION

The character and pace of world developments suggest that if American
administrative agencies ever could afford to engage in regulatory policy
without regard to the policies and practices of administrative agencies
abroad, that era has come to a close. The substantive problems facing
American agencies have parallels, to a greater or lesser extent, in the
problems facing those agencies' counterparts in foreign countries. The policies and procedures developed by governments abroad should frequently
be of interest and benefit to American regulators, and those developed
here may be of utility abroad.
The case for international regulatory cooperation does not, however,
rest entirely on the exchange of information about the current regulatory
landscape. As the experience of certain agencies engaged in international
regulatory dialogue demonstrates, there are still unresolved problems and
potentially more efficient solutions. In areas of fast-changing technology
or fast-evolving standards and expectations, regulatory bodies may find
that they actually need, or could profitably share, the resources of other
governments in addressing common problems. In their continuous efforts
at improving performance, agencies have become increasingly aware that
19931
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contemporary regulation entails a powerful research and development
burden that is best shared among many.state actors.'
However substantial the agencies' interest in regulatory cooperation
with foreign counterparts, that interest is at least matched by the prospective advantage of such cooperation to regulated interests and to those affected by those interests. Economic interests generally prefer an orderly
regulatory environment with a high degree of correspondence, if not uniformity, among the standards imposed upon them by public authorities in
the various markets they serve. The internationalization of business has
put the need for that kind of environment on an international scale. It
accordingly points in the direction of greater and more deliberate intergovernmentalism in regulatory matters than one generally associates
with the American administrative process.
I have knowingly chosen the general term cooperation to denote the
kind of intergovernmentalism described in this Article. But it should be
obvious that cooperation can take a wide variety of forms, from the casual
and unsystematic sharing of information, at one extreme, to a firm commitment to concerted regulatory action, at the other. In between fall a
number of different patterns, such as regular consultations, reciprocal participation in foreign agency rulemaking, and various forms of joint study,
research and rule development.
However slight may be its present development, international regulatory cooperation is not an entirely new phenomenon. We have long
known the existence of international organizations charged with harmonizing or at least developing minimum standards in different regulatory
fields. Bilateral and multilateral treaties have formalized international cooperation, and in some instances established common standards. International technical standards bodies do exist, and when their products are
adopted as national standards, they too foster a more orderly regulatory
environment. The fact remains, however, that a very small fraction of
overall American regulatory activity is governed by such formal structures
and arrangements and, even where it is, it is rarely governed by them
comprehensively.
1. The FAA has acknowledged economies in research and development costs as a principal reason for its establishment with the European Joint Aviation Authorities of a Joint Cabin Safety Research Group for purposes of shared technological research and development. See OPEN SESSION
CONCLUSIONS AND ACTIONS, SIXTH FAA-JAA MEETING, Bordeaux, France (June 1989) (on file

with Law and Policy in International Business); MINUTES OF THE OPEN SESSION, SIXTH FAAJAA MEETING, BORDEAUX, FRANCE pt. VIb (June 1989) (on file with Law and Policy in International Business).
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If the extent of commonality in regulatory problems is as great as it
appears to be, and if the private interest in an orderly world-wide regulatory environment is so pronounced, then international regulatory cooperation may call for wider and more consistent practice than it now receives.
In fact, in its allusion to rulemaking activity, the term regulatory cooperation may understate the potential scope for intergovernmentalism in administrative action. Much of the administrative process looks little like
rulemaking or standard-setting. Many observers have pointed out that
routine agency conduct, daily administration and individual decisionmaking constitute the bulk of that process, and intergovernmentalism may
have a distinct though less easily recognizable role to play in those forms
of activity as well.
This Article examines in some detail the practice and experience of one
agency, the Federal Aviation Administration, and more particularly its
Aircraft Certification Service, that has of recent years consciously engaged
in forms of concerted activity with certain counterpart agencies abroad.
This "case study" is of particular interest because the FAA's practice of
intergovernmentalism includes, but also goes beyond, cooperation in
rulemaking to embrace a certain amount of cooperation in more routine
aspects of administration. The study may also be of interest because the
intergovernmentalism engaged in largely involves cooperation with a
body-the European Joint Aviation Authorities--that is itself an illustration of highly concerted regulatory activity among the component European states, and therefore a model of sorts that may or may not be appropriate for consideration by American agencies acting in certain domains.
This Article is largely descriptive of the FAA's interaction with counterpart agencies and of the respects in which that interaction has been
thought to facilitate the agency's task and to improve its performance of
functions. However, the Article will also call attention to certain difficulties and complications that the process has generated, and on occasion
point out what might loosely be called lessons learned. Lastly, and appropriately for what was originally an Administrative Conference study, it
briefly considers the legal constraints, if any, on the kind of intergovernmentalism that the FAA practices and that other agencies may have an
interest in practicing.
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II.

THE

FAA's

REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR AIRWORTHINESS
CERTIFICATION

Aircraft safety regulation began in the United States in 1926 with passage of the Air Commerce Act.' That legislation was superseded in 1938
by the Civil Aeronautics Act' and in 1958 by the Federal Aviation Act.4
The latter represents the current legal framework for regulation of aircraft. The Federal Aviation Act, like its predecessors, is predicated on the
need for a safe civil aviation system-one that can enhance public safety
and at the same time promote the development of aviation through enhanced public confidence in the system. The Act directs the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to conduct "[t]he regulation of air commerce
in such manner as to best promote its development and safety."' To this
end, the FAA has created and maintained an Aircraft Certification Service
whose view and whose raison d'etre are that both aviation safety and public confidence in aviation safety presuppose safe aircraft.'
A.

Registration and Certification

The airworthiness regulation of individual aircraft is based upon two
closely related ideas: registration and certification. The Federal Aviation
Act requires that all aircraft operated in the United States be registered if
2. Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568, repealed by Federal Aviation Act of 1958, tit. XIV, §
1401(b), 72 Stat. 806.
3. Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 977, repealed by Federal Aviation Act of 1958, tit. XIV, §
1401(b), 72 Stat. 806.
4. Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1551
(1988)).
5. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1303(1) (1988). The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, amending the Federal Aviation Act § 102 (a)(2), declared that deregulation should result in no diminution of air safety
standards. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1307 (1988).
The Supreme Court, in the context of holding that the FAA is shielded by the Federal Tort Claims
Act's "discretionary function" exemption from tort liability for alleged negligence in certificating commercial aircraft, emphasized that the agency "has a statutory duty to promote safety in air transportation, not to insure it." United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 821 (1984).
6. Opening Remarks of M. Craig Beard, Director, Aircraft Certification Service, Federal Aviation Administration, at the 1989 Annual Conference of the ABA Forum on Air and Space Law (June
6, 1989) [hereinafter Beard Remarks].
According to the FAA's regulatory handbook, aviation safety is the principal objective of the
agency's regulatory activity. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., FAA ORDER 2100, FAA REGULATORY HANDBOOK § 1-2 (1990) [hereinafter FAA REGULATORY HANDBOOK]. On the other hand, the FAA asserts
that "the public interest is not served if standards and regulations go beyond the needs of safety,
efficient use of the airspace, national defense, and the general public interest." Id. § 1-4b.
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eligible for registration.7 The obligation to register falls upon the aircraft's
owner.8 Aircraft eligible for registration include those that are both (A)
owned by an American citizen, permanent resident alien, or (if the aircraft is based and primarily used here) by a corporation doing business
under the laws of the United States or any state, and (B) not registered
under the laws of a foreign country. Thus, if an aircraft is registered
abroad, it does not need to be registered in the United States, nor may it
be. Within limits, then, owners of aircraft may have a choice from among
several jurisdictions in which to register the aircraft. In making that
choice, owners usually prefer the country where they reside or conduct
their business."0 As for the United States as place of registry, the Federal
Aviation Act positively requires the Secretary of Transportation to issue a
certificate of registration to the owner of any aircraft eligible for American
registration who requests it. 11
As a practical matter, aircraft registration as such has limited significance. Registration basically confers upon an aircraft a kind of nationality
and serves as conclusive evidence of that nationality. It also gives the aircraft a unique identification number, much as automobile registration specifically identifies a motor vehicle. On the other hand, American law expressly provides that registration is not evidence of ownership of an
aircraft in any proceeding in which that matter might be in issue. 12

Aircraft registration derives its importance chiefly from the certification
process to which it is linked. The Federal Aviation Act requires that any
civil aircraft registered in the United States have a valid airworthiness
certificate before it may lawfully be operated." The aircraft also must
conform to the terms of that certificate. 14 Accordingly, certification rather
7. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1401(a) (1988).
8. id.
9. Id. app. § 1401(b).
10. Id.
11. Id. app. § 1401(c).
12. Id. app. § 1401(0.
13. Id. app. § 1430(a)(1).
14. Id. The section makes it unlawful "[f]or any person io operate in air commerce any civil
aircraft for which there is not currently in effect an airworthiness certificate, or in violation of the
terms of any such certificate." Id. Parallel provisions require certification (and compliance with certification terms) of airmen, id. § 1430(a)(2)-(3), operating air carriers, id. § 1430(a)(4), aircraft producers, id. § 1430(a)(7), and airport operators, id. § 1430(a)(8).
In addition, when a non U.S.-registered aircraft is to be operated in the U.S. under lease or charter
by a U.S.-certificated air carrier, the aircraft will require an FAA airworthiness certificate. FED.
AVIATION ADMIN., FAA ADVISORY CIRCULAR No. AC 21-23, at 21 (1987) [hereinafter FAA ADVISORY CIRCULAR No. AC 21-23].
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than registration most directly serves the government's interest in aviation
safety.
Although certification is the procedure by' which the FAA determines
the safety of individual aircraft, certification itself actually occurs rather
late in the regulatory process. In order for an aircraft to receive an airworthiness certificate, it first must be shown to conform to an aircraft type
15
design that has been certified by the Federal Aviation Administration.
The FAA also issues certificates of approval for aircraft production quality control systems, though these (unlike type design certificates) are not,
strictly speaking, prerequisites to the issuance of airworthiness certificates."' All three kinds of certificates-design, production and airworthiness-are expressly contemplated in the Federal Aviation Act. 7 In point
of fact, the FAA regulates the design and manufacture not only of complete aircraft, but also of certain aircraft appliances and component parts
which it considers eligible for separate certification."8 Aircraft and aircraft
components are referred to collectively for these purposes as "civil aeronautical products. '"1 9 In addition, the FAA separately licenses pilots, aircraft mechanics, repair stations, and the like.20
B.

Airworthiness Regulations

If airworthiness certification takes place against the backdrop of prior
design and production certification, the latter two kinds of certification in
turn proceed on the basis of previously adopted FAA design and production regulations. Put differently, the FAA ensures the airworthiness of
U.S.-registered aircraft first by adopting safety regulations on aircraft design and production, then by certifying particular designs and production
quality control methods as in compliance with those regulations, and finally by certifying that individual aircraft conform to a certified design
and certified production process. The basic standards are found in Title
14 of the Code of Federal Regulations in the form of Federal Aviation
Regulations (FARs), organized by various categories of aircraft design in
FARs 21 through 35.2" The regulations governing design and production,
15. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1423(c).
16. Id. app. § 1423(b).
17. Id. app. § 1423(a)-(c).
18. Id. app. § 1423(a)(1) ("The Secretary of Transportation is empowered to issue type certifi...); id. § 1403.
cates for aircraft, aircraft engines, and propellers.
19. A civil aeronautical product is defined as "any civil aircraft, or aircraft engine, propeller,
appliance, material, part, or component to be installed thereon." FAA ADVISORY CIRCULAR No. AC
21-23, supra note 14, at ii.
20. 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1422, 1427.
21. 14 C.F.R. pts. 21-35 (1992).
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like airworthiness standards themselves, are generally the products of
traditional administrative rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure
Act.22 On the other hand, the airworthiness certification of civil aeronautical products is a species of individual administrative decisionmaking. Part
III of this Article more fully presents the regulatory process just described,
but from the regulated industry's point of view.
C.

Compliance and Enforcement

Naturally, the FAA's involvement in air safety issues does not end with
initial airworthiness certification of an aircraft or component. The agency
has established programs to monitor the safety performance of aircraft in
service and to direct corrective actions on the part of manufacturers, owners and operators if unsafe situations are later deemed to arise.2" Regulations known as Airworthiness Directives (ADs) may be issued to require
design modifications, special inspections or special operating procedures,
or to define new operational limitations for aircraft.
The FAA also has need of a mechanism for dealing with eventual
noncomplicance with civil aviation standards on any of the matters covered by the FAA certification procedures, that is to say, for enforcement.
If noncompliance is detected prior to the issuance of the relevant certificate, then the result will be denial of the certificate. Failure to comply
with the terms of a certificate once issued, on the other hand, may result
in a range of administrative sanctions, including revocation of the relevant
certificate. 2 4 Internal FAA guidelines seek to channel the agency's discretion in determining the appropriate sanction for any such violation.25
The FAA enforcement program applies equally to all activities regulated by the agency. When violations occur-whether involving the production or maintenance of aircraft (the subject matter of the certification
upon which this Article focuses) or the operation of airports or of aircraft-enforcement action may be indicated. 8 Internal FAA guidelines
describe the processes of surveillance, investigation, reporting and referral
of matters for appropriate enforcement action.2 7 These activities are un22. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1988 & Supp. 11 (1991). The Act gives the Secretary of
Transportation authority to promulgate minimum airworthiness standards for aircraft and component
parts. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1421(a) (1988).
23. Id. § 1429(a).
24. Id. app. § 1429.
25. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., FAA ORDER 2150.3A, COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT
PROGRAM 1 (1988) [hereinafter COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM].
26. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1429.
27. See generally COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM, supra note 25.
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derstandably directed primarily at manufacturers so far as the production
of aircraft is concerned and at air carriers with respect to aircraft maintenance. Actions on other matters will be directed toward certificated maintenance personnel, certificated maintenance facilities (known as "repair
stations") and even aircraft operators if they operate an aircraft in noncompliance with an airworthiness directive. Details of the FAA's compliance and enforcement program lie outside the scope of this study and will
not be examined further in the sections that follow. Suffice it to say that
an airworthiness inspector who finds an aircraft not to be in condition for
safe operation must promptly notify the aircraft owner or operator and
report to the agency. The subsequent factual investigation yields a violation report. The same would be true, for example, of allegations that an
aircraft manufacturer failed to maintain a quality control system during
aircraft production. FAA guidelines urge both careful adherence to regulations and attention to mitigating or otherwise unusual circumstances
("firmness" and "fairness"). 2" However, air carriers appear, in keeping
with section 601(b) of the Federal Aviation Act, to be held to an especially
high standard, namely " 'to perform their services with the highest possible degree of safety in the public interest.' "29
Enforcement, with a view to promoting compliance with the established
safety standards, is achieved through both informal administrative action
(warning letters or letters of correction) and formal legal action. Statutory
methods for the latter include amendment, suspension and revocation of
certificates,3 0 civil and criminal penalties,"' and aircraft seizures,3" supported by judicially enforceable orders, including cease and desist orders
and. injunctions. 3 Considerable emphasis is placed by the FAA on guidelines for choosing between administrative and legal enforcement action,3
and, within the latter, for the use of discretion in setting sanctions.3 5 The
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 14.
Id. at 16 (quoting 49 U.S.C. app. § 1421(b) (1988)).
49 U.S.C. app. § 1429.
Id. §§ 1471-1472.

32. Id. § 1472(b)(3).
33. Id. § 1487.
34. Administrative action may be favored when no significantly unsafe condition exists, no incompetence is demonstrated, the violation isnot deliberate, and the violator's history and attitude are
positive. COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM, supra note 25, at 17.
35. See id. at 22-23. For example: 1) sanctions are not initially proposed with a view to downward negotiation; 2) all mitigating circumstances are considered at the outset; 3) all significant enforcement actions should be coordinated with the Office of Chief Counsel to ensure consistency; 4)
record-keeping or "paper" violations are considered serious and any falsification of records will incur
the most severe sanctions; 5) voluntary reporting of violations is marginally rewarded; 6) the compli-

ance history of the offender is considered; 7) financial circumstances do not constitute an excuse or
[Vol. 24
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FAA states as a matter of principle that a legal sanction should be selected
in each case that is sufficient to punish the particular violation and to
serve as a deterrent and example to others.3 6
Significantly, guidelines suggest that certificate action (amendment, suspension or revocation) should be the FAA's primary enforcement tool, but
that civil penalty action may be preferred when disruption of service will
have a substantial adverse impact on the public not outweighed by safety
considerations."7 An Assistant Chief Counsel is responsible for deciding
whether to seek suspension or revocation of an aircraft registration certicate for any reason rendering the aircraft ineligible for registration. 8 Any
decision to initiate certificate action triggers the adjudicatory-style provisions of the Federal Aviation Act, initially a notice of proposed certificate
action, followed by an opportunity to answer and be heard, 9 possibly including an informal conference and a reevaluation of the case. Any person
whose certificate is impaired by an order issued by the FAA may appeal
to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) which, after notice
and hearing, may modify or reverse the FAA order if it finds that safety
in air commerce or air transportation and the public interest do not require affirmation of the order.4 When an order is appealed to the NTSB,
the legal office that issued the order will represent the FAA at an evidentiary hearing before an NTSB administrative law judge.' Either party
may appeal from the ALJ's initial decision to the full Board, whose review is limited to considering whether the decision is based on erroneous
findings of material facts, a departure from law or NTSB policy, an abuse
of discretion, or a prejudicial procedural error."2 Within sixty days after
the Board issues its final decision and order, the certificate holder may
petition the Court of Appeals for judicial review."3 Where enforcement
ground for mitigation; 8) the FAA's failure to discover violations over a long period is no excuse,
though enforcement action may be inappropriate where the FAA affirmatively misled a carrier about
compliance issues. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 18.
38. Id. at 35.
39. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1429. The notice sets out the facts alleged, the regulations in issue and the
action proposed; it also advises the respondent of the several alternative responses available, including
voluntary surrender of the certificate. Id.
40. Id.
41. Procedures before the NTSB are contained in the NTSB Rules of Practice in Air Safety
Proceedings, 49 C.F.R. pt. 821 (1992).
42. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1429(a); see also COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM, supra note
25, at 142-44.

43. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1486(a). In the case of NTSB decisions adverse to the FAA, the agency has
no right of appeal. Id. at 1486.
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action other than certificate action is taken (for example, civil penalties,
aircraft seizures, cease and desist and other orders, injunctions, or criminal prosecution), substantially different procedures obtain.""
D.

Aircraft and Airport Operations

The FAA naturally also has safety considerations to bear in mind that
have more to do with the operation of aircraft in American airspace than
with the certification of aircraft and their component parts. The territoriality-based system of airworthiness certification makes it entirely likely
that an aircraft will enter the space of a jurisdiction in which neither its
generic design, nor its production, nor its individual airworthiness has
been certified. For the most part, the nations of the world do not formally
require that a craft conform to the national standards of design, production or airworthiness of every jurisdiction where the craft flies. However,
the Chicago Convention of 1944, and the international standards and
practices administered by the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) created under that convention, seek to assure that aircraft registered in one signatory country meets certain minimum safety standards
when operating in the airspace of another signatory country."5
Every country also has an evident interest in seeing to it that craft flying in its airspace or landing or taking off at its airports be compatible
with the local air control system. Throughout the world, we accordingly
find operating rules designed to bring international aviation into line with
existing national air controls. The FAA's operating rules are found at 14
C.F.R. Parts 71 through 109. It is plainly essential that all craft used in
international aviation meet design standards that will enable them to satisfy the operating conditions imposed by every state in which they may
expect to venture. These operating rules apply more broadly than might
be expected. For example, FAA regulations require that these rules be
followed not only by foreign-registered craft entering the United States
but also by American-registered craft wherever they may happen to
operate.
Although the FAA's safety agenda thus transcends issues of certification
of design, production and individual aircraft, it is these issues that are the
focus of the present Article.
44. See

RICHARD FALLON, ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S. REPORT: IMPOSING CIVIL MONEY

[PENALTIES] FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE FEDERAL AVIATION REGULATIONS: IMPLEMENTING A FAIR
AND EFFECTIVE SYSTEM (1990).

45. INT'L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., MEMORANDUM ON ICAO 11 (1981) [hereinafter MEMORANDUM ON ICAO] (on file with Law & Policy in International Business).
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III.

THE

FAA's

AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICATION PROCESS AND THE
AERONAUTICAL INDUSTRY

The preceding section of this Article demonstrates how, under the
American regulatory scheme, the registration of individual aircraft is
linked to the prior processes of certifying aircraft design and aircraft production quality control methods. The importance of these processes can be
particularly well gauged by examining regulatory realities from the aeronautical industry's point of view.
A.

Aircraft Design Certification

An aircraft manufacturer ordinarily will seek design certification, in the
form of a "type certificate," for every model of aircraft it places on the
market. As indicated earlier, design certification is required not only for
aircraft as such, but for component parts such as aircraft engines, propellers and appliances as well.4 6 Fresh approval is also required for any major modification of a type-certificated design. 47 More specifically, the Federal Aviation Act invites any interested person-normally a
manufacturer-to apply to the Secretary of Transportation for the typecertification of an aircraft or component part."' The FAA then conducts
an investigation and, in rare instances, holds hearings.49 It is also authorized by statute to require that the applicant conduct certain physical and
performance tests to show that the product design meets FAA standards as
set out in the agency's published design regulations and is otherwise
safe. 50 If satisfied in all respects, the FAA issues the design certificate.5"
Such certificates may be of limited duration and may contain specific
46. While "type certificates" are issued for the design approval of aircraft, aircraft engines and
propellers, 14 C.F.R. § 21.11-53 (1992), design approval of appliances and articles of equipment to
be manufactured outside of the United States take the form of "letter[s] of TSO design approval" to
signify that they meet the performance standards of an FAA technical standard order, id. § 21.617(a).
47. In such cases, either a "supplemental type certificate" will be issued, or the existing certificate will be appropriately amended. See generally 14 CFR §§ 21.111-199 (1992).
48. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1423(a)(2) (1988).
49. Id.
50. The FAA regulations containing design requirements are set out in Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) 23 through 35, 14 C.F.R. pts. 23-35 (various products), and 21, 36, and 91, id. pts. 21,
36, 91 (noise standards), as well as Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 41, id. pt. 21 (certain small airplanes). The FAA also has promulgated a series of Technical Standard Orders (TSO)
for certain component parts. See id. § 21.601 (1992).
51. The FAA must find "that such aircraft, aircraft engine, propeller, or appliance is of proper
design, material specification, construction, and performance for safe operation, and [that the design)
meets the minimum standards, rules and regulations prescribed." 49 U.S.C. app. § 1423(a)(2).
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terms and conditions. 2 The fact that the FAA has issued a type certificate
or other form of design approval does not relieve the certificate holder of
principal responsibility for non-compliance with FAA airworthiness standards or for unsafe design features. 3
The simplest situation is one in which an American manufacturer of
aeronautical products seeks certification by the FAA of one of its designs.
In this situation, the manufacturer files directly with the FAA an application for design approval. 54 These regulations provide for the FAA or its
designees to conduct the technical inspections and evaluations required for
certification. The FAA aircraft certification staff involved in the certification process consists of engineers, flight test pilots, and aviation safety
inspectors. 5
However, a manufacturer typically requests certification of its designs
not only-perhaps not even-in the country of its nationality or the place
of manufacture, but in those jurisdictions where it foresees that the ultimate purchasers of its products may seek to register them. This results
from the fact already mentioned that the airworthiness certification of individual aircraft within any given country depends upon the aircraft's
conformity to a design type that has previously been certified within that
same country. More specifically, an FAA type design approval for a product assembled abroad is a prerequisite to the import of the product for
eventual registration in the United States, to its operation here under lease
or charter by a U.S.-certificated air carrier or operator, or to its installation on an aircraft carrying an American airworthiness certificate." In
fact, the FAA does not normally grant type design approvals for foreignmanufactured products unless intended for placement on the U.S. registry,
7
or for operation by a U.S. operator under lease or charter.
In the United States, as in many other countries, the procedures for
issuance of type certificates are somewhat different for foreign-manufactured imports than for domestic products. As a later section of this Article
explains, the FAA's findings of compliance for imported products may be
based primarily on the inspections and evaluations performed by the
agency's counterpart in the exporting country." The FAA's type certifica52. Id.
53. United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S.
797, 815-16 (1984).
54. The procedures for issuance of type certificates to U.S. manufacturers are set out in Federal
Aviation Regulation 21.21, 14 C.F.R. § 21.21 (1992).
55. See S.A. Empresa, 467 U.S. at 807.
56. 14 C.F.R. § 21.183(c).
57. FAA ADVISORY CIRCULAR No. AC 21-23, supra note 14, at 21.
58. Id. at 22.
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tion' procedures for imported goods are set out in Federal Aviation Regulation 21.29.59
Just as the airworthiness of individual aircraft is dependent on their
continuing conformity with approved design and production standards, so
these standards too are subject to ongoing monitoring.6" The FAA's review of the safety performance of approved aircraft designs and of the
quality of approved production and maintenance systems may lead it to
require that specified changes be made in order for them to retain their
certification.
B.

Aircraft Production Certification

This kind of certification is closely linked to the design certification just
discussed. According to the Federal Aviation Act, a production certificate
is to be issued upon a manufacturer's showing that multiple articles or
"duplicates" of an aircraft or aircraft component covered by a design certificate will conform to that certificate. 61 Thus, a production certificate is
granted upon demonstration of a quality control system offering reasonable assurances that the aircraft actually produced will conform to the basic
design for which a type certificate has been issued or that has otherwise
been approved, and that it will be in a condition for safe operation. The
FAA is authorized to make or require such tests or inspections as may be
necessary to satisfy this standard, and may impose a time limit and other
conditions on any production certificate issued.62 A type certificate or
other form of FAA design approval must have been issued before a production certificate can be issued; however, a production certificate is not
itself a prerequisite for issuance of an airworthiness certificate for the aircraft produced." It simply facilitates the process by which the latter certification may be achieved and is accordingly advantageous to the aircraft
manufacturer and owner alike.
Unlike FAA design certification, which may be sought by any manufacturer, domestic or foreign, who anticipates registration of aircraft of that
design within the United States, FAA production certificates are available
exclusively to American aircraft manufacturers. 64 Products imported to
59. 14 C.F.R. § 21.29 (1992).
60. Id. § 21.99.
61. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1423(b) (1988).
62. Id.; see Federal Aviation Regulation 21, subpts. F, G, 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.121-.165 (1992).
The FAA's emphasis on the quality of the production process is to be contrasted with certain other
countries' emphasis on the substantiality of the manufacturer's organization.
63. 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.133, .173.
64. Id. § 21.137.
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the United States for FAA airworthiness certification or approval must be
accompanied by an export certificate of airworthiness issued by the aircraft certification authority of the country of manufacture.65 The export
certificate attests to the aircraft's conformity.to the FAA certificated design
and to its being in a condition for safe operation.6 6 Thus, the purpose that
would otherwise be served by issuance of an FAA production certificate is
served through another procedure.
C.

Airworthiness Certification

As previously stated, FAA airworthiness certification is required of any
aircraft registered in the United States.6" An airworthiness certificate attests to the conformity of each aircraft with the specifications of an FAAapproved aircraft design and to its being in condition for safe operation.68
Thus, issuance of a design certificate is an absolute prerequisite to the
issuance of an airworthiness certificate (as well as to approval of products
for installation on U.S.-registered aircraft). Airworthiness certificates, like
the other kinds of certificates, may be issued for a limited duration and
subject to specific terms and conditions.69 Specifically, it is an FAA requirement, and a requirement of most other countries, that aircraft subject
to regulation not only meet the relevant standards initially, but also continue to do so. 7" Thus, aircraft must remain in conformity with an FAAcertified design and be maintained in a safe condition. The FAA accordingly also certifies replacement parts, maintenance personnel, and repair
stations. 1
It frequently happens that the owner of a registered aircraft wants to
modify the aircraft in a way that will place it out of conformity with the
then-approved design specifications. Accordingly, a significant civil aircraft modification industry has developed in the United States. The FAA
has established procedures to certificate design modifications and to help
assure that aircraft so modified conform to the approved design change.7
Although the FAA is required by law to make the findings necessary
for the approval of a design and for the airworthiness certification of U.S.registered aircraft, it does have latitude in deciding how such findings are
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. § 21.183(c).
Id.
49 U.S.C. app. § 1430(a)(1) (1988).
Id. § 1423(c).
Id.
The requirement for the United States is found at 14 C.F.R. § 21.181(a)(1) (1992).
14 C.F.R. § 21.500.
Id. §§ 21.95, .97, .99.
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to be made. 3 This means some freedom of choice not only over the kind
of evidence to be accepted, but also over the extent to which the FAA itself
must exercise independent technical judgment. This latitude has allowed
the FAA to enter into cooperative arrangements with selected countries for
dealing with the certification of designs or products previously certificated
overseas or otherwise imported from abroad. This network of country-tocountry agreements is described in section VC of this Article.

IV.

THE CASE FOR INTERNATIONALIZING AIRWORTHINESS AND
RELATED STANDARDS

There are over thirty countries in addition to the United States having
a significant aeronautical product manufacturing industry, each with a
civil aviation authority regulating such manufacture and operating under
that country's laws. Even the briefest account of the FAA's certification
activities demonstrates the practical necessity of harmonizing the design,
production, and airworthiness standards found among these various countries, as well as the operating rules that govern air traffic within them.
The factual interdependence characterizing aviation regulation in today's
world surfaces at every stage of the FAA's certification activities.
A.

Industry Incentives

The import and export of aviation products is an important feature of
the multibillion dollar American aeronautical industry. Unless airworthiness standards are reasonably similar around the world, aircraft manufacturers cannot effectively engage in that manufacture on an international
basis. As already noted, the entitlement of an individual craft to airworthiness certification essentially turns on the craft's conformity with an approved aircraft design, which in turn must satisfy applicable airworthiness
regulations. 4 Since aeronautical products will eventually have to earn individual airworthiness certification in all countries where their own operators contemplate registering them, manufacturers must be cognizant of
airworthiness and design standards in every country in which they see,
directly or indirectly, a market. Unless a design offers reasonable confidence in that respect, it is unlikely to prove very attractive on the international market for aircraft. This is true no less for trade in component
aeronautical parts than for trade in completed aircraft.
A factor further dramatically favoring the internationalization of airworthiness standards is the growing international character of aircraft
73. See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1421(a)(3).
74. 14 C.F.R. § 21.183(c) (1988).
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manufacture itself. Major European aircraft and engines are today being
manufactured internationally. Components of virtually every U.S.-assembled aircraft and aircraft engine are being designed and manufactured all
over the world. Likewise, the European Concorde (SST) is a product of
France and the United Kingdom; the Fokker F28/100 a product of the
Netherlands, Germany, the United Kingdom, and France; the Airbus 300,
310, and 320 a product of France, the United Kingdom, Germany,
Belgium, and Spain; the ATR 42/72 a product of France and Italy; and
the SAAB 340 a product of the United Kingdom and Sweden. Additionally, parts and equipment for these planes come from Greece, Ireland,
Portugal, Austria, Switzerland, Denmark, Finland, and Norway, not to
mention non-European sources.
Among the prime movants in the early 1970s of a system of European
Joint Aviation Authorities-discussed more fully later in this Article-was AECMA, the European aeronautical manufacturers association.
AECMA's purpose was to stem the proliferation of European airworthiness codes, the emergence of needless national variants, and the growth of
discrepancies in the interpretation and implementation even of those provisions in common. In existence at the time were a set of British standards, a French code similar to the FAA's, a German translation of the
American standards, and a host of national variations in the other European countries. Quite apart from their inefficiencies in a global setting,
regulatory discrepancies raise a prospect of unequal treatment of like
products, and therefore a risk of disguised protectionism. From the European point of view, the case for internationalizing airworthiness standards
has only been strengthened by the emergence of a very significant European aeronautical manufacturing industry over the last fifteen years. Increasingly, it is the European manufacturer of aeronautical products
whose research, development and marketing paths are being cleared by
the prospect of harmonized airworthiness standards.
Aircraft operators represent another segment of industry that has encouraged heightened international cooperation on the FAA's part in the
airworthiness field. Operators plainly derive an interest in orderly airworthiness regulation from their obligation to register and maintain to standards the craft they operate. In addition, U.S.-manufactured and U.S.registered aircraft are with some frequency being leased to foreign carriers
or operators for use outside the United States." The latter need to keep
such aircraft in conformity both with FAA- and foreign-approved designs.
Moreover, American operators are permitted to operate foreign-registered
75.

FED. AVIATION

ADMIN.,

AERONAUTICAL PRODUCTS,

EXPORT/IMPORT AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICATION OF CIVIL

FAA-P-8110-1 28 (1987) [hereinafter FAA

EXPORT/IMPORT].
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aircraft provided those aircraft likewise conform to an FAA-approved design. These and other industry developments favor an approximation of
national airworthiness requirements and suggest an opening of regulatory
channels with foreign airworthiness authorities. 6
B.

Foreign Government Incentives

The harmonization of airworthiness standards stands to bring related
advantages to the different national regulatory bodies affected. The nations that initially formed the European Joint Aviation Authorities did so
in part in order to overcome difficulties encountered in certificating aircraft that had been manufactured (and possibly also certificated) in countries having somewhat different airworthiness standards. The European
regulators plainly and simply sought to facilitate the import and export of
aviation products, as well as the certification of joint aviation products.
A similar logic suggested harmonization on a wider scale, including and
especially with the United States. The international aviation industry was
traditionally centered in this country, and it made little sense to the
Europeans (except from a short-sighted protectionist point of view) to
maintain airworthiness standards that impeded the flow of Americanmade aircraft to European users or of American-made aeronautical parts
for use in European products.
The European authorities were also in search of a comprehensive set of
airworthiness standards. Given the variation among European standards
then in place, coupled with the powerful influence over them of the existing American standards, the latter exerted a particular appeal. On the
other hand, the pace of technological change in the aviation field (plus a
measure of national pride) made it unthinkable that the Europeans would
simply adopt the FAA's accumulation of regulations and in effect "freeze"
the Federal Aviation Regulations as they then stood. Collaboration of a
more flexible and ongoing nature was indicated. Although civil aviation is
probably not unique in this respect, it is a field marked by technological
complexity and rapid development. Among the attractions of the Joint
Aviation Authorities to the separate European governments was the difficulty each had been experiencing, and expected to continue experiencing,
in maintaining regulatory competence in all fields. Collaboration with the
United States authorities offered similar promise not only on account of
their accumulated regulatory and technical experience, but also the continuing expertise they could be expected to bring to the solution of newly
emerging problems.
76. Id. at 24-29.
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C.

American Government Incentives

Faced with the realities of a more diversified aeronautical manufacturing environment, American regulatory authorities have come rather
quickly to share their European counterparts' enthusiasm for the harmonization of standards. To begin with, harmonization increases the ease
with which American-made products will be welcome for certification and
eventual registration abroad. But it is also simply no longer the case, if
ever it was, that the FAA can concern itself solely with the conformity of
American aviation technology to the needs of air safety. With non-American craft, non-American component parts, and joint aeronautical products
assuming an ever larger share of the international market, the FAA needs
to be equipped to make airworthiness judgments about designs or products
with which it may not be initially familiar and that were conceived
against the background of different foreign country airworthiness
standards.
I have previously adverted to the government's perceived economic advantage in addressing technological problems jointly with foreign governments. A good example of concerted action of this sort was the convening,
at the FAA's invitation, of an international conference on aging aircraft in
the aftermath of the 1985 JAL 747 air disaster and the 1988 Aloha accident. The conference, attended by the regulatory authorities and representatives of manufacturers and operators in twenty countries, led to the
creation of an International Airworthiness Assurance Task Force on Aging Aircraft and resulting research and development on aircraft fatigue,
corrosion, repair and maintenance, and flight loads.
Thus far, the discussion of industry and government incentives has fo• cused exclusively on the virtues of a harmonized regulatory environment.
As any student of the contemporary administrative process knows, however, rulemaking as such constitutes a small part of that process. The design, production, and airworthiness standards with which this study is
concerned also require implementation. They need to be applied with respect to particular type designs, particular production processes, and individual craft. The implementation stage of the administrative process opens
up large opportunities for collaboration among national airworthiness authorities and corresponding government savings. These opportunities,
which obviously present risks as well as promise, are best illustrated by
the workings of the many bilateral airworthiness agreements to which the
United States is a party. As the discussion in Part VC of this Article
shows, the mutual recognition of airworthiness certification contemplated
by the bilateral agreements depends in turn, as a practical matter, on a
certain level of commonality among national regulatory standards. Thus,
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the prospect of mutual cooperation in the airworthiness enforcement process has served as yet an additional impetus to regulatory harmonization.
V.

THE EXISTING INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK OF AVIATION
REGULATION

The forms of international regulatory cooperation engaged in by the
FAA are not taking place in an historical vacuum. Over the years, the
traditional territoriality-based system of aviation regulation has at various
points taken on a distinct international dimension. Although aviation regulation remains a nationally organized activity, the realities of economic
and regulatory interdependence have given certain aspects of international
cooperation an ever-increasing importance in that regulatory domain."
Even the Federal Aviation Act expressly recognizes that international
agreements will figure prominently in American aviation regulation."8
A.

The Chicago Convention: The International Civil Aviation
Organization

The Convention on International Civil Aviation7 9 (or the Chicago Convention), which dates from 1944 and now counts over 150 signatory
states,8 0 represents an undertaking by those states to adopt and enforce a
common minimum set of international standards for aircraft, air traffic
controller, and pilot certification. The Convention resulted from a conference on international civil aviation held in Chicago toward the end of
World War II, by which time the need for orderly development of civil
aviation had become apparent.8 1 The Convention's basic idea is that each
state party undertakes not to reexamine the soundness of aircraft or pilots
77. At the time drafting of the Convention on International Civil Aviation began in 1944, most
air routes were confined within national boundaries. INT'L CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION, THE
CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION: THE FIRST THIRTY-FIVE YEARS

3 (1979)

on

file with Law and Policy in International Business [hereinafter THE FIRST THIRTY-FIVE YEARS].

"International routes, where they existed, consisted mostly of short trans-border hops." Id.
78. See Federal Aviation Act § 1102, which requires that the Administrator exercise his authority "consistently with any obligation assumed by the United States in any...agreement that may be
in force between the United States and any ... [other] countries, and shall take into consideration any
applicable laws and requirements of ... [other] countries." 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502.
79. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295
[hereinafter Chicago Convention]. Although the Convention accepts the principle that every state has
complete sovereignty over its airspace, id. art. 1, it provides for the adoption of international standards
and practices of air navigation, id. art. 37. Each state agrees to help secure the highest practicable
degree of uniformity in regulations and procedures. Id.
80. MEMORANDUM ON ICAO, supra note 45, at 5 (1981).

81. Id.at 5-6.
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entering its airspace when the craft or pilots, as the case may be, are
already certified by the authorities of another Convention state as meeting
the ICAO standards. The agreement to extend such "full faith and credit"
to foreign country certification naturally depends on the existence of a
common international minimum standard for aircraft, air traffic controllers and pilots, as well as uniform visual and instrument flight rules.8 2 It
is through its various annexes (particularly Annex 8 on "Aircraft Design
and Quality Control") that the Convention establishes these minimum
standards in the form of International Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs). The development and improvement of standards is entrusted under the Convention to the Montreal-based International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO). Altogether, ICAO has adopted seventeen
annexes covering a wide spectrum of aviation specifications. Each state
party to the organization is entitled to representation at meetings of the
ICAO Assembly, which take place at least once every three years. The
Assembly makes its decisions by majority vote, 8 but most of ICAO's work
is accomplished through its thirty-member Council, assisted by a standing
committee of experts known as the Commission 84 and by various technical
panels.85 The American delegate to ICAO enjoys ambassadorial rank.
The ICAO mechanism also presupposes that the participating states
will in fact establish and enforce regulations that satisfy ICAO standards.
ICAO standards are not self-executing and each state is charged with implementing them.8 6 Article 38 of the Convention requires that a state notify ICAO if it finds it impracticable to comply with an ICAO standard
and indicate the respect in which national standards fall short.8" Although
the FAA generally has no problem in satisfying ICAO standards-and
considers it official policy to satisfy them 8 -it contemplates a number of
situations in which noncompliance might occur. These circumstances are
unfortunately very broadly conceived. 89 On the other hand, the FAA has
82. See id. arts. 33, 37 (discussing the development of international airworthiness standards).
83. Id. art. 48(c).
84. Id. art. 56. The Commission is also comprised of representatives of aircraft manufacturers
and of the leading manufacturing states. See MEMORANDUM ON ICAO, supra note 45, at 15-17.
85. Id. Specifications proposed for adoption as SARPs, and normally incorporated in Convention
annexes, are developed by the Air Navigation Commission upon consultation with all contracting
states, and then submitted to the Council for approval by a two-thirds majority. Id. at 18. Following
their adoption and provided a majority of contracting states does not disapprove them, SARPS become
effective at dates set by the Council. Id.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Chicago Convention, supra note 79, art. 1.
Id. art. 38.
FAA REGULATORY HANDBOOK, supra note 6, § 13-3.
Situations justifying noncompliance include the following:
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adopted practices designed to minimize the likelihood of noncompliance.9
In addition to developing the minimum airworthiness specifications embodied in Annex 8,91 ICAO has formulated detailed Procedures for Air
Navigation Services (PANS), which are considered too detailed to be appropriate for inclusion in the SARPs.92 Once approved by the ICAO
Council, they are simply recommended to contracting states for national
adoption.9" ICAO also produces an Airworthiness Technical Manual that
contains nonbinding guidance material designed to assist member states in
airworthiness
their own national
developing and improving
requirements.9 4
Under the Chicago Convention, the state of registry of an aircraft is
required to inform the state of manufacture when it initially enters on its
registry an aircraft of a type certified by the latter. This will enable the
state of manufacture to notify all states of registry of any information
about the aircraft's continuing airworthiness of which it becomes aware.
Conversely, the state of registry must bring all continuing airworthiness
information about a given aircraft type to the attention of the state of
manufacture so that the latter may transmit it to all other contracting
states known to have such aircraft on their registers.
In sum, the International Civil Aviation Organization has produced
more a framework for international cooperation in airworthiness than an
(1)Implementation would be detrimental to the national interest.
(2) Implementation cannot be effected without obtaining new or amended legislation.
(3) Necessary funds are not available.
(4) Implementation would work a substantial hardship on the various aviation activities
of the United States.

(5) Existing national practices provide a greater degree of safety.
(6) Implementation would conflict with the principles upon which United States requirements are established.

Id. § 13-3(a).
90. FAA offices are required to ensure that ICAO standards are consulted and presumably observed prior to issuing an NPRM or final rule. Such offices are further required, whenever advised of
a new or amended ICAO standard, to review FAA regulations, determine whether a difference exists
and, if so, either seek to amend the FAA standard or process a notice to ICAO of the difference.
Finally, these offices have a standing duty to review existing differences to determine whether it is
appropriate to rescind notices that are no longer apt, to initiate amendments to FAA standards to
produce compliance, to propose amendments to the relevant ICAO standards, or to maintain existing
differences. See id. § 13-4(a) to (c).
91. Chicago Convention, supra note 79.
92. MEMORANDUM ON ICAO, supra note 45, at 18.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 20-21.
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airworthiness code as such.9 5 Moreover, rather than establish a common
inspection system among the member states, it simply requires that each
state inspect locally-manufactured aircraft in accordance with a state-approved inspection system and ensure that such aircraft conform with the
corresponding approved design."
The ICAO framework must be counted a limited one from several
points of view. First, the organization lacks any inspection capability and
engages in no enforcement activity whatsoever. Its standards, though binding on the state parties to the Convention, appear, as a practical matter, to
be widely disregarded by many of those parties. In the second place, the
standards that emerge from the process of consensus-building through negotiation among 150 different states tend to represent a lowest common
denominator in airworthiness; the FAA in any event does not regard them
as adequate from an air safety point of view.9" Accordingly, the FAA is
not obligated to and does not accept export certificates of airworthiness for
the import of aeronautical products into the United States merely because
those products satisfy the criteria of Annex 8 or because the exporting
country is a Convention party.9" Consideration was at one time given to
establishing uniform rather than minimum standards under the Convention, but this was not done, partly because agreement could not be reached
as to whose national standards-those of the United States or the United
Kingdom- should form the basis for the Convention's standards. Finally,
the ICAO rules take the form of performance rather than design standards and therefore do not satisfy any given state's need for a comprehensive airworthiness code. All in all, from a procedural and a substantive
viewpoint alike, the ICAO mechanism continues to leave essential responsibility for airworthiness regulation in national hands.99
95. Thus, ICAO has developed a system of uniform aeronautical symbols and terms and recommends ways of facilitating the flow of air traffic, particularly along heavily travelled routes. It has
proposed ways of simplifying customs, immigration, public health and other procedures for passengers, crews, baggage, cargo and mail, and established minimum essential services and facilities at
international airports. Improved airport and aircraft security has been its latest concern.
96. THE FIRST THIRTY-FIVE YEARS, supra note 77, at 16.
97. See FAA EXPORT/IMPORT, supra note 75, at 10. The Convention's requirement of the

highest practical degree of uniformity in regulations does not necessarily facilitate adoption of the
highest standards.
98. Id.
99. It is recognized that ICAO Standards would not replace national regulations and that
national codes of airworthiness containing the full scope and extent of detail considered
necessary by individual States would be required as the basis for the certification of individual aircraft. Each State is free to develop its own comprehensive and detailed code of
airworthiness or to select a comprehensive and detailed code established by another Contracting State.
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American participation in ICAO raises the question of how national
representatives see to it that the positions they adopt at international regulatory gatherings reflect the views of other government agencies interested
in the outcome of such activity. Although the United States is represented
at Montreal by an official of the Federal Aviation Administration, international aviation necessarily interests other agencies as well. To this end,
there has been created an Interagency Group on International Aviation,
bringing together representatives of the Departments of Commerce, Labor, State and Transportation, and the Office of United States Trade
Representative."10

B.

GATT, the Standards Code, and the Trade Agreements
Act of 1979

National airworthiness standards are affected not only by the level of
agreement, albeit modest, reached through ICAO, but also by international agreements respecting nontariff trade barriers. The 1979 Tokyo
Round of multilateral trade negotiations under the auspices of GATT...
produced two related instruments of importance to the subject of airworthiness, namely the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft (the Aircraft
Agreement)... and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (the
Standards Code). 103 Article 3 of the Aircraft Agreement provides in effect
that the Standards Code shall apply to trade in civil aircraft, in particular
to "civil aircraft certification requirements and specifications on operating
and maintenance procedures."'" 4
The Standards Code has as its principal objective to ensure that national air transport safety measures are not employed and do not function
as disguised trade barriers.'0 5 To that end, the Code requires that national
supra note 77, at 16.
100. See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., FAA ADVISORY CIRCULAR No. AC 21-18, at 2 (1982) [hereinafter FAA ADVISORY CIRCULAR No. AC 21-181.
101. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts.
5-6, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT]. The current amended version of the GATT appears at 4
Vol. B.I.S.D. 1 (1969).
102. Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, done Apr. 19, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 619, 26 Supp.
B.I.S.D. 162 [hereinafter GATT Aircraft Agreement].
103. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (Relating to Product Standards), done Apr. 19,
1979, 31 U.S.T. 405, 26 Supp. B.I.S.D. 8 [hereinafter GATT Standards Code].
104. The GATT Aircraft Agreement defines civil aircraft as "all aircraft other than military
aircraft," including engines and other parts and components, "whether used as original or replacement equipment in the manufacture, repair, maintenance, rebuilding, modification or conversion of
civil aircraft." GATT Aircraft Agreement, supra note 102, arts. 1, 3.
105. GATT Standards Code, supra note 103, art. 2.1.
THE FIRST THIRTY-FIVE YEARS,
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certification authorities grant foreign manufacturers in signatory countries
(and hence foreign products) the same market access as they grant to domestic manufacturers.1 0 8 More specifically, those authorities are required
to accept test results, certificates or marks of conformity issued by the
country of export whenever they have reasonable assurance that the procedures were performed by competent bodies using appropriate methods.10 7 The Code further calls upon states to express their national standards whenever possible in terms of performance rather than design, to
develop their standards and certification systems in accordance with open
and public procedures, and to provide less developed countries technical
assistance in their own development of such systems.1 08 Like GATT violations generally, violations of the Standards Code are subject to established dispute resolution procedures. The Standards Code and Aircraft
Agreement are implemented in the United States by titles IV and VI of
the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, effective January 1, 1980,1"' and the
United States is represented in GATT-related procedures by the Office of
United States Trade Representative." 0
C.

BilateralAirworthiness Agreements

As indicated earlier, the International Civil Aviation Organization has
not undertaken to promulgate a uniform international airworthiness code,
though its minimum standards mechanism does enable pilots and aircraft
to cross national borders in the course of international aviation. ICAO
accordingly does not adequately assist manufacturers and others engaged,
in the international marketing of aeronautical products in facilitating the
registration and certification of such products by their prospective owners
and operators in different jurisdictions. Even before ICAO was established, or the Standards Code promulgated, the United States began entering into bilateral airworthiness agreements with selected countries, that is,
countries in whose standards and procedures we had particular confidence
and therefore to whose judgments about airworthiness we might be prepared to grant full faith and credit.
106. Id.
107. Id. art. 5.2.
108. Id. arts. 7, 11.
109. Trade Agreements Act of 1979, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2531-2533 (1988).
110. Id. § 2541.
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The United States entered into its first bilateral airworthiness agreement with Canada in 1929, in the form of an executive agreement."'
Twenty-six such government-to-government agreements have been concluded between the United States and countries deemed to have both a
competent aviation authority and aeronautical product manufacturing industry. " 2 The FAA has begun work with a number of additional countries (including China and the former Soviet Union) to broaden its number and range of bilateral airworthiness agreements."' The decision
whether to enter into a bilateral agreement with a given country-a decision made by the FAA in consultation with an interagency group on international aviation-depends upon a number of considerations. These include: (1) the quality of the foreign state's airworthiness laws and
regulations; (2) the technical competence and efficacy of the foreign aviation authority; (3) the design and manufacturing capabilities of the local
industry; and (4) the prospects for export of the country's aeronautical
products to the United States. " " No federal statute or regulation or international treaty requires such agreements. They have been entered into, at
the initiative of the United States or a foreign country, only as and when
the FAA determines that the other country has an aeronautical product
manufacturing industry of significance whose products may be exported to
the United States." 5 Bilateral agreements typically come into effect upon
the exchange of diplomatic notes, with a State Department official signing
for the United States." 6 They normally allow a contracting state that has
lost confidence in another country's airworthiness authority or standards,
in its discretion, to terminate its agreement with that country after a speci7
fied time following the giving of written notice."
Bilateral airworthiness agreements differ substantially in scope. The
more limited among them merely facilitate the other country's export of
111. See William J. Sullivan, Ass't Dir. Aircraft Certification Service, Fed. Aviation Admin.,
Address Concerning A Framework for the Development of Compatible Cabin Safety Standards (undated) (on file with Law and Policy in International Business).
112. FAA ADVISORY CIRCULAR No. AC 21-18, supra note 100, at i. These countries are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania,
Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
113. See SULLIVAN, supra note 111.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. A typical clause to this effect reads: "Either Contracting State may terminate (the) Agreement at the expiration of not less than 60 days after giving written notice of that intention to the other
State." This is understood to allow termination for any reason within the discretion of the country
invoking the right. FAA ADVISORY CIRCULAR No. AC 21-18, supra note 100, at 3.

1993]

LAW & POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS

component parts manufactured to previously FAA-approved designs,
while the more complete cover the import and export of an entire range of
aeronautical products." 8 Generally speaking, however, bilateral airworthiness agreements obligate the aviation authorities of each country to
treat as established the airworthiness of a civil aeronautical product imported from the other country (including those partially or wholly manufactured there) once the product is shown to have been certified by the
other country's competent authorities. Bilateral agreements commonly
read: "

.

.

. the importing State shall give the same validity to the certifi-

cation made by the competent aeronautical authority of the exporting
State as if the certification had been made by the importing country's own
competent aeronautical authority in accordance with its own applicable
laws, regulations, and requirements."" 9 Aviation authorities of the importing state thereby give the fullest credit possible to the airworthiness
functions performed by the exporting state under the latter's own domestic
certification system, thus avoiding the burdens and costs of essentially duplicative testing and certifying. On the other hand, even though two states
have entered into such an agreement, the airworthiness criteria and practices prevailing in the two states may not be identical. That is to say, the
importing state may impose additional or more stringent criteria than the
exporting state and may require that those criteria be met. Accordingly,
bilateral airworthiness agreements typically go on to provide:
The ... aeronautical authorities of the importing State shall have

the right to make acceptance of any certification by the aeronautical authorities of the exporting State dependent upon the product
meeting any additional requirements which the importing State
finds necessary to ensure that the product meets a level of safety
equivalent to that provided by the applicable laws, regulations and
requirements which would be effective for a similar product produced in the importing State. 20
The FAA emphasizes that these accords do not constitute trade agreements so much as agreements for technical cooperation. 2 ' This is demonstrated by the fact that the FAA treats an aircraft as "imported" for these
purposes only if it is intended to be placed on the U.S. registry, and other
118.
119.
U.K., 23
120.
121.

Id.
Agreement on Certificates of Airworthiness for Imported Aircraft, Dec. 28, 1972, U.S.U.S.T. 4309, 4310.
Id.
FAA ADVISORY CIRCOFAA ADVISORY CIRCULAR No. AC 21-23, supra note 14, at i-ii;

LAR No. AC 21-18, supra note 100, at 2.
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civil aeronautical products only if intended for installation on U.S.-registered aircraft. 2 On the other hand, the FAA considers bilateral airworthiness agreements essential for these purposes. It generally will not issue
approvals of imported civil aeronautical products for purposes of U.S. certification unless such an agreement is in effect with the exporting country.12 As a result, the United States has sought to enter into bilateral
agreements with all countries having an aeronautical manufacturing industry whose products are likely to be exported to the United States. The
situation is different so far as the export of American-manufactured civil
aeronautical products are concerned. These may be exported to and imported by countries having no bilateral airworthiness agreement with the
United States. 2 4
A freer mobility of aircraft and aircraft components is of obvious utility
to all parties in the international chain of aircraft manufacture and distribution, especially as aircraft and aircraft components are increasingly sold
for use in a jurisdiction other than that where they have been designed
and manufactured. Bilateral airworthiness agreements contribute to freer
mobility at each of the certification stages set out earlier in this Article:
acceptance of new aeronautical design technologies, conformity of aircraft
to previously accepted designs, and the assessment of production processes.
The subsections that follow show how industry and government savings
can flow from a national authority's reliance on technical investigations
that have been adequately performed by counterpart agencies abroad.
1. Design Certification Under Bilateral Airworthiness Agreements
Federal Aviation Regulation 21 provides that type certificates may be
issued under either the standard procedures of FAR 21.21 (for approval
of U.S.-manufactured products) under FAR 21.29 (for approval of imports to the United States).12 Under the standard procedures, the FAA
essentially conducts its own technical inspections and evaluations for purposes of establishing conformity with American airworthiness standards,
while under FAR 21.29, such findings may be based primarily on the
122. FAA ADVISORY CIRCULAR No. AC 21-23, supra note 14, at ii.

123. See 14 C.F.R. § 21.29(a) (1992). The FAA implements its bilateral airworthiness agreements through its export and import certification regulations under Federal Aviation Regulation 21.
See id. §§ 21.29, .183(c), .500, .502, .617.
124. Most European countries do not require bilateral airworthiness agreements for these
purposes.
125. 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.21, .29(a) (1992).
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inspections and evaluations, and ultimately the certifications, performed
by the civil authority of the exporting state.' 2
FAR 21.29 contemplates issuance by the FAA of a type certificate for a
product to be manufactured in a country with which the United States has
a bilateral airworthiness agreement and then imported into the United
States. 127 As a preliminary matter, an applicant must demonstrate that the
product for which design certification is sought is in fact destined for export to the United States and that the product falls within the scope of the
relevant bilateral airworthiness agreement."2 8 As to its merits, the application must include proof to the FAA of certification by the foreign authority that the product in question has been tested and meets FAA airworthiness standards.' 9 The application must contain all the required technical
data, with manuals, placards, listings, and instrument markings in the
English language. " ' Commonly the application will identify the foreign
country airworthiness standards upon which the foreign authority originally based its design approval, and will cite the American airworthiness
standards that are believed thereby also to be satisfied. It will normally
also identify any unusual design features that the applicant or the foreign
authority believes may necessitate issuance by the FAA of a special condition,'" an exemption, or an equivalent safety finding. It is ultimately for
the FAA, of course, to determine whether in fact the airworthiness standards and practices applied by the foreign authority correspond with
American certification requirements. "'
As a practical matter and in accordance with FAA preferences, the foreign aviation authority itself, rather than the foreign manufacturer, will
file the application for FAA design certification. In this event, the manufacturer submits the application and supporting materials to its own certification authority with a request that the whole be forwarded to the FAA
certification office responsible for the country in which the manufacturer
126. Id. § 21.29(a)(1).
127: Id. § 21.29(a).
128. Id.
129. Id. § 21.29(a)(1)(i)-(ii).
130. Id. § 21.29(a)(3).
131. A special condition needs to be issued if the FAA finds that its airworthiness standards do
not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for a product (or a product feature) because of a
novel design characteristic of that product or feature. The issuance of FAA special conditions is done
through the public rulemaking procedures set out in FAR 11 and is designed to yield such safety
criteria for a given product as the FAA finds necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that
established in the ordinarily applicable airworthiness standards. See id. §§ 21.16, .101.
In principle, FAA special conditions issued for imported products are the same as would be issued
for a similar product made in the United States.
132. FAA ADVISORY CIRCULAR No. AC 21-23, supra note 14, at 22.
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is located. For example, the application for an FAA type certificate for the
Airbus A 320 was officially filed by the French aviation agency (Direction
Gin~rale de I'Aviation Civile, or DGAC) on behalf of Airbus. In completing the application, DGAC certified that the design satisfied French
airworthiness standards as well as American ones, to the extent they were
the same. Actually the DGAC went further still, for it also determined, on
behalf of the FAA, whether the design also satisfied FAA airworthiness
standards to the extent that they exceeded or otherwise differed from
French standards. In other words, the foreign authority supplies certification to the FAA not only with respect to shared or common standards, but
also those peculiar to the United States.
Bilateral airworthiness agreements nevertheless leave scope for FAA
technical involvement in the approval of foreign designs. The FAA must
become sufficiently familiar with the general design, performance and operational characteristics of a product in order to determine whether the
product would have met U.S. airworthiness standards if produced domestically, as well as to conduct any post-certification responsibilities (such as
handling service problems, or approving design or flight manual changes)
that may arise. (The first determination is called establishing "the normal
U.S. certification basis" of the product in question.) Finally, of course, the
FAA must identify any additional technical conditions, beyond those applied by the foreign authority, that compliance with FAA certification
standards will require.1 s
In a fundamental way, the borrowing of design certification functions
presupposes a basic familiarity on the part of the FAA with the foreign
certification system and standards (and their comparability with those of
the United States), as well as sufficient liaison with the foreign aviation
authority to ensure that any technical or administrative questions that
may affect American certification are identified and.resolved. The FAA's
interest and involvement in its counterpart's performance of design certification functions under a bilateral agreement normally cause it to designate
a particular FAA unit (either a geographic office or technical directorate)
133. FAA additional technical conditions are those that must be satisfied above and beyond the
certification standards of the exporting state in order to meet the standards necessary for FAA approval. Normally these can be determined simply be comparing the two countries' basic airworthiness
standards. However, it is also possible that (1) the product had been granted an exemption from the
exporting state's airworthiness standards, (2) that unusual design features will require that the FAA
issue special conditions, (3) that the exporting state directed mandatory airworthiness actions on account of unsafe conditions during operations, or (4) the FAA has identified additional optional conditions that would assist an eventual U.S. operator in complying with independent U.S. operational or
maintenance requirements. In these situations, too, FAA additional technical conditions may be specified. FAA ADVISORY CIRCULAR No. AC 21-23, supra note 14, at 28.
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having overall management of the project and to appoint an individual
project manager. The foreign aviation authority will be informed of the
FAA office and individual having project management responsibility. Although the foreign manufacturer is not barred from direct correspondence
with the FAA on technical or policy issues that may arise, FAA policy is
that the foreign authority remain fully involved:
[B]ecause the FAA relies heavily on the [foreign civil aviation authority's] understanding of FAA's position on such issues, it is imperative that the [foreign authority] be included in any such meetings or correspondence. Also, FAA will normally seek the [foreign
authority's] opinions before significant issues are resolved and, accordingly, may decline to meet with the applicant to discuss and
resolve technical issues unless the [foreign authority] is adequately
represented at the meeting.""
As soon as practicable, a "familiarization briefing" will be scheduled at a
mutually agreeable location in order for the applicant, the foreign civil
aviation authority, and the FAA to meet and discuss the design."' The
FAA typically has its foreign counterpart arrange the meeting and considers the latter's attendance mandatory. Discussion will cover unusual design features that might necessitate the issuance of special conditions, any
prior service history of the product, and comparisons between the relevant
foreign and American airworthiness criteria.'"
Cooperation between the FAA and its foreign counterpart does not end
with the familiarization briefing; it continues throughout the design certification process. For example, the FAA needs to know of any unusual
design features that come to light during further design development that
might necessitate amendment of the U.S. type certification basis, issuance
of unexpected special conditions or negotiations on acceptable means of
compliance. It also needs to know of any relevant changes in the foreign
authority's certification basis. Quite apart from these eventualities, the
FAA may request additional technical data, or assistance in conducting
inspections or test flights, and cooperation by the foreign aviation authority is obviously crucial, especially where there is a need to verify manufacturer-supplied data. Conversely, the FAA will share with the foreign authority the various technical and regulatory status reports produced in the
course of final U.S. certification of the foreign design.
134. Id. at 26.
135. Id.
136. d. at 26-27.
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Prior to a final certification meeting, the FAA will require formal assurance from the foreign aviation authority that the applicant has demonstrated the design's compliance with the applicable American airworthiness criteria. 37 At that meeting, it will be determined whether all items
on the Type Certification Compliance Checklist drawn up for the project
have been received either by the foreign authority or the FAA, as the case
may be.1"8 If so, FAA type certification (or, in the case of materials, parts
or appliances, some other form of design approval) will follow.1" 9
In the Airbus example given earlier, the FAA essentially lent credence
to the DGAC's determination both with respect to Airbus' satisfaction of
standards common to France and the United States, and to its satisfaction
of any additional or different American requirements, though, particularly
as to the latter, the FAA exercised some review of the DGAC's determination. The FAA estimates that, as a general rule, over ninety percent of
the work involved in aircraft design approval of imported products is done
by the aviation authority of the manufacturer's country.
Although the procedures followed by the FAA in certifying the airworthiness of imported product designs differ materially from those applicable
to domestic product designs-chiefly through reliance on certification
functions performed by the exporting state-the FAA's eventual issuance
of a type certificate still constitutes a formal FAA finding that the relevant
American airworthiness standards or their equivalent have been met.14 °
The certificate has the same technical and legal significance as if issued on
the basis of local inspection and evaluation, and the FAA is no less legally
responsible for the accuracy of the underlying determinations than would
be the case if all testing and evaluation had been performed locally by its
own personnel. 4
2.

Airworthiness Certification Under the Bilateral Agreements

Thus far, my emphasis in discussion of the bilateral airworthiness
agreements has been on cooperation in design certification. As indicated at
the outset of this Article, however, airworthiness approval is also needed
for specific products and, like the designs, these too may be imported
rather than domestically produced. Once again, the international procedures developed by the FAA for these purposes seek to exploit fully the
aircraft certification services that may have previously been performed on
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
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Id.
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FAA ADVISORY
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FAA ADVISORY CIRCULAR No. AC 21-18, supra note 100, at 2.
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the product in the place of manufacture or export. The bilateral agreements contemplate this form of cooperation as well.
In general, in order to earn FAA airworthiness approval, individual
aircraft manufactured abroad must be accompanied by an export certificate of airworthiness by the civil aviation authority of the manufacturing
or exporting country, with any deviation from an FAA-approved design
noted thereon. United States registration of imported aircraft understandably also entails certain administrative steps-the application of new registration markings, issuance of a new identification plate, evidence of
deregistration from the foreign registry, production of approved flight
manual and placards in English as well as logbooks and maintenance
records, recording of aircraft titles and security documents-that lie
outside the scope of this study. The real interest of the process for the
purposes of this Article lies in the reliance placed on export certificates of
airworthiness in the issuance of U.S. airworthiness certificates for imported aeronautical products.
As was the case for design certification, legal responsibility for the U.S.
airworthiness certification of individual craft remains with the FAA.
Before issuing such a certificate, the FAA must find that the aircraft conforms to an FAA-approved design and that it is in a condition for safe
operation. 4 2 However, export certificates of airworthiness by the country
of export greatly facilitate airworthiness certification by the new country
of registry. A bilateral airworthiness agreement, where applicable, may
enable the FAA to base its airworthiness findings in whole or in part on
the other country's export certification.1 43 The situation is at its simplest
when the imported aircraft is covered by a type certificate that itself was
issued under the bilateral airworthiness agreement procedures described
above. In principle, the craft will be entitled to U.S. airworthiness certification upon a simple export certification by the authorities in the country
of manufacture that it conforms to an FAA-approved type design and is in
a condition for safe operation.1 4 4 Before issuing its own airworthiness certificate, the FAA will simply examine the aircraft to determine that it has
14
not deteriorated or been modified.
If an aircraft is exported to the United States from a country other than
the country of manufacture-and if our bilateral agreements with both
142. FAA

ADVISORY CIRCULAR

No. AC 21-23, supra note 14, at 44.

143. Id.
144. 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.183(c), .185(c) (1992). The FAA expects that the aircraft will have been
fully assembled and flight tested, and the engines and propellers performance tested, before the export
certificate is issued.
145. FAA ADVISORY CIRCULAR No. AC 21-23, supra note 14, at 46.
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the manufacturing and exporting countries contain the appropriate language-the FAA will accept export certificates of airworthiness issued by
the exporting country, provided of course it furnishes the usual assurances
about conformity to an FAA-approved design and safe operating condition. 1" The following remark in the FAA's relevant advisory circular
reveals the complexity of the three-country situation:
In such cases, the FAA considers it incumbent upon the [civil aviation authority] issuing the export certificate to consult with both
the civil aviation authority of the country of manufacture and the
FAA to assure it has adequate knowledge of the type design approved by the FAA. Configuration variations, modifications, and
major repairs that are not FAA-approved should be identified,
and FAA approval should be obtained before the [exporting civil
47
aviation authority] issues its export certificate of airworthiness.
Where an imported aircraft is in used condition, applicants for a U.S.
airworthiness certificate have the added burden of identifying repairs and
modifications that may have taken place, as well as documenting all maintenance and installation of new equipment. 4 8 This may entail extensive
inspections by a variety of sources, including the civil aviation authority of
the place of export and/or of manufacture. 4 9
The situation is not fundamentally different for the certification of imported engines, propellers, or other component parts and appliances. Federal Aviation Regulations 21.500 and 21.502 provide for the airworthiness
certification of foreign-manufactured parts for which a U.S. type certificate or other form of FAA design approval has previously been issued. 5 0
Such products are considered approved for installation on U.S.-registered
aircraft when accompanied by a current export certificate of airworthiness
issued by the authorities of the manufacturing state.' 1 Predictably, the
export certificate needs to state that the part conforms to a U.S. type certificate, passed a final operational check by the manufacturer and is in a
condition for safe operation.15' Nevertheless, the person returning to ser146. Id. at 45.
147. FAA ADVISORY CIRCULAR No. AC 21-23, supra note 14, at 44. Early bilateral airworthiness agreements did not adequately cover the three-country situation. See FAA EXPORT/IMPORT,
supra note 75, at .7.
148. FAA ADVISORY CIRCULAR No. AC 21-23, supra note 14, at 45.
149. Id.
150. 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.500, .502 (1992).
151. Id.
152. Id. § 21.500.
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vice the aircraft on which the component part has been installed bears
legal responsibility for determining that the part: (1)has not been modified or damaged subsequent to the time of export certification; (2) complies with all applicable FAA airworthiness directives; (3) has been installed properly and is in a condition for safe operation; and (4) is
accompanied by the necessary maintenance documentation. 15 3 Installation
or replacement of parts thus obviously requires additional inspections and
verifications that can be feasibly performed only on the importing side.
Plainly, the FAA places extensive reliance upon the airworthiness certification authorities of other states in the issuance of airworthiness certificates for individual imported aircraft. The extent of that reliance is shown
by the fact that the FAA will simply not ordinarily issue a U.S. airworthiness certificate for a foreign-manufactured aircraft-new or
used-unless accompanied by an export certification. 1" At the same time,
some auxiliary FAA inspection may still be necessary, for example to ensure that no changes or modifications were made (and that no deterioration of aircraft condition occurred) since the time of export certification.
Where reassembling has taken place, FAA flight testing may also be
required.'"

3.

Production Certification under the Bilateral Agreements

Reference was made earlier in this Article to a third form of FAA certification, namely aircraft production certification."" Ordinarily, FAA approval of an American manufacturer's production and quality control system serves to facilitate the airworthiness certification of products
manufactured at that facility, that is to say, the assurance that such products will conform to an approved design and be in a condition for safe
operation. However, a production certificate is not a legal prerequisite for
the issuance of airworthiness certificates for particular craft, even in the
case of domestic manufacture. Thus, the use of bilateral airworthiness
agreements for certifying foreign production processes is less critical than
for certifying foreign designs and products. On the other hand, direct production quality control by the FAA of foreign manufacturing systems
would simply not be technically or politically feasible.
153. FAA

ADVISORY CIRCULAR

No. AC 21-23, supra note 14, at 48.

154. See id. at 45-46.
155. Id. at 46.
156. Production certification, it will be recalled, is to be distinguished from design certification
and the airworthiness certification of aeronautical products including complete aircraft. See supra
subpart I1I.A-C.
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Accordingly, the FAA does not use its bilateral agreements to certify
overseas production as such. In effect, it treats a foreign country's issuance
of an export certificate of airworthiness for individual craft as indirectly
approving the production system, but only with respect to countries with
which the United States has a bilateral airworthiness agreement. The use
of such agreements for drawing inferences about the quality of overseas
production only underscores the importance of carefully evaluating a foreign aeronautical industry and the airworthiness performance of the foreign country's aviation authorities before entering into a bilateral airworthiness agreement with that country.
4.

General Considerations

The preceding discussion demonstrates that both the initial decision of
the FAA to enter into a bilateral airworthiness agreement with a given
country and the practical implementation of the agreement presupposes a
considerable sharing of information between or among national civil aviation authorities. Predicating an airworthiness finding on a design's or a
product's certification abroad requires familiarity with the other country's
certification system, performance by the FAA of advisory services respecting the U.S. certification system, continuous monitoring of the other authorities' performance, and an awareness of equivalence or lack of equivalence in standards. These modes of cooperation also presuppose that the
aviation authorities remain in close liaison and cognizant of changes in the
other's technical, legal, and regulatory environment. 157 The FAA implements its bilateral airworthiness agreements through detailed export and
import certification procedures set out in Part 21 of the Federal Aviation
Regulations. 5"
The adequacy of the FAA's current bilateral airworthiness agreements
lies outside the scope of this Article. Suffice it to say that the "bilaterals"
do not address all issues, especially the emerging problems of multistate
aviation products. However, over the sixty years of their existence, they
have been made more modern and complete, while still allowing for dif157. A bilateral airworthiness agreement thus typically provides: "The aeronautical authorities

of each Contracting State shall keep aeronautical authorities of the other Contracting State currently
informed on all relevant laws, regulations, and requirements in their State." FAA ADVISORY CIRCULAR No. AC 21-18, supra note 100, at 3.
158. There are separate FAA procedural requirements for issuance of type certificates for imported aircraft, engines, and propellers, 14 C.F.R. § 21.29 (1992); issuance of airworthiness certificates for the import of foreign-manufactured aircraft, id. § 21.183(c); issuance of export airworthiness
approvals, id. subpt. L; approval of foreign-manufactured engines and propellers, id. § 21.500; approval of foreign-manufactured material, parts, and appliances, id. § 21.502; among others.
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ferences in scope and coverage depending on the country in question."'
Many have been revised and updated, and additional revisions are contemplated. According to the director of the FAA's Aircraft Certification
Service, there is no documented evidence that any aircraft accident has
been caused by a weakness in the aircraft certification process under a
bilateral airworthiness agreement.
Plainly enough, the mutual recognition of airworthiness determinations
makes no sense unless each party to a bilateral agreement is satisfied with
the level of competence shown by the other's enforcement authorities. But
it also makes no sense unless the basic airworthiness standards in the two
countries are reasonably similar. There would simply be no point in
agreeing to treat airworthiness certification performed in Canada as decisive of a design's or a craft's airworthiness in the United States unless the
American airworthiness standards or type specifications, as the case may
be, are ones that the Canadian authorities can recognize and administer.
As already indicated, it can happen that the exporting country's standards
are basically equivalent to the importing state's, but differ or fall short in
one or another respect, and therefore bilateral airworthiness agreements
commonly allow the importing state to prescribe additional technical conditions necessary to ensure that a covered product does indeed meet that
state's required level of safety.1 0 The fact remains that such agreements
cannot yield much mutual recognition or "credence" absent a fundamental
commonality of standards."'
Bilateral agreements of course do not themselves unify or harmonize
national airworthiness standards. But the advantages to private enterprise
and regulators alike of mutual recognition of airworthiness determinations
have created an important incentive to harmonization of those standards.
Reasonably common airworthiness standards in turn create an environment that favors joint national development of new aeronautical technologies and the related regulatory standards.
159. Respects in which bilateral airworthiness agreements have been improved over the years are
described in FAA EXPORT/IMPORT, supra note 75, at 7-8.
160. A typical clause to this effect reads:
The aeronautical authorities of the importing State shall have the right to make acceptance
of any certification by the aeronautical authorities of the exporting State dependent upon
the product meeting any additional requirements which the importing State finds necessary
to ensure that the product meets a level of safety equivalent to that provided by the applicable laws, regulations, and requirements which would be effective for a similar product
produced in the importing State.
FAA

ADVISORY CIRCULAR

No. AC 21-18, supra note 100, at 3.

161. Id. at 2.
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D.

Harmonization of National Airworthiness Standards

The preceding discussion shows that, although the network of bilateral
airworthiness agreements to which the United States is a party decidedly
facilitates international trade in aircraft, simplifies administrative responsibilities in airworthiness regulation, and indirectly promotes aeronautical
innovation, it does not of itself produce a harmonized regulatory environment. The ICAO and GATT initiatives, discussed still earlier in this Article, though also favorable, have not substantially produced that result
either.
Historically, substantial harmonization has tended to occur when the
aviation authorities of one or more countries choose to adopt the standards
developed by some other, presumably influential, aviation power. The
Federal Aviation Administration's design, production, and airworthiness
standards, as codified in Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations, have
in fact been widely borrowed. Until recently, such borrowing took place
on a strictly country-by-country basis, with the borrower free to select
parts only and to introduce modifications as it saw fit. Apart from its
haphazard character, this approach entails the problem that when the
parent standards change, as they always do, all states that have borrowed
them must follow suit if uniformity is to be maintained. From a more
general perspective, too few nations may participate in the process to create an effective world-wide standard. Finally, the airworthiness standards
of the state dominant in aviation circles may not necessarily be the best
ones available on any given issue.
1. Development of the European Joint Aviation Authorities and Their
Joint Airworthiness Requirements
For these reasons-along with the general aversion that many states
feel toward copying foreign country regulations as such-a trend has recently developed in the direction of joint and collaborative standard-setting. Progressively over the past twenty years, a number of Western European nations have deliberately cooperated in the establishment of a
structure called the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA), whose central purpose has been to develop common airworthiness regulations. Current JAA
participants include a majority of member states of the European Economic Community (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom),1 6 plus certain non-EEC

U.S.

162. Non-JAA members of the Community are Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Portugal. See
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. RCED-92-179, AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION: LIMITED PRO-
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states (Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland). 6 To date,
the JAA countries have adopted joint airworthiness requirements (or
JARs) on different matters.' 6 4 Initially, only France, the Netherlands, the
United Kingdom, and the former West Germany agreed to make the JAR
standard as such the national standard, the others making the JAR standard optional, so that parties subject to national certification in those
states had a choice between meeting the JAR or the national standard on
any given issue. More recently, all participating states have agreed to
make the JAR provision, once adopted, their sole national standard on the
subject.
The scale and timing of JAA cooperation was not at the outset a foregone conclusion. The founders emphasize that the joint rulemaking effort
began on a purely exploratory basis, subject from the very start to the
condition of technical feasibility in any given case."6 5 "The task of ascertaining whether differing national views could be reconciled within an acceptable timescale was initially entrusted to aeronautical engineers having
safety as their main objective; only when this appeared feasible were more
formal agreements contemplated."'6 6 From a material point of view too,
the JAA began on tentative footings. Its personnel needs and administrative expenses were covered in their entirety by the European aeronautical
manufacturers association, AECMA, and by the participating national
67
authorities, and this on a strictly informal basis.1
In a decidedly pragmatic spirit, the JAA Steering Committee decided
that each JAR, unless dealing with entirely new matter, should be based
upon one or another existing national code, the so-called "basic code" for
that matter.'6 Nevertheless, the Committee intended that each JAR
would reflect the airworthiness state-of-the-art, and that the basic code
would therefore serve as a point of departure only, subject in every respect
to review by technical study groups, composed of authority and industry
representatives, with a view to identifying all desirable additions and
modifications.'6 9
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Intergovernmental work on development of the Joint Airworthiness
Regulations began in 1970, with the active support of the AECMA airworthiness committee. By 1974, one joint requirement, JAR-25 (on large
airplanes) had been issued. 170 Five years later, that requirement was
adopted by four of the JAR countries as the sole code governing large
first large aircraft was type-certifairplanes and in another four years the
1
17
icated in conformity with JAR-25.

There currently exist a JAR-AWO (on all weather operations), a
JAR-APU (on-auxiliary power units), a JAR-E (on engines), a JAR-P
(on propellers), a JAR-22 (on sailplanes and powered sailplanes), and a
JAR-VLA (on very light airplane design). Underway or in preparation
are a JAR-TSO (on equipment), a JAR 21 (on certification procedures),
JAR 23 (on light airplane and commuter design), JARS 27 and 29 (on
helicopters), JAR 65 (on certifying staff qualifications), JARS 91(C), 121
(L) and 135U) (on operations and maintenance), and JAR 145 (on repair
stations). On all of these, the expectation is that national variants will be
minimal or nonexistent.
2.

Formalization of the JAA and a Joint Certification Process

The essential framework for JAA cooperation was first set out in writing in an "Arrangements" document dating from 1979, when the JAA
had ten members.1 72 The Arrangements expressed a commitment by the
signatory states to enforce the airworthiness requirements that might from
time to time be mutually agreed upon, and also established certain common procedures for their application to products manufactured in other
signatory states."" In 1987, the JAA states entered into a more formal
"Memorandum of Understanding" on certification procedures, and the
following year the Dornier 328 became the first aircraft jointly certificated
according to those procedures.
The Memorandum of Understanding formalized the members' commitment to a single airworthiness code eventually shorn of all national variations. On a more strictly procedural level, the JAA states agreed to the
establishment of joint multinational certification teams. Besides distributing the costs of regulation among the member states, joint certification
ensures acceptance of a certification team's findings by all participating
authorities without additional national review. In order to justify this degree of confidence in the joint certification teams on the part of the various
170.
171.
172.
173.
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national aviation authorities, both the composition of each team and the
framework for its activities require approval by the different national authorities. In addition, a system of national coordinators promotes an adequate flow of information between the authorities and the team, once the
latter is established. By 1989, joint certification teams had been created for
three aircraft (the SF 340B, the MD-1 1,and the A 330/340) and proposed for three others (the DHC-8-300, the SAAB-2000, and the CN235). That year Spain became the last JAA country to subscribe to the
Memorandum, and an overall JAA certification director was named.
Joint certification represents an important stage in the eventual development of a single European certification process. It is now possible for
type-certification of any given aeronautical product to occur virtually simultaneously in the various JAA states, with a reduction in the cost and
delay normally associated with multiple design certification. The logical
next step is installation of a single European aviation safety agency with
Europe-wide type-certification authority.1" 4 For the forseeable future,
however, each national authority remains responsible for the actual issuance of type certificates as well as for the performance of airworthiness
certification functions with respect to individual aircraft.
Thus far, JAA efforts have accordingly focused on the.joint issuance of
airworthiness regulations and on collaborative type certification pursuant
to those regulations. Beyond that, the JAA has begun the process of harmonizing the rules governing issuance of production certificates. This initiative is less far advanced and the gathering of needed basic data is still in
process. On the other hand, the JAA has advanced considerably the sharing of airworthiness determinations for specific products. A "common release document," otherwise known as an "authorized release certificate,"
or simply an "airworthiness approval tag," essentially certifies that a particular component part was manufactured in compliance with the applicable regulations of the country stated in the certificate. Where the special
requirements of an importing country have been notified- to the country of
manufacture, the latter's "tag" may certify that those regulations likewise
are met. The common release document also may be adapted for used
parts, in which case the certificate will state that the repair or maintenance work described was performed in accordance with the regulations of
the stated country (and again, where applicable, also in accordance with
the special requirements of an importing country) and further that the
174. The JAA states do not comprise the whole of Europe or even of Western Europe. In 1988,
a JAA working group was established to develop the JAA's relations with the preexisting and larger,
but substantially weaker, European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC), which has a current membership of 22.
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parts are "in condition for safe operation and considered ready for release
to service." At the present time, each European authority has its own
"tag;" harmonization of forms will facilitate their mutual recognition.1 75
3. JAA Organization
As its functions have developed, the JAA has assumed a more elaborate
organizational structure. Its functions are performed by the JAA's directors-general (DG's), one per member state, though most decisions as a
practical matter will be made by the Airworthiness Authorities Steering
Committee (AASC), otherwise known as the JAA Committee, or management committee, likewise with one member per state. Many of the Committee's functions in turn are delegated to an Executive Board consisting
of representatives of France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and a fifth rotating state. A JAA Secretariat provides the Board
with administrative support.
The JAA staff is divided into several divisions whose respective directors report to the JAA Committee and its Executive Board. The regulation division is responsible for fashioning JAA airworthiness standards,
and to that end is assisted by technical study groups organized according
to the particular regulation (JAR) in need of change or development.
JAA certification activities are entrusted to a certification division organized, as seen, into teams according to aircraft type requiring certification.
A project certification manager (PCM), assisted by a variable number of
local and foreign specialists, heads each team. Two further JAA divisions-one for maintenance and one for operation-have been created or
are under contemplation. The five-member Maintenance Committee, assisted by representatives of European manufacturers, operators and pilot
groups, is responsible for developing a maintenance code based on the European regulations system, but taking the American regulatory system into
account wherever possible and for identifying significant national discrepancies with that code. 176 The contemplated Operation Committee, charged
with developing codes for approving and supervising commercial opera175. The United States has recently become involved in this cooperative effort. For years, the
FAA used a Form 8130-3 tag for export of aircraft parts. Upon complaint by several JAA countries
that the small size of the tag made it difficult to include all the information they deemed necessary, the
FAA has met with representatives from the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and
Sweden to develop a mutually acceptable common document.
176. The FAA regulations that are currently being used as the JAA maintenance models are
FAR 65(D & E), 14 C.F.R. pt. 65D, E (1992); 91(C), id. pt. 91(c); 121(L & V), id. pt. 121L, V;
127(I & P), id. pt. 1271 P; 135(J), id. pt. 135J; and 145, id. pt. 145.
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tors, considers the Federal Aviation Regulations (particularly FARs 121,
125, and 135) to be their point of departure.
Apart from the functional divisions just described, the JAA Committee
maintains formal links, in the form of joint boards (JB's), with existing
organizations of operators and manufacturers of aircraft. These Boards
are in effect standing mechanisms for JAA consultation with interested
groups like AECMA, AEA (the European airlines' association), and
Europilote (the pilots' association). A Joint Assembly affords the JAA a
forum for the widest possible discussions and consultations with representatives of manufacturers, operators and pilot organizations.
As previously suggested, airworthiness regulation is not at present a
function of the European Economic Community, and its conduct takes
place entirely outside the Community framework. The participating states
cooperate on a strictly intergovernmental basis, and a given JAR standard, once adopted, becomes a national standard only as and when each
state takes the necessary legislative or regulatory action. Eventually, it is
hoped, those JAA participants that are members of the Community will
share a single certification authority and those EEC states not as yet participants in JAA-Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Portugal-will
have joined it.
4.

U.S. Attitudes Toward JAA Development

The United States is not and cannot be a member of the European
Joint Aviation Authorities, but it has encouraged the organization's development and worked closely with it. Much the same may be said of Canada and Australia. These countries have several reasons for supporting
and involving themselves in the European joint airworthiness effort. First,
if American, Canadian, and Australian enterprises intend to produce and
sell aeronautical products on the European and international markets, or
operate those products, they necessarily have an interest in the adequacy
and feasibility of the European standards and the cost of compliance with
them. Economic realities give third countries, particularly those with an
active aeronautical manufacturing industry, a strong derivative interest in
the JAA process. As for American industry, approximately sixty percent
of the world-wide market in aircraft lies outside the United States. It is
true that the existing Federal Aviation Regulations provided the basis for
many of the JARs, but neither was that a foregone conclusion nor is that
invariably the case. As noted, for example, JAR 25 on large airplanes
originated from the parallel FAA provision, but JAR 22 on sailplanes
was based directly on the German national standard, and the JARs on
engines UAR-E) and propellers (JAR-P) on the applicable British provi[Vol. 24
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sions. The JAR-AWO provision was newly developed, though influenced
by an existing FAA advisory circular on all-weather operations.
In the second place, non-JAA governments have an independent interest in an efficient, well-functioning international regime, particularly in a
field like civil aviation. Standards adopted over as large and economically
important an area as Western Europe simply cannot be ignored by other
countries in developing their own standards and in protecting local industries upon which prevailing airworthiness standards will have an impact.
Earlier sections of this Article clearly demonstrate the difficulties that discrepancies in airworthiness standards present for the free movement of
1
aeronautical products in international trade. 7
American regulators cite yet a third rationale for their involvement in
JAA activities. The FAA has found its European counterparts to be
highly knowledgeable in technical aspects of airworthiness regulation.
They are in any event necessarily in close contact with some of the world's
most sophisticated aeronautical product manufacturers. Though under no
duty to conform to the emerging JAR standards, American regulators believe they stand to learn a great deal from the Europeans, or at least from
consultation and collaboration with them.
E.

Investigative Cooperation

I have previously described compliance aspects of the FAA's airworthiness and operations activities as outside the scope of this study. It is nevertheless worth pointing out that FAA enforcement guidelines contemplate
cooperation with foreign aviation authorities in these respects. An apparent violation of foreign aviation regulations by FAA certificate holders or
U.S. citizens may come to the FAA's attention in any number of ways,
including directly from foreign aviation authorities. The FAA regional office having geographic responsibility for the country filing the complaint
investigates the matter and ultimately reports back to the foreign aviation
authority through the FAA Office of Chief Counsel and, if need be, the
U.S. foreign service post. 78 If the FAA needs to perform investigations
abroad, it will seek permission from the foreign aviation authorities and
coordinate its activities with the U.S. foreign service post in that
country. 7 9
Conversely, foreign persons may commit apparent violations of FAA
regulations, though this appears to be extremely rare. Such violations
177. See supra Part IV.
178. COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT
179. Id.
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would be investigated and reported in the usual manner.18 Should it need
to obtain evidence through a foreign government, the FAA investigative
office would consult the FAA regional office having geographic responsibility for the area and the relevant U.S. Foreign Service Post."8" The regional office would process an enforcement report, either through counsel
in the region or (where the respondent is in the service of a foreign company or air carrier) through the FAA Office of Chief Counsel. 8 ' Agency
counsel, in consultation with the relevant FAA aviation standards office
and the FAA Office of International Affairs, would determine whether
enforcement action in this country is appropriate or whether the complaint should be referred to the foreign government instead. 8 If a violation should directly implicate a foreign government, the Office of Chief
Counsel would call upon the Department of State to notify the foreign
government and, to that end, furnish it a factual and legal summary, a
copy of the investigative report, and a request to be advised of action taken
by the foreign government.
VI.

HARMONIZATION ACTIVITY:

FAA

PRACTICE IN NEGOTIATING

AIRWORTHINESS STANDARDS WITH THE EUROPEAN JOINT AVIATION
AUTHORITIES

The previous section of this Article described the engagement of the
European Joint Aviation Authorities in development of common national
certification standards and practices. For the set of reasons indicated, the
FAA has determined that American participation in that process would be
distinctly in the interest of the United States. The present section of the
Article discusses the establishment and conduct of that relationship.
A.

The Establishment of Contacts and the Decision to Initiate
Consultations

The collaborative relationship between American and European aviation regulators has been fueled by considerations of enlightened self-interest in virtually all quarters. Although patterns of collaboration have by
now become established and even institutionalized, it is still possible to
reconstruct how they came to be. The Europeans themselves, looking for a
common regulatory basis for joint European action and finding none
among themselves that was both technically and politically acceptable,
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. § 503.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 1003(c)(3).
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provided much of the impetus. The JAA thus decided to take existing
FAA regulations as their point of departure for the gradual development
of European counterparts. The conscious patterning of JAA after FAA
material extends even to the numbering of regulations-JAR numbers
generally parallel existing FAR numbers on any given matter-and to
their wording.
As might have been expected, the JAA carefully avoids any appearance
of slavish imitation of American regulatory design. A convergence rather
than copying of views is the JAA's stated objective. As a matter of drafting, the JAA has followed the practice, whenever designing a JAR on the
basis of an existing FAR, of beginning with the FAR text, editing it as
required and underlining the divergences if any for easy comparison.'"
The practice extends to the adoption of procedural regulations as well.
When the JAA Regulation Committee Working Group on JAR 21 decided in 1988 to develop administrative codes for type certification of European products and for products imported from outside Europe, it initially read and reviewed the entire FAR 21 as it then stood. It then
determined provisionally that certain "minimum variations" from the
wording of FAR 21 would be necessary. Within eighteen months, the
working group was able to circulate publicly a proposed JAR 21 that
differed only slightly from the American text and whose differences from
FAR 21 were clearly indicated."8 5
The FAA and JAA have now agreed to initiate discussions with one
another before making any changes in airworthiness regulations that
would introduce discrepancies with the standards established by the
other."'
184. In order to facilitate a commonality of language and format in FAA and JAA helicopter
airworthiness standards, the FAA Rotorcraft Directorate furnished the JAA Helicopter Airworthiness
Study Group (HASG) with IBM-PC-compatible diskettes on Word Perfect software containing the
current presentation of FARs 27 and 29 (14 C.F.R. pts. 27, 29). The goal was a JAR compatible
with the FARs.
185. See Joint Aviation Authorities, Joint Aviation Requirements JAR-21 (Sept. 1, 1992) (draft
no. 4). The draft also indicates where criteria are expected to be changed on the basis of further
discussions and coordination with the FAA or information supplied by the FAA. Discussions between
the FAA and the JAR-21 Working Group were held in February 1989 (Gatwick, England), June
1989 (Bordeaux), and March 1990 (Atlanta).
186. See generally MINUTES OF THE OPEN SESSION, SIXTH FAA-JAA MEETING, BORDEAUX,
FRANCE, supra note 1, pt. III. The General Accounting Office (GAO) studied the FAA's coordination of aircraft certification with foreign authorities and published a report on the efficiency of the
process. GAO REPORT, supra note 162. The GAO Report focused on the effectiveness of the harmonization activities undertaken by the FAA. Specifically, it reviewed certification of designs for transport category airplanes. GAO REPORT, supra note 162, at 13. Programs involving smaller aircraft,
engines, and rotorcraft were not studied; nor were harmonization efforts with the JAA for airplane

19931

LAW & POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS

B.

Putting Consultation on a Regular Basis: The Frameworkfor
U.S. Participationin European Joint Aviation Regulation

Once the JAA decided on a course of conscious regulatory parallelism
with the United States as described above, a framework for continuing
dialogue had to be established. At present, the FAA and JAA hold joint
annual policy meetings for the discussion both of general policies and of
more or less specific work programs that have been the subject of smaller
and more specialized bilateral working groups meeting throughout the
year. These annual sessions alternate between Europe and the United
States-for example, the 1990 meeting took place in San Francisco and
the 1989 meeting in Bordeaux-but the working groups meet periodically
as, when, and where the circumstances suggest, with much accomplished
through telecommunications.
The joint annual meetings are divided into sessions reserved to "the
authorities" ' and sessions open to industry, operators and other interproduction requirements, airworthiness certification, or continuing airworthiness. Id. Within this
area, the GAO examined data from the FAA and domestic manufacturers, interviewed FAA officials,
reviewed legislation, regulation, agreements, and FAA policies, and interviewed and collected data
from JAA representatives and manufacturing representatives. Id. After the report was drafted, the
GAO obtained written comments from the Department of Transportation Id. at 14.
After considering this information, the GAO concluded that although common international standards and interpretations would reduce costs to manufacturers and probably increase safety, the current harmonization system is inefficient. Id. at 4, 15. Examples of inefficiency are the duplication of
certification activities, the imposition of additional requirements, and varied interpretations of similar
regulations. Id. One reason for these problems, according to the GAO, is that "their elimination
requires compromise and coordination that intrude of [the aviation authorities'] independent obligation[s] under [their] national law." d.
Despite these difficulties, the GAO Report noted that FAA and JAA officials had recognized the
problems and were "developing a strategic plan" in early 1992. Id. at 4. The Report recommended
that the Secretary of Transportation ensure that this "recent momentum in the harmonization process
result[ ]in the resolution of regulatory difference and avoidance of duplication." Id. Specifically, the
GAO advised that the Secretary direct the FAA Administrator to:
(1) monitor and report annually to the Secretary on the progress achieved relative to time
frames established in the strategic plan,
(2) develop mechanisms, such as joint certification teams, with JAA to coordinate certification activities and help prevent late design changes and duplication, and
(3) report the achievements, problems, and impacts of the advisory committee to the Congress, when rechartering the committee.
Id. The Department of Transportation "generally agreed with GAO's recommendations" but added
that the strategic plan being developed by the FAA and JAA at the time accomplished the goal of
setting priorities and time frames for harmonization. Id. at 5.
187. These sessions are "closed" to the interested parties and the media so as to foster an uninhibited expression and exchange of opinions. MINUTES OF THE CLOSED SESSION OF THE SIXTH
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ested groups including the press.' The former often provide the opportunity for European and American authorities to arrive at common preliminary positions that can then be presented in more or less joint fashion at
the "open" sessions which are themselves jointly presided by the two sets
of authorities. The annual meetings understandably also provide an opportunity for the working groups referred to earlier, which are composed
both of "authorities" and private sector parties, to pursue and at intervals
present their findings or recommendations. For example, at a recent annual meeting, the FAA and JAA were jointly briefed on water ingestion
problems by a study group actually headed by a committee of the Aerospace Industries Association with a view to eventual changes to air traffic
control weather avoidance guidelines." 9 Thus, a striking feature of the
FAA/JAA relationship is its continuity. In effect, the annual meetings are
only formal plenary sessions, significant less for the official decisionmaking that takes place on those occasions-actually little does-than for the
opportunity to exchange views and report progress made in smaller joint
industry/authorities gatherings throughout the year. Moreover, an early
agenda item at each joint annual meeting is a follow-up report on actions
and conclusions reached at the previous annual meeting. 9 To facilitate
communications with the JAA, the FAA has appointed an individual at
FAA headquarters specifically designated as "entry point" for all JARrelated issues. 9 '
Among the most interesting trends over recent years is the development
of a pattern of collaboration between American and European industry
groups paralleling the collaboration between the FAA and JAA. The joint
annual meetings offer settings at which industry on both sides of the Atlantic may effectively present its views to the regulators. This opportunity
in turn provides an incentive for industry representatives from both sides
to meet periodically throughout the year to discuss common problems and
arrive at common positions vis-a-vis the regulators. At the June 1990 joint
FAA-JAA MEETING, BORDEAUX, FRANCE, 6 (June 1989) (on file with Law and Policy in International Business).
188. See, e.g., Agenda for the Open Session, Sixth FAA-JAA Meeting, Bordeaux, France (June
1989) (on file with Law and Policy in InternationalBusiness).
189. See NOTES OF SEVENTH FAA-JAA MEETING, SAN FRANCISCO 21 (June 12-15, 1990) (on
file with Law and Policy In InternationalBusiness).
190. See e.g. Follow-Up of Actions and Conclusions of the Sixth FAA-JAA Meeting-Open
Session, Bordeaux, France (June 1989) (on file with Law and Policy in International Business,
presented at Seventh FAA-JAA Meeting, San Francisco, Califoria (June 1990). Carryover agenda
items included aging aircraft, derivative aircraft, tuned gust, fatigue testing, cabin safety and a variety
of specific harmonization efforts. Id. at 37.
191. The Aircraft Certification Service also has an office in Brussels.

1993]

LAW & POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS

annual meeting in San Francisco, for example, the Aerospace Industries
Association (AIA), the General Aviation Manufacturers Association
(GAMA), and their European counterpart, AECMA, themselves made a
joint presentation on aviation noise issues.192 In that presentation, these
manufacturing groups strongly urged: (1) the harmonization of existing
FAA (FAR 36) and JAA noise standards; (2) the adoption of ICAO Convention Annex 16 and its associated technical manual as the basis of such
a harmonized standard; (3) uniform interpretation of the standard adopted
and uniform application of equivalences; and (4) agreement on flight test9
ing, noise certification and other compliance procedures and appeals.' ' At
the previous annual meeting in Bordeaux, European and American industry worked jointly to eliminate differences between the FAA and JAA on
flight test requirements and to that end formulated petitions for proposed
4
rulemaking to the FAA and for parallel action by the JAA.1 And at San
Francisco, industry expressed support for the development of common
standards for derivative aircraft and for the establishment of uniform
maintenance record requirements.
These are not isolated examples. When it became apparent at Bordeaux
that the FAA and JAA intended to harmonize their respective engine airworthiness standards, European and American industry determined to
have significant input into the process. The AIA's Propulsion Committee
accordingly formed a subcommittee (comprising representatives of all major American and Canadian engine manufacturers) to organize that effort
by intially calling a joint meeting in Paris among the JAA, FAA, AIA,
and AECMA. The AIA subcommittee then sought in cooperation with
AECMA to establish a common industry position on the twenty items
that the FAA and/or JAA had identified as possible additional engine
conditions.1 95 The AIA was thus able to present formally to the authori96
ties in San Francisco a fully joint industry position on those matters.'
Similarly, GAMA took that occasion to express formally to the FAA and
JAA the joint industry view that the safety record of commuter airplanes
192. NOTES

OF SEVENTH

FAA-JAA

MEETING,

supra note 189, at 19.

193. AIA/AECMA/GAMA Presentation, Noise Issues, Seventh FAA/JAA Meeting, San
Francisco, California (June 13, 1990).
194. OPEN SESSION CONCLUSIONS AND ACTIONS, SIXTH FAA-JAA MEETING, supra note 1, at
13.
195. NOTES OF SEVENTH FAA-JAA MEETING, supra note 189, at 19.

196. Paul Meyer, AIA FAR 33/JAR-E Harmonization Committee, Statement to the Joint
FAA/JAA Annual Meeting, San Francisco, California (June 1990) (on file with Law and Policy in
International Business).
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did not justify adoption of more stringent airworthiness requirements for
that category of aircraft. 9 7
The FAA and JAA strongly support the concept of concerted industry
activity on standards research and development. One can well imagine
that the authorities would perceive an advantage in presenting a united
regulatory front to a nationally divided industry. However, the FAA and
JAA alike have stated and acted on the view that it is in the regulators'
long-term interest to know the industry position, if indeed there is one,
and to be able to deal with industry as a more or less unified group.
As these examples suggest, FAA/JAA collaboration (and related collaboration between American and European industry) concerns substantive technical matter, often in the form of standards to be newly adopted,
modified, borrowed or harmonized. To date, most collaboration has related to aircraft certification standards, but has now extended to operations and maintenance as well.1 98 No less interesting from a legal point of
197. General Aviation Manufacturers Ass'n, Presentation, Commuter Category Airplanes: Industry Views, Seventh FAA/JAA/Industry Meeting, San Francisco, California (June 12-15, 1990).
198. Cooperation in operations and maintenance standards has become vital on account of the
growth of international aircraft leasing. Through such leasing, a plan may operate out of state for
long periods, making it unworkable for the state of registry to perform its regulatory functions with
respect to that craft. A proposed article 83bis of the Chicago Convention would provide a legal basis
for the formal transfer of maintenance and operations responsibilities to the leasing country. Until the
Convention is ratified by the requisite number of countries, 98, the only way to delegate responsibility
is through informal understandings. As in the certification area, those understandings can be effectively implemented only if there is a fair degree of commonality in aircraft operations and maintenance standards and procedures. See Remarks of Admiral James B. Busey, FAA Administrator, at
seventh FAA-JAA Meeting, San Francisco, California (June 1990) [hereinafter Remarks by Admiral
Busey] (on file with Law and Policy in InternationalBusiness).
In hopes of coordinating further harmonization efforts, the FAA and JAA have developed a Harmonization Work Program, which was presented to the Ninth Annual FAA-JAA meeting in June,
1992. See FAA-JAA Harmonization Work Program (1st ed., June 1992) (on file with Law and
Policy in InternationalBusiness).
The strategic plan was developed and presented at the Ninth Annual Meeting in June 1992. Final
Notes of Open Session, Ninth Annual FAA-JAA Meeting (June 5, 1992), at IV-3 (on file with Law
and Policy in International Business) (hereinafter "Final Notes of Ninth Meeting"). A regular
quarterly update of the harmonization plan is intended. Id. at VII-3. It is called the "Harmonization
Work Program" and outlines the processing of a harmonization idea. Id. at IV-5. The document
setting forth the program is "a living document.., subject to revision as new information is obtained
and decisions are made." See FAA-JAA Harmonization Work Program (June 5, 1992), at 11-4 (on
file with Law and Policy in InternationalBusiness) (hereinafter "Harmonization Work Program").
The stated purpose of the program is to document harmonization initiatives, to provide a management
tool for the authorities to "monitor the progress made by the Harmonization Working Groups," and
to direct resources as necessary. Id. at I-I.
Under the program, a harmonization idea can come from a number of sources. These sources
include the FAA and JAA, the aviation industry, academia, Congress, government agencies, and tech-
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view, however, are the exchanges of view that take place between the authorities (as well as with industry) on issues of certification procedure.
Among the matters treated at the Bordeaux annual meeting, and subject
to follow-up reported at San Francisco, were procedures for manufacturers' appeals against adverse decisions taken in their regard by the JAA. a 9
The steps eventually taken were fully discussed in draft at joint meetings
of the FAA and JAA, in which industry participated.
An earlier section of this Article emphasized that regulatory cooperation
between national aviation authorities has been fueled in large measure by
a mutual desire to increase the opportunities for cooperation in airworthiness enforcement, in particular the sharing of design certification functions. It is not surprising, therefore, that the increase in regulatory harmonization between the FARs and JARs has been accompanied by more
concerted certification efforts. A good illustration of the latter is the recent
Memorandum of Agreement between the FAA and JAA on the delineation of responsibilities for certification of the McDonnell Douglas MD-11
airplane.2 00 Pursuant to this agreement, whose primary objective is "to
define the working procedures under the respective responsibilities and to
foster a greater understanding of the MD-11 certification issues and concerns between the FAA and JAA and [thereby] strengthen relationships to
minimize differences in aircraft certification standards,"' ' the FAA and
JAA each assumed distinct responsibilities with respect to the MD-11 design certification process."02 The JAA undertook to notify the FAA in
writing of any JAA requirements beyond those of the FAA, to indicate for
which of those the JAA would make its own inquiry, to furnish all relevant JAA regulations and interpretive' material with respect to the others,
and to notify the FAA of any FAA test it wished to witness. 03 For its
nical experts, among other organizations. Id at 11-4. See also id. at HI-2. The idea is then submitted
(in writing) to the "focal points." Id. at 11-3. The "focal points" are various FAA and JAA officials
who are assigned to one particular standard or practice. See id. at A-l-A-5. The focal points "obtain
input from users . . .[and] develop a terms of reference sheet to track the proposal." Final Notes of
Ninth Meeting, at IV-5. Next, an FAA-JAA executive review is carried out, and the idea is transmitted to a "harmonization work group." Id. An additional executive review is done before the idea
enters the official FAA and JAA rulemaking processes. Id. Communication between the authorities is
emphasized. See id.
199. See MNNUTES OF THE OPEN SESSION, SIXTH FAA-JAA MEETING, supra note 1.
200. Memorandum of Agreement between the FAA Transport Airplane Directorate and JAA,
March, 1990 (effective Apr. 9, 1990) at 1 (on file with Federal Aviation Administration, Washington,
D.C.).
201. Id. The agreement further recites as an objective "to minimize redundant inspections, tests,
demonstrations, evaluations, and approvals." Id. at 1-2.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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part, the FAA undertook to satisfy itself and report formally to the JAA
as to the craft's compliance with the FAA certification basis plus the additional JAA requirements as notified by the JAA. 0 4 The agreement further specifies communication routes between the FAA and JAA respecting
the MD-11 certification. 0 5
C.

Agency Information-GatheringAbout Foreign Regulatory Activity
and its Domestic Impact

It should be obvious from what has thus far been said, that the FAA
does not rely on happenstance to discover the regulatory and technological
developments occurring in European aviation circles. Gathering basic information of that sort is essential to the FAA's efforts to assess the impact
of regulatory or technological change abroad on American regulatory and
economic interests. The establishment of an information network in other
regulatory domains may turn out to be more difficult in operation and less
perfect in result than has been the case for civil aviation regulation. The
relatively easy access to European developments enjoyed by the FAA may
be explained in part by the Europeans' candid acknowledgment of our
traditional preeminence in both regulatory and technological aspects of
civil aviation, and their collective judgment that a full, timely, and cooperative-spirited exchange of information is decidedly in their interest. It is
nevertheless likely that the same situation obtains in other regulatory sectors where systematic cooperation with foreign authorities offers promise.
In any event, a full mutuality of information seems to depend upon two
circumstances in particular. The first is the development of a generally
common regulatory agenda. The more or less formal and regular contacts
between the FAA and JAA described earlier help ensure that at any given
time both sets of authorities are addressing parallel regulatory and technical problems. The second element favoring mutual access to information
on current developments is a more purely operational understanding that
research, study, and recommendations generally speaking will be undertaken by joint working or study groups, on which, as has been seen, private sector interests on both sides likewise may be represented.
A particularly productive area of collaboration was in the development
of a rule for rejected-take-off performance for transport aircraft. As a result of successive meetings among FAA and JAA technical staff and European and American manufacturers and pilot groups, a solution is under
development that will be satisfactory to both sets of regulatory authori204. Id.

205.
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ties.2"" Implementation in the United States will require modification of
FAR 25.207
D.

Techniques for Communicating U.S. Agency and Private Party
Views to Foreign Authorities

When matters pass from the study to the action phase, the JAA routinely notifies the FAA of all notices of proposed amendment (or NPAs),
as the Europeans call their nearest equivalent to our notices of proposed
rulemaking (NPRMs). 20 ' NPA's are formulated by the JAA Joint Steering Committee,'0 9 upon the advice of one or more JAA technical study
groups. In all likelihood, the content of these NPA's will come as no surprise to the FAA as it will have sprung in whole or in part from prior
consultations. But the notices do serve as formal reminders that JAA action in the nature of an amendment to the JARs is about to be taken and
that final FAA comments are still welcome. When the JAA recently issued an NPA on the subject of tuned gust, it notified the FAA as well as
industry and held meetings jointly with both. Following final comments,
the NPA will be sent again to one or more JAA technical study groups
for reconsideration arid report to the Joint Steering Committee for eventual acceptance or rejection. On the tuned gust subject, the NPA process
eventually resulted in rule changes acceptable to all parties.210
Among the clearest signs of the openness of channels between the FAA
and JAA is the latter's practice of entertaining for adoption any amendments that the FAA actively considers introducing into the Federal Aviation Regulations. The JAA has thus shown its aversion to allowing unintended disparities between the JAR and any parallel FAR that may exist.
This spirit of conscious parallelism does not necessarily ensure agreement
between the FAA and JAA. However, where agreement cannot be
reached, the JAA has adopted the practice of publishing an underlined
version of the JAR in order to facilitate comparison with its American
counterpart and the identification of differences.
206. NOTES OF SEVENTH FAA-JAA MEETING, supra note 189, at 20-21.
207. See Remarks by Admiral Busey, supra note 198, at 8.
208. For a detailed comparison of differences between the JAA's and FAA's rulemaking
processes, see GAO REPORT, supra note 162, at 33-36.
209. The Joint Steering Committee consists chiefly of representatives of the civil airworthiness
authorities of the participating countries, plus representatives of the manufacturing industry, operators
and pilots. See Joint Airworthiness Requirements, supra note 165, at 2.
210. NOTES OF SEVENTH FAA/JAA MEETING, supra note 189, app. at 1. An NPA on
crashworthiness and seat configurations has also been subject to discussion in joint FAA-JAA gatherings. Id. at 2.

[Vol. 24

AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION COOPERATION

The scale of collaboration between the FAA and JAA is manifestly the
result of the latter's conscious desire to build its developing airworthiness
standards upon existing FAA regulations, while at the same time enlisting
FAA interest in modifications that the JAA deems advisable.2 11 Although
the FAA has responded enthusiastically to these overtures, it understandably has not had the same incentive to conduct a reciprocally comprehensive review of European airworthiness standards. Thus, the JAA's more
or less systematic examination of the Federal Aviation Regulations has not
quite been matched by a parallel FAA review of all the JARs currently in
effect. Such review might offer an additional opportunity to identify regulatory dissonance between the European and American authorities.
E.

American Preparationfor InternationalAirworthiness
Consultation

Although previous knowledge of a foreign regulatory system and its
practices seems a perfectly obvious aid to productive collaboration with the
foreign authorities, the point has received special emphasis from all participants in the process, American and foreign alike. Complete knowledge
and understanding of the regulations of the other party, however, implies
a heavy and long-term investment in learning a foreign language and becoming familiar with a foreign culture. Not every American regulatory
agency may be prepared to make such an investment, and that investment
may not be sound in the case of all agencies. Nevertheless, the relationship
of that investment to results achieved by the FAA is unmistakable. For
example, Craig Beard, the FAA's director of the Aircraft Certification
Service in Washington, spent several years at the agency's European office
and was professionally and personally acquainted with his European
counterparts and their practices. That undoubtedly had something to do
with his commitment to placing European and American regulatory cooperation in aviation matters on an institutionalized footing. His personal
interest in expanding the scope of the FAA's international aircraft certification activities has since brought the agency into contact with authorities
in Asia, South America, and Eastern Europe. On the other hand, the interest and inclination of one person alone are not sufficient to sustain a
program of cooperative regulatory activity. In the case of the FAA, that
211. On certain matters still under research and development, the JAA has consciously decided
to allow the FAA "to carry the ball" and to participate only marginally at the R&D stage. Such is the
case, for example, with powered-lift standards for rotorcraft. NOTES OF SEVENTH FAA-JAA MEETING, supra note 189, at 24-25. The reasoning is that on relatively noncontroversial matters, or at

early information-gathering stages, it is more economical for one set of authorities to "take the lead"
in rule development.
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interest and inclination came to infiltrate the agency's entire Aircraft Certification Service, with each FAA regional certification chief personally
engaged in cooperation with the JAA regulatory apparatus under the
leadership of that person.
F. Caveats About Direct InternationalAgency-to-Agency Influences
1. Problems of Language and Meaning
The experience of the FAA Aircraft Certification Service in dealing
with European counterpart agencies offers good illustrations of the difficulties that arise out of differences in language and meaning. The best
way to avert or minimize these sorts of difficulties is to acquire a sensitivity to the circumstances in which they are likely to arise and to adopt
specific practices designed to reduce their incidence. For instance, the
FAA and JAA have found it useful to employ the same terms and the
same format when inscribing agreed upon matters within their national
regulations and to keep national reformulations to a minimum if not eliminate them altogether.2 1
An identity of texts does not, however, ensure an identity of interpretations. As the manufacturer of the Boeing 747 sought to comply with JARs
that were based on the same language as preexisting FARs, it found that
the Europeans were interpreting that language somewhat differently.
Good examples of the differential meaning of shared language are the
terms "new" and "derivative" aircraft. As much as anything else, industry
preference for an orderly and unambiguous regulatory environment has
prompted FAA and JAA efforts to reach a single understanding of shared
language. Those efforts understandably involve dialogue between national
authorities and a mutual willingness to seek clarity and occasionally to
compromise.21 3
As for the resolution of misunderstandings that do arise, there is no
single remedy. In the narrow context of the bilateral airworthiness agreements, the accepted rule, in case of ambiguity in a country's laws, regulations or requirements, is to adopt the interpretation of that country." 4
212. JAA documents and discussions are generally in the English language. For most of the
JAA countries, however, regulations and other documents must ultimately be enacted in the jurisdiction's official language or languages.
213. Industry representatives repeatedly emphasize the importance of consistent interpretation
and application by national authorities of their common standards. See, e.g., MINUTES OF THE OPEN
SESSION, SIXTH FAA-JAA MEETING, supra note 215, at 6.
214. A typical bilateral airworthiness agreement clause reads: "In the case of conflicting interpretations of the laws, regulations, or requirements pertaining to certifications or approvals under this
Agreement, the interpretations of the aeronautical authorities of the Contracting State whose law,
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This not only makes sense, but is central to justifying the full faith and
credit that importing states under such agreements are asked to give to the
findings and conclusions of exporting states. Of course, a precondition to
any effective international communication in the regulatory arena is accurate and up-to-date information by each country of the other's regulatory
criteria in force. Accordingly, bilateral airworthiness agreements commonly impose an obligation of mutual notification of regulatory change.2" 5
2.

Problems of Style

In matters as substantively complex and technical as airworthiness regulation, matters of regulatory style are bound to play a relatively minor
role. Nevertheless, it is useful to point out the possibility that different
national regulatory establishments also may take somewhat different regulatory approaches, and that these differences may occasionally be productive of misunderstanding.
Conversations with JAA officials suggest that the European authorities
generally favor a better organized and more systematic approach to regulatory drafting, and accordingly strive for a higher degree of comprehensiveness and structure, than is common in American regulatory practice.
The JAA's pronounced willingness to take the existing FARs as a regulatory point of departure has served to mask considerably the extent to
which they naturally favor a more code-like methodology. In fact, some of
the differences that have arisen in FAA/JAA harmonization efforts may
be explained by the Europeans' preference for a complete and orderly
regulatory framework. For their part, the Europeans have had to deal
with a relatively unfamiliar tendency on the FAA's part to target
problems on a decidedly concrete basis with an emphasis on narrow solutions to reasonably well-focused problems.
My impression is that these stylistic differences can easily be exaggerated, that they do not loom especially large in highly technical fields like
airworthiness regulation, that the preeminence of the FARs has given the
American approach a decided edge, and that the authorities on both sides
have shown a marked capacity to bridge what are at bottom relatively
inconsequential differences of style. The FAA and JAA share both a
strong sense of programmatic purpose and a sensitivity to function, which
regulation, or requirement is being interpreted shall prevail." FAA ADVISORY CIRCULAR No. AC
21-18, supra note 100, app. 1, at 3.
215. Accordingly, bilateral airworthiness agreements typically provide that "[tihe competent authority of each Contracting State shall keep the competent authority of the other Contracting State
currently informed on all relevant laws, regulations and requirements in its State." Id. at 4.
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in turn lend their efforts a powerfully pragmatic flavor and better serve
the public interest in promoting aviation safety.
3.

Defining "Foreign" for International Regulatory Purposes

To the baseline difficulties of language and meaning in any international communication situation must be added the problem of defining
terms such as "foreign," "country of production," or "place of manufacture" that recur in this regulatory setting. The latter problem is heightened by the international realities of the industry itself that is being regulated. Take again, for example, the bilateral airworthiness agreements
under which certification services performed by the authorities of one
country may be conclusively relied upon by the authorities of another for
product import purposes. The agreements typically refer to production in
one country for export to another. However, many aircraft and appliances
consist of component parts or subassemblies originating in several countries. Prominent examples include the Boeing 747, McDonnell Douglas
DC-10, Lockheed L-1011, Concorde, and Aerospatiale A300B Airbus.
For the sake of regulatory simplicity, the FAA traditionally has considered the country of production to be the country where units of the product first come together as end units, are tested as such for certification
purposes, and receive their first approval by a recognized airworthiness
authority.2" 6 Certain segments of the manufacturing industry have complained that this practice thwarts their preference for postponing final assembly. and flight testing of a product until after its export in an unassembled condition, because it requires post-testing disassembly for export and
consequently retesting upon reassembly abroad. 2 7 Moreover, the definition of "country of production" requires that even component parts manufacturers in the importing country must ship those parts to the country of
aircraft manufacture for the final assembly and flight test required for
export certification.2 1" The components then may well be removed for reshipment along with the disassembled aircraft for later reassembly.21 9
These scenarios illustrate the problems of squaring regulatory simplicity
with changes in the market realities (notably the emergence of multinational products) that the regulated industries are facing.
Problems of classification have become still more acute with the emergence of multinational joint ventures in the aeronautical manufacturing
field, typified by the International Aero Engines Model V-2500 engine.
216. FAA

EXPORT/IMPORT,

supra note 75, at 24.

217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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Where true joint ventures are concerned, the term "country of manufacture" can lose meaning altogether. In the joint venture situation, the FAA
and its foreign counterparts now deliberately determine and refer to a
"country of prime accountability" for the regulation of product design,
production quality, and the airworthiness of completed products.2 2
G.

The Inter-Agency Dimension: Consultations with the Departments
of Commerce, Defense, Labor, State, and Transportation and the
Office of U.S. Trade Representative

Because of its obvious international trade and foreign relations implications, the FAA's airworthiness certification operations may be of interest
to other federal agencies. Consultation with other agencies is most obviously in order at points where the federal government enters into binding
international engagements. Thus, our membership in the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) came about as a result of the negotiations conducted by the State Department at the Chicago Conference of
1944.*"1 The United States is represented today at ICAO meetings at all

levels by officials of the Department of Transportation, including the Federal Aviation Administration. 2 2 However, before taking any official position on matters of importance, they will report to the Interagency Group
on International Aviation (IGIA), which consists of the principally interested executive branch departments and agencies: Commerce, Defense,
Labor and State, and the Office of U.S. Trade Representative. 2 '
Similarly, whenever a foreign government requests the conclusion of a
bilateral airworthiness agreement with the United States, or requests that
an existing agreement be revised, the FAA submits the request, together
with any supporting materials, to the interested federal agencies represented in the Interagency Group. 2 4 If the initial reaction is positive, the
State Department asks the FAA to examine the requesting country's airworthiness certification system to establish the appropriateness of entering
into a bilateral agreement with the country or modifying the existing
agreement. 28 As noted, the FAA makes determinations about the foreign
airworthiness authority's technical competence and regulatory efficacy, the
adequacy and completeness of the foreign country's airworthiness laws
and regulations, and the state of the foreign industry's design and manu220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
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Beard Remarks, supra note 6.
See MEMORANDUM ON ICAO, supra note 45, at 5-6.
See generally 22 U.S.C. § 5501 (1990).
See Sullivan, supra note 111, at 4-6.
Id.
Id. at 5.
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facturing capability, in order to decide whether the country's aviation authorities and industry will be able to perform their responsibilities under a
bilateral agreement. 228 The FAA also considers the country's need for an
agreement enabling it to export products to the United States, since a
proliferation of needless accords is rightly deemed undesirable. 22" Although these determinations rest largely on FAA shoulders, the other
2 8 FAA and
agencies, particularly the State Department, are consulted.
State Department counsel jointly negotiate and draft any agreement with
their foreign country counterparts, and the State Department reserves the
right of final review of any such draft.2 29 Once approved, the agreement is
the subject of an exchange of diplomatic notes between the State Department and its foreign counterpart.2 30 Negotiation of a new bilateral agreement normally takes three to four years, and the amendment of an existing agreement takes about two years. 23 '
Once this international legal framework is in place, resort by the FAA
to the Interagency Group on International Aviation is unusual. Absent
some discernible controversy of direct interest to one or more of those
agencies, the FAA acts largely on its own. These controversies are rare.
One example-the repair stations episode-surfaces later in this Article.
In another, better-known example, the FAA had decided, in the wake of a
major Chicago air disaster involving the DC-10, to immediately ground
all such U.S.-registered aircraft pending investigation and to deny takeoff
and landing rights to non-U.S. craft of that design. 32 This action, which
impaired the functioning of foreign as well as domestic airlines in the
United States, provoked a strong negative reaction from the major foreign
aviation authorities and eventually the foreign governments themselves.
The State Department understandably became involved in negotiations
over the duration and continuing necessity of the grounding order. However, the grounding order was not lifted until the FAA satisfied itself that
the DC-10 design had no unsafe features.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. If a decision is made not to enter into a bilateral agreement, the requesting country
receives a written report specifying the reasons and indicating what steps need to be taken to ready the
situation. Id. Such a report may become the basis for a technical assistance agreement between the
FAA and the foreign country in keeping with the Standards Agreement referred to above. Supra note
103 and accompanying text.
231. Id.
232. The Big Travel Mess, NEWSWK., June 18, 1979, at 22.
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VII.

THE MIRROR-IMAGE QUESTION: WHEN AND

FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS PARTICIPATE IN

FAA

How Do

REGULATION?

Like so many other aspects of the relationship between the United
States and Western Europe, influence over foreign regulatory activity no
longer travels a one-way street. The FAA's involvement in European airworthiness developments has brought with it a corresponding influence of
European authorities over FAA aviation safety policy. This development
can best be illustrated by a concrete example involving the regulation of
helicopter design.
A.

The Helicopter Regulations: A Case Study in Bilateralism

In the wake of a series of recent mishaps, Britain, Norway and certain
other North Sea perimeter countries recently decided to re-examine safety
aspects of the use of helicopters for servicing oil rigs operating in the
harsh North Sea environment and eventually to adopt appropriate joint
airworthiness requirements for those vehicles. These countries individually advised the FAA's Aircraft Certification Service that they did not regard existing FAA airworthiness regulations governing helicopters as sufficiently protective, and that they were not prepared to adopt those
regulations as their own unless the regulations were made more stringent
in certain ways.
The FAA responded by notifying those countries-and indeed the JAA,
of which they were members-that an update of the helicopter FARs (in
particular, Parts 27 and 29) was planned, and by asking them to withhold
action until the updating process could be completed.2"3 The FAA understandably also sought to know in advance the respects in which the
Europeans thought the American helicopter standards inadequate. There
ensued a considerable exchange of information, the FAA advising the
JAA of its own helicopter safety concerns and of the regulatory changes it
was considering to address them. The JAA then offered detailed written
commentary, based on the reactions of the various European aviation
agencies, both on the existing FAA rules and their prospective reform. 3 '
The JAA actually formed a joint European study group on Parts 27 and
29 to coordinate this effort."3 5
Much of what the Europeans proposed-the Aircraft Certification Service estimates it at seventy percent-proved immediately persuasive to the
FAA and was incorporated into a draft proposed regulation that itself
233. See 54 Fed. Reg. 17,936 (1989) (proposed Apr. 25, 1989) (background).
234. See id.
235. Id.
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eventually became the subject of an FAA notice of proposed rulemaking. 6 The convergence of views, and prospects for still further convergence, were such that the JAA agreed to defer adoption of its own helicopter standards-which at that time still would have differed
significantly from the modified American proposal-until the FAA
rulemaking procedure had run its course and all opportunities for European influence had been used. During the FAA comment period, the European study group was persuaded that certain changes it had advocated
were unnecessary, but still it continued to press for other changes in the
proposed FAA rule that would align it more closely with European thinking. In the course of extended discussions at the FAA's Fort Worth office,
the JAA countries took a hard line on what they considered the remaining
essential safety features missing from the FAA's proposed helicopter rules.
A final rule was adopted in September 1990,3

incorporating some, but

not all, of the recommendations of the JAA; there remained certain discrete points on which the FAA and JAA could not bridge their differences, with the Europeans generally favoring stricter standards. The
FAA's position was that it would seek to distinguish among the outstanding points of difference according to the degree of consensus among the
individual JAA states, their apparent priority in importance to the
Europeans, and the strength of the FAA's own informed convictions.
Though not unproblematic, the scenario just described has distinctly
positive attributes. It seems basically useful and appropriate that the FAA
work constructively with its European counterparts on regulatory matters
of common interest. In the case of civil aviation airworthiness governance,
those interests are not only common but, as we have seen, highly interdependent. The willingness of the JAA in principle to build their helicopter
standards, and indeed their standards on virtually all other airworthiness
matters, on the current Federal Aviation Regulations was an early and
enduring sign of genuine good will. However, the impression of some persons in the FAA Aircraft Certification Service is that this attitude on the
part of the JAA, and related practices like regular consultation with the
FAA on prospective deviations from the FARs, is in part a product of the
FAA's own amenability to discussion and compromise.
The helicopter standards episode also shows how difficult it is to identify exactly who is seeking to influence whom. When the FAA persuaded
the JAA that certain modifications the latter had been seeking to bring to
the FARs on helicopter airworthiness were unnecessary, the FAA in effect
236. Id.
237. 55 Fed. Reg. 38,964 (Sept. 21, 1990) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 27, 29).
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influenced the JAA's own helicopter rulemaking. This is evidence that
influence is truly being exerted in both directions.
The importance attached to harmonization of helicopter airworthiness
standards is such that the FAA and JAA have entered into an express
undertaking to pursue that goal. Their "Letter of Intent" to this effect
expresses an undertaking to cooperate toward the convergence of standards and advisory materials by January 1, 1993.2"' The agreement commits the authorities to a series of early joint industry/authorities meetings
on both the general design and precise wording of further changes needed.
for development of "a compatible mutual approach." 28 9 In order to facilitate their dialogue, the FAA and JAA have designated specific contact
persons for each relevant subpart of the helicopter regulations to be
harmonized.2 40
The pattern of reciprocal regulator-to-regulator influence had already
surfaced in the JAA's first major JAR initiative, the certification standards for large transport airplanes. The development in the 1970s of new
European models, exemplified by the Concorde and later the Airbus, represented an effort by European aircraft manufacturers to enter a lucrative
market previously dominated by American enterprise. The American attitude toward the new technology and its regulation was understandably
ambivalent. On the one hand, United States manufacturers rightly perceived a threat to their traditional dominance of the market. They also
feared that certain of the standards likely to be adopted by the JAA would
be tailored to suit the new European entries but not their established
American rivals, and would thus operate as exclusionary and unnecessary
trade barriers. On the other hand, they had to welcome the technological
advances brought by this more competitive environment and to concede
the necessity of regulating for their safety and for the protection of environmental values.
As in the helicopter case, the JAA commenced by borrowing the pertinent Federal Aviation Regulations, in this case Part 25. However, the
JAA favored certain modifications and, at that time, was prepared to al238. Letter of Intent for Coordination on U.S. FARs and European Helicopter Airworthiness
Codes (March 20, 1990) [hereinafter Letter of Intent for Coordination]. The agreement arose out of a
special meeting in Paris among the FAA Rotorcraft Directorate, the JAA Helicopter Airworthiness
Study Group (HASG), AIA and AECMA. See John J. Shapley & Robert T. Weaver, Trip Report:
Joint Airworthiness Requirements (JAR) 27/29 Meeting in Paris, France, March 19-21 (March 30,
1990).
239. Letter of Intent for Coordination, supra note 238, at 1.
240. Id. app. D.
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low national variances among the JAA countries.2 4 The FARs and JARs
were not then fully identical. Over the next ten years, as national variances within Europe were gradually phased out, the JAA remained in
constant communication with its FAA counterparts. The agencies discussed the further regulatory modifications for large transport airplanes
that technological change and heightened environmental concerns were
causing European and American regulators to consider. In fact, the FAA
Aircraft Certification Service was consulted by the JAA on all regulatory
issues arising over the ten-year period, and the JAA participated as such
in all the relevant FAA rulemakings. Ultimately, virtually every significant change made to Part 25 during this period was reproduced in the
parallel JARs, and vice versa.
This process apparently replicates itself across the broad spectrum of
technical issues confronting American and European civil aviation authorities. Both sides acknowledge their interdependence by conferring extensively before making changes of any moment in their airworthiness regulations. Equally important, and by way of anticipation of these changes,
they have formed joint working groups to address technical and regulatory
problems as they arise and to formulate common solutions. Those having
perhaps the most direct interest in a common American and European
response to emerging airworthiness problems-AIA, GAMA, and
AECMA-have done their best to encourage the progressive harmonization of standards as they evolve. By way of a more current example, the
JAR 21 group (consisting of French, German and United Kingdom authorities and AECMA representatives) began in 1988 to develop administrative codes for aeronautical products, both domestic and imported. It
comprehensively reviewed FAR 21 and within eighteen months had produced a proposed JAR 21 that diverged in certain respects from the
American version on such technical issues as flammability and gust requirements and collision avoidance systems. Joint deliberations are underway to determine whether some of the provisions the Europeans still
would like to introduce into JAR 21 might be agreeable to the FAA and
might become the subject of parallel FAA proposed rulemaking.
Although the FAA may be unusual in the extent to which it engages
and attends to the opinion of foreign country regulators, it is difficult to
fault the FAA for openness and responsiveness of that kind. In a field
such as civil aviation, the need for international cooperation is evident and
241. At first, only five JAR countries-Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden-adopted JAR requirements as the national standard. The other countries basically offered manufacturers a choice between conforming to the JAR requirements or else to the existing national
standards as modified.
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a refusal to engage in that process will inevitably prove costly. It will do
the American aviation industry little good to secure relatively relaxed
safety standards from the domestic regulatory agency when, as a practical
matter, its products still must pass regulatory muster with more exacting
foreign authorities who ultimately decide what air safety within their jurisdictions reasonably requires.
B.

The Repair Station Episode: Drawing the Line Between
Unilateralism and Bilateralism

Notwithstanding the mostly positive record of the FAA's international
certification activities, problems and misunderstandings occasionally have
arisen. FAA policy on the use of foreign repair stations for the servicing of
U.S.-registered planes provided one such occasion. Under a longstanding
FAA regulation, absent an emergency situation, U.S.-registered craft normally could be serviced by foreign mechanics or at foreign repair stations
only if the craft were predominantly used abroad.24 Besides limiting the
circumstances permitting foreign repairs to U.S. air vessels ("the scope of
work restriction"), the regulation also barred the use of foreign mechanics
and repair stations not previously approved by the FAA. 4 3 An awkward
and costly system of certification of foreign mechanics and repair stations
was accordingly put into place. 44 In the face of widespread disregard of
these rules, the FAA's Flight Standard Service (Maintenance Division)
issued a reminder to the airlines and to foreign aviation authorities both of
the importance of the rules and of the FAA's intention to enforce them.
This statement of FAA policy on the use of foreign repair stations by
U.S.-registered aircraft and on the certification of foreign stations and
mechanics provoked a strongly negative reaction from foreign governments
and from United States airlines. Both forcefully lobbied for a change in
the regulations, and brought the matter to the attention of the Secretaries
of Commerce and Transportation and the United States Trade Representative. As demonstrated by the involvement of the USTR, the regulations
were depicted as an unjustified nontariff barrier to trade in services, as
well as an affront to foreign states, particularly those with which the
United States had seen fit to enter into bilateral airworthiness agreements.
The airlines and foreign governments did not particularly take issue
with the claim that the FAA, bearing responsibility to third parties for the
safety of U.S.-registered craft, had an interest in ensuring the adequacy of
242. See 55 Fed. Reg. 45,124 (proposed Nov. 24, 1987) (background).
243. Id.
244. Id.
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repair services wherever performed, though the appropriateness of an
FAA certification program for foreign repair stations was not conceded.
The focus of complaint was the confinement of foreign repairs to craft
predominantly flown abroad, and the FAA eventually sought to eliminate
this restriction through FAA rulemaking.2 " In the face of vocal opposition by the International Association of Machinists to the proposed reform, Congress chose, through a rider to the FAA appropriations bill, to
bar the FAA for one full year from adopting any final rule on the subject.2 46 After the year had passed, in November 1988 to be precise, the
.FAA adopted a final rule eliminating the restriction.2 47
In some respects, this episode illustrates FAA resourcefulness and responsiveness to international aviation realities. However, the Maintenance
Division's expression of policy on the use of foreign repair stations came
as a jolt to the agency's counterparts abroad and generated deep dismay.
This reaction was due as much to the apparent unilateralism of the FAA
position as to the position itself. Moreover, although the prospect of the
FAA conducting inspections of foreign repair stations was not received as
unfavorably as the scope of work restriction, there is evidence that it too
was greatly resented as unduly suspicious of foreign agency know-how
and competence in aviation regulation. Had Maintenance Division personnel effectively communicated with their European counterparts, they
might have anticipated the foreign reaction and approached the repair station problem differently from the outset. Consideration might also have
been given, so far as the adequacy of foreign repairs is concerned, to a
system of mutual recognition of repair station certification, a system not as
yet embraced even by the bilateral airworthiness agreements with partners
in whom the FAA has the highest level of confidence. Arrangements of
that sort might avoid the unhappy prospect of FAA inspection and surveillance of foreign installations. Many persons in the FAA regard the
repair station episode as a costly one in terms of the FAA's foreign relations and one whose damage itself has been difficult to repair.
A positive result of the foreign repair station episode is that the JAA
member countries have begun work on common European standards for
aircraft maintenance. Accordingly, the FAA and JAA are now in the
early stages of pursuing the harmonization of their maintenance standards
and practices, following the aircraft certification model.
245. See generally id.
246. See 53 Fed. Reg. 47,362 (Nov. 22, 1988) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 135, 145)
(background).
247. Id.
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C.

FAA Policy and Practice on JAA Involvement in Rulemaking

This Article demonstrates how the involvement of the JAA in FAA
rulemaking has evolved out of a shared and largely industry-supported
interest of the agencies in establishing and maintaining common airworthiness standards. It also illustrates the natural linkage between the commonality of those standards and the feasibility of an international sharing
of responsibility for the implementation of those standards through a system of mutual recognition of tests and certificates.
The FAA's borrowing of foreign country certifications takes place
within a formal framework of well-established, treaty-based bilateral cooperation. The decision when, under what conditions, and to what extent
to utilize the enforcement services of a foreign governmental agency inevitably requires the sound exercise of judgment by an agency. It also requires continuing review of the technical adequacy of those services and
their degree of "fit" with the domestic regulatory operations in which they
are enlisted. Provided the necessary safeguards are observed in entering
into, implementing, and reviewing these administrative arrangements,
they do not raise substantial issues of principle.
The involvement of foreign government authorities in the rulemaking
process as such raises more delicate questions. Although, as noted, this
pattern of involvement is more the product of a natural evolution than of
planning, it has reached the point where a statement of FAA procedural
policy is in order. The following sections of this Article describe the basic
FAA practices on the solicitation and utilization of foreign regulatory
views, and then examine their degree of harmony with the conventional
norms of American administrative procedure.
1. FAA Solicitation of Foreign Government Views
Habits of rulemaking cooperation between the FAA and JAA have developed so far that it can now safely be said that no notice of proposed
rulemaking on design, production, or airworthiness certification matters,
or related issues, is likely to be issued until the JAA has first had an
opportunity to examine what is about to be proposed and been invited to
comment. To put the matter differently, the JAA has become de facto a
privileged rulemaking participant, accustomed to being consulted by the
FAA in a systematic fashion and at a distinctly pre-NPRM stage. Only
recently, the FAA and JAA agreed that whenever NPRMs and NPAs on
the same subject differ, each will call specific attention to the points of
19931
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difference so as to allow parties commenting
on the proposed rule or
248
amendment to take them into account.

In fact, to describe JAA involvement as systematic and pre-NPRM
would be to underestimate the thoroughness of FAA/JAA collaboration
and the "earliness" at which it is likely to commence. The FAA does not
simply submit ripe and full-blown FAR proposals to the JAA for comment. On the contrary, any significant airworthiness initiative entertained
by either side will now probably emerge from a joint technical study
group comprising both FAA and JAA officials, and likely industry from
both sides. Exchanges of view and the search for common solutions now
appear to characterize the process from its earliest stages. Recent examples of joint projects include the design of a common streamlined ETOPS
approval process, the evaluation of passenger protective breathing equipment, the development of contingency ratings for engines on fixed-wing
aircraft, and the protection of aircraft from high energy radiated electromagnetic fields. At San Francisco, the FAA felt constrained to share with
the JAA the fact that it was entertaining the idea of oral as opposed to
written export airworthiness applications, even though the idea was still
in the most inchoate of forms. The FAA did not want to proceed with the
idea unless the JAA was aware of its actions.
In any event, and irrespective of the extent of prior collaboration, all
FAA notices of proposed rulemaking are routinely sent to the JAA, and
routinely receive JAA comment. The JAA is familiar with the procedural
models of American rulemaking and cognizant of the fact that the formal
publication of proposed rules and the invitation to public comment from
interested parties are integral components of FAA rulemaking. FAA notices of proposed rulemaking have on occasion been amended to take account of subsequent joint FAA/JAA task force recommendations. 2 49 From
time to time, the desire to explore fully and resolve differences of view
between the two sets of authorities has caused the Europeans to request
an extension of the usual APA public comment period.250 In the case of
2 1
Technical Standard Orders (TSOs), that request has been granted.
In some situations, discrepancies between the FARs and JARs have not
been eliminated, or eliminated soon enough, and private groups have ac248.

CLOSED SESSION-AUTHORITIES CONCLUSIONS AND ACTIONS, SIXTH

FAA-JAA

MEET-

ING, BORDEAUX, FRANCE 6-7 (June 1989) on ile with Law and Policy in International Business.

249. For example, an NPRM on reduced screen height for wet and contaminated runways was
revised to incorporate a number of recommendations of the joint industry/airworthiness authorities
safety enhancement task force. 52 Fed. Reg. 45,578 (Nov. 30, 1987).
250. See MINUTES OF THE OPEN SESSION, SIXTH FAA-JAA MEETING, supra note 1, at

13-16.
251. Id. at 14.
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cordingly introduced petitions for rulemaking to that effect. As recently as
July 1990, AIA and AECMA jointly petitioned the FAA and JAA to
amend certain regulations on certification flight testing,2 5 for the stated
purpose of standardizing procedures on that subject and thereby facilitating the mutual recognition of tests.2"'
In order that the JAA remain abreast of the FAA's regulatory agenda
on airworthiness, the FAA periodically sends it a version of that agenda
and a detailed status report on each pending or prospective item, including
proposed rulemakings. Such agenda and status reports are communicated,
at a minimum, once a year in advance of the FAA/JAA annual meeting.
American industry has shown a basically supportive attitude toward
FAA/JAA collaboration. This support has been conditional, however, on
the FAA's satisfaction of industry concerns over: (1) the extent and timing
of industry's involvement in the process, and (2) the potential competitive
advantage that the process may confer on European manufacturers.
The first of these problems has already been discussed at several points
in this Article. Although the AIA and other industry groups evidently believe that the FAA has done a better job over time of involving industry in
its collaboration with the JAA and making joint FAA/JAA activities reasonably transparent, they nevertheless remain concerned that regulatory
compromises might be struck between the authorities without an opportunity for adequate and timely industry influence. 2 " They want an adequate technical explanation of all regulatory initiatives at an early stage
and an ample opportunity for comment and influence.2 55
The second and more focused concern of American industry is that
FAA/JAA collaboration may indirectly confer an unfair competitive advantage on European manufacturing interests. The AIA reports, for example, that because AECMA has a closer working relationship with the
JAA than AIA has with the FAA, AECMA enjoys superior access to
information about FAA/JAA initiatives and indeed about the FAA's own
regulatory intentions. With this risk in mind, the AIA has formally requested that the FAA review and amend its procedures so as to "[k]eep all
parties advised of issues at the same time" and "[p]rovide an environment
in which all parties can effectively participate in the process of development of common ground between European and American airworthiness
252. The affected FAR provisions are 14 C.F.R. §§ 25.143(c), .143(f), .149, .201. 55 Fed. Reg.
29,062 (1990) (proposed July 17, 1990).
253. 55 Fed. Reg. 29,862 (July 17, 1990).
254. Letter from Don Fuqua, President, Aerospace Industries Association, to Admiral James B.
Busey, FAA Administrator (Oct. 23, 1990), reprinted in GAO REPORT, supra note 162, at 44-45.
255. Id.
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requirements, safety requirements and regulations."2 5 8 American industry
is thus concerned not only with the question of whether its European
counterpart will derive unfair advantage from the substantive rules that
the FAA and JAA jointly develop, but also with the question of whether
the collaborative process itself tends to favor those national interests-in
this case, European manufacturers'-that enjoy a closer relationship with
their own national authorities.
2.

FAA Utilization of Foreign Government Views

Prior sections of this Article have shown that JAA opinion influences
FAA regulatory policy chiefly through one of two processes. Sometimes
the JAA has communicated its reservations about existing Federal Aviation Regulations in the course of considering them for adoption as JARs,
in which case an often long and uncertain process of consensus-seeking
follows. A good example is the notice of proposed rulemaking of April
1989 that sought to introduce changes to the type certification requirements for normal and transport category rotorcraft in the interest both of
standardization and improved aviation safety. " ' The changes were based
on proposals that had been submitted to the FAA by a JAA study
group,2" and that proved attractive to the FAA in part because their
adoption would in turn ensure the Europeans' adoption of the balance of
the FAA's rotorcraft type certificate requirements and obviate the development of a new European standard. In other cases, new or modified airworthiness regulations have emerged from a joint program of identification and solution of air safety problems. As the following section of this
Article makes clear, in neither circumstance will the virtues of international consultation relieve the FAA of its obligation to conduct rulemaking
in conformity with the standard American procedural statutes.
It also can happen, however, that a particular requirement is mostly
European in its origins and, in a departure from the usual pattern, the
United States may become the beneficiary of a foreign regulatory initiative. An example is JAR 22, on sailplanes and powered sailplanes, which
derived chiefly from existing German regulations and later likewise came
to be adopted by the Canadian, Australian and Chinese civil aviation authorities. More recently, the FAA took an interest in the JAA's develop256. Letter from Don Fuqua, President, Aerospace Industries Association, to Hon. James S.
Busey, FAA Administrator (Apr. 9, 1990) (on file with author).
257. FAA Notice of Proposed Rulemaking No. 89-10, Rotorcraft Regulatory Changes Based on
European Joint Airworthiness Requirements Proposals, 54 Fed. Reg. 17,936 (1990) (proposed Apr.
25, 1989).
258. 'd.
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ment of a JAR 145 on repair stations once it became clear that the American rule needed updating and that the JAA studies and drafts in
preparation of JAR 145 might be useful."5 9
Increasingly, the impetus for parallel rulemaking has come from joint
European and American (as well as Canadian) industry efforts. In 1989,
aviation manufacturing groups submitted four related petitions for proposed rulemaking and amendments to the FAA and JAA respectively, on
flight test requirements. When rulemaking is initiated concurrently in that
fashion, the likelihood that the FAA will receive and utilize JAA views on
the pending matter is only further enhanced.
Whatever the precise sequence in which it comes about, an expression
of JAA views will normally be sought on any significant FAA airworthiness initiative. For example, the FAA's agenda for a joint meeting with
the European authorities notes that draft copies of a notice of proposed
rulemaking on the measurement of stalls in flight were sent to the JAA
"with a request for comments and . . a joint dialogue on this subject." A
reason for the urgency in that case was the FAA's assumption that the
proposed change could affect both new Boeing and Airbus aircraft, and its
desire that both products be treated equally. Although the influence of
JAA views on the FAA is likely to vary from case to case, they invariably
carry weight, and the question necessarily arises how much weight they
deserve.
Attaching considerable significance to foreign agency views in FAA
rulemaking cannot of course in itself be considered objectionable. On the
other hand, absent strong congressional indications in its favor, any notion
that FAA rules require prior JAA approval would be equally objectionable. One reason why the matter has never been put squarely in terms of a
JAA veto is that the collaborative process tends to begin as early as it
does, thus lessening the likelihood that strongly divergent views along national lines will form at a later date. For example, a joint industry/authority task force of Americans and Europeans on wet and contaminated
runway operations has met periodically to develop a text that might form
the basis both of an NPRM and an NPA on the subject. Similarly, a
series of meetings in 1987 and 1988 of joint American and European technical panels (comprising authorities and industry alike) has produced
draft criteria for transport category powered-lifts.2 6 0 These meetings in
fact were preceded by a public notice and invitation for public comment
259. See infra subpart VII.B.
260. NOTES OF SEVENTH FAA-JAA
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and will eventually be followed by the formal initiation of proposed
rulemaking action. 6
Although international regulatory consensus-seeking is an appropriate
and desirable mode of operation, the fact is that it does not invariably
produce a commonality of views. In that event, yet further efforts to seek
consensus may always be made, but as previously noted there should be
no compulsion to succeed at all costs. At present, the FAA, in response to
a recommendation from the National Transportation Safety Board and in
cooperation with the AIA, is entertaining amendments to its bird ingestion
standards (FAR 33). For its part, the JAA does not believe that the current standards require change and in fact has drafted a proposal (JAR-E)
that would essentially codify them as they now stand. Negotiations are
still ongoing, but perfect agreement between the FAA and JAA does not
appear likely. Six meetings between FAA and JAA engine and propeller
standards staff have been held over a two-year period to narrow progressively the differences between American and European standards. Considerable convergence has occurred, due in part to the practice of assigning
each participant a top priority item for study, comparison and formulation
of a proposed solution wherever important divergences still existed, and
also in part to the joint efforts of European and American manufacturers
to bridge the regulatory differences. The degree of difficulty in reaching
consensus on a given problem turns principally on its technical aspects,
and sometimes on special economic or other interests advanced by industry
or some other constituency on the American or European side. Beyond
that, the moment at which cooperative efforts on a problem are initiated
appears to bear some relation to the degree of difficulty encountered. In
the bird ingestion case, policy thinking on the American side (prompted
by the NTSB), and the formation of preliminary regulatory views, were
well' advanced by the time coordination with the JAA, AIA and AECMA
had begun. Timing, in a way, thus may have contributed to the impasse.
One procedural obstacle to swifter harmonization mentioned with some
emphasis by both the Europeans and by industry (American and European alike) is the strikingly different time frames in which FAA and JAA
rulemaking tend to occur. The American rulemaking process generally
requires a good deal more time than its JAA counterpart, with the result
that by the time the FAA is ready to lend agreement to a given regulatory
proposal the JAA may have substantially reconsidered its thinking or begun entertaining related revisions. This observation only underscores once
again the importance of timing in the achievement of international regulatory consensus.
261. Certification Issues Conference, Notice of Conference, 52 Fed. Reg. 3192 (1987).
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3.

Legal Problems of Integrating International Negotiation with
Domestic Rulemaking

However constructive it may appear to be as agency practice, the FAA's
pattern of consultation with the JAA nevertheless raises a variety of procedural problems of a legal character. The fact that the FAA may be
seeking or receiving commentary from foreign governmental quarters
rather than the more usual private sources should not in principle excuse
it from compliance with the ordinarily applicable procedural statutes.
This section of the Article deals with questions of an agency's legal entitlement to engage in international consultations and the procedural limitations it may have to observe in doing so.
a. Agency Authority to Participate in Government-to-Government
Consultations
A threshold question worth posing is whether the FAA has statutory
authority to engage in the pattern of foreign consultation traced in this
Article. The FAA has proceeded on the assumption that it has that authority, an assumption amply supported by statutory language. As an arm
of the Department of Transportation, the FAA is counseled to "take into
consideration any applicable laws and requirements of foreign countries"
and "not . . .restrict compliance by any air carrier with any obligation,

duty, or liability imposed by any foreign country."2'62 Given such authority, the FAA would seem to be acting on solid statutory ground when
participating in discussions with foreign countries as to their prospective
as well as their present aviation norms.
The FAA's authority in this regard should not, however, be thought to
depend on the existence of statutory language to that precise effect. If consultation with foreign counterparts promises to yield information of use to
an agency in its policymaking functions, then that behavior legitimately
forms part of agency practice. In some regulatory spheres, like the FAA's,
the case for internationalizing the rulemaking process is a compelling one.
Although the agency's authority to engage in international consultations
was not as such drawn into question, the Court of Appeals in Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board,26 3 underscored the
need of the then-existing C.A.B. to consult with foreign counterparts and
the special deference owed by the courts in the name of comity in the
262. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502(a) (1988). The FAA Regulatory Handbook requires that the FAA's
"Administrator shall exercise his powers and duties consistently with the international obligations of
...
FAA REGULATORY HANDBOOK, supra note 6, § 1-4d.
the United States.
263. 517 F.2d 734, 745-46 (2d Cir. 1975). The court cited 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502(a) (1988).
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international aviation arena. "[Tihere is an obvious need for cooperation,
coordination and mutual agreement regarding the regulation of scheduled
and charter services among the countries involved in international air
transportation. "264
In fact, international agency-to-agency consultation also would seem
appropriate in spheres not as inherently "international" as civil aviation,
even though the need for international consultation may not be described
as compelling in such cases. Information on present or prospective foreign
regulatory practice is simply that much more useful knowledge for regulators even of the most purely domestic of subjects. In fact, in a mobile
society and global economy, cross-border standardization in virtually any
regulatory sphere has potential value, and international consultation is accordingly a procedurally rational course of action.
Apart from the general issue of propriety just evoked, the pattern of
FAA/JAA collaboration traced in this Article also raises more specific
questions of conformity with otherwise applicable U.S. procedural statutes. The balance of this section deals with the rulemaking procedures of
the Administrative Procedure Act, as well as with the Government in the
Sunshine and Federal Advisory Committee Acts, and more particularly
with the procedural mandates embodied in these enactments. It concludes
with some rather more general observations regarding procedure.,
b.

The Administrative Procedure Act

The fundamental issue presented by the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA)2 15 for our purposes is the extent to which its procedural framework for rulemaking accommodates the extended and systematic dialogue
that increasingly characterizes the FAA/JAA relationship.2"' The duration and intensity of the FAA's pre-NPRM discussions with the JAA are
such that, by the time the FAA proposes a rule for public comment, its
vision of that rule will have been shaped in part by, or at least in collaboration with, its European counterparts. Do any administrative law principles stated or implied in the APA place limits on the character of this preNPRM activity or require the observance of certain formalities when that
activity takes place?
The APA in principle leaves agencies free to gather information and
form provisional policy opinions prior to issuance of a notice of proposed
rulemaking. Whenever confronted with the question, courts have held that
264.
265.
266.
work for

Pan American World Airways v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 517 F.2d at 746.
5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706.
The FAA Regulatory Handbook indicates that the APA constitutes the procedural frameFAA regulatory activity. FAA REGULATORY HANDBOOK, supra note 6, § 1-3a.
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agencies are entitled freely and fully to inform themselves prior to formulating a proposed rule. 6 This is so however "formative" those preNPRM inquiries are intended or in fact turn out to be.2 8
On occasion, litigants have argued that pre-NPRM agency conduct
may practically speaking be so decisive of the outcome that it must be
treated as if part of the rulemaking (i.e., post-NPRM) process and therefore itself preceded by a notice of proposed rulemaking. In In re FTC
Corporate Patterns Report Litigation," ' for example, the court faced a
challenge to the use by the FTC in its rulemaking of records that it had
required private interests to keep and make available to the agency at a
pre-NPRM stage.2 ' 0 The court held that the imposition and use of record-keeping requirements do not amount to rulemaking "merely on the
basis of the possible future use to which the data might be put.

1 71

This

would indicate that there is room for the rulemaking process to begin
before formal initiation of rulemaking.
Even if the conduct of international negotiations does not legally require the prior initiation of proposed rulemaking, it might be claimed that
such activity nevertheless necessitates observance of all APA rulemaking
requirements. But that claim too lacks substance, for essentially the same
reason that formal initiation of proposed rulemaking is not required.
Agencies enjoy a basic freedom in the deliberative processes that precede
issuance of proposed rules. A large component of that freedom is the
agency's liberty to determine when it has gathered sufficient information
to formulate responsibly a proposed regulation and to open it up to public
comment. No agency should be expected to embark blindly on regulatory
ventures. Neither should it be expected to insulate itself from knowledge
of the policies and preferences of foreign counterpart agencies, particularly
in a domain as marked by regulatory interdependence as is civil aviation.
The FAA would be the poorer a regulator as a result. Thus, it would
seem counterproductive if not futile to pose a formal barrier to the FAA's
dealings with the JAA prior to the initiation of rulemaking proceedings.
Provided the FAA, having possibly been influenced by pre-comment period communications with foreign regulatory authorities, remains genuinely open to different expressions of view, it should be legally free to
have those communications.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
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432 F. Supp. 291, 302 (D.D.C. 1977).
Id. at 298-99.
Id. at 302.

§ 4.10, at 189 (3rd ed. 1991).
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The question that logically arises next is whether an agency, having
issued a notice of proposed rulemaking, might then be limited in its international consultative activities. Is the agency required to place in the
rulemaking file information about the prior consultations that led to the
formulation of the proposal? Is it required to record such information
about consultations that take place during the comment period?
Courts occasionally have heard the claim that background information
upon which an agency relies in its proposed rule must accompany the
publication of that rule or otherwise be made available for public comment. 2" Until recently, courts took a broadly negative view of that claim.
In Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v. Boyd, for example, the court relieved the
agency of the burden of producing during the rulemaking proceedings
positive evidence in support of the proposed rule, and allowed that agencies might take final action largely based on information not publicly
presented during the comment period as such, much less at its outset. 7
Certainly the APA does not by its terms require that an agency make
public all the background information upon which it may have relied in
devising its proposal or, for that matter, ultimately adopting a rule.27 4
More recently, courts have held that while an agency may not be required to provide a detailed justification of its rules in proposing them or
to disclose all the information that may have had a bearing in their formulation, it must be forthcoming with some such information, particularly
where it appears to be critical to the proposal. In Lloyd Noland Hospital
and Clinic v. Heckler,"' the plaintiff argued that the Secretary of Health
and Human Services had failed in the notice of proposed rulemaking to
identify adequately the specific study that formed the basis of the proposed rule, and accordingly had deprived the public of its right of effective
comment."" While the court eventually found that any such defect in the
notice was cured through timely though subsequent disclosure of the
study, it also reaffirmed the principle that notices of proposed rulemaking
should identify critical studies when they actually form the proposal's fundamental basis. 2 77 According to the court, a notice must "disclose the

thinking of the agency and the data relied on," at least to the extent neces272. See generally infra notes 328-46 and accompanying text.
273. Flying Tiger Line v. Boyd, 244 F. Supp. 889, 892 (D.D.C. 1965). According to the court,
an agency "may act on the basis of data contained in its own files, on information informally gained
by members of the body, on its own expertise, or on its own views or opinions." Id.
274. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Dept of Transp., 541 F.2d 1178, 1184 (6th Cir. 1976); see generally
SCHWARTZ, supra note 267, § 4.8, at 168 (2d ed. 1984).
275. 762 F.2d 1561 (11th Cir. 1985).
276. Id. at 1565.
277. Id. at 1565-66.
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sary for reasonable and meaningful public comment on the proposal.27 8
Other courts have adopted a substantially similar position.27 9
Under this general view, joint FAA/JAA technical studies forming the
essential foundation of a proposed rule would appear to constitute the sort
of essential background material that should be disclosed in conjunction
with the notice of proposed rulemaking. Such disclosure would substantially promote intelligent public participation in rulemaking. Similarly, if
the FAA were to supplement in some important way the underlying data
on the basis of JAA consultations, or to revise its method of analysis during the course of rulemaking, it should notify interested persons and allow
public comment. The FAA risks reversal of its rule upon judicial challenge if it does not take these precautions.2 8
The next question that arises is whether it suffices simply to disclose
the underlying joint technological data, or whether disclosure of the collaboration itself is required? An agency ought not generally be required to
identify in detail all its sources and all its motivations. But where the
essential technical data for the proposed rule were gathered in a joint
fashion, with a view toward common American and European standards,
that fact may be as essential to an intelligent understanding and appraisal
of the rule as the data itself. Domestic aviation interests and public interest groups may legitimately fear that the pursuit of congruence between
American and European standards will compromise the FAA's ability to
meet its statutory mandate.28 ' They accordingly have a legitimate interest
278. Id. at 1565.
279. See, e.g., City of Stoughton v. EPA, 858 F.2d 747, 752-53 (D.C. Cir. 1988); United States
v. Nova Scotia Food Products Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251 (2d Cir. 1977) ("we do not believe that when
the pertinent research material is readily available and the agency has no special expertise on the
precise parameters involved, there is any reason to conceal the scientific data relied upon from the
interested parties."); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 48-49 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941
(1976); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393-94 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 921 (1974). In the latter case, the District of Columbia Circuit found the EPA's failure to
make public on a timely basis its test procedures and results in adopting new-source performance
standards for Portland cement plants under the Clean Air Act constituted "a critical defect in the
decision-making process." Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelhaus, 486 F.2d. at 392. It further held
that "[ilt is not consonant with the purpose of a rule-making proceeding to promulgate rules on ...
data that, [to a] critical degree, is known only to the agency." Id. at 393.
280. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY

RULEMAKING 179 (2d ed. 1991). The report suggests that, subject to Freedom of Information Act
exemptions, agencies should make all information generated during a pre-NPRM inquiry available
for comment by interested persons early in the rulemaking. See id. It also advises that written comments received during the comment period be placed promptly into the rulemaking file, that persons
who choose to comment at a later date may make reference to them. Id. at 211-12.
281. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1346 (Supp. 1992).
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in timely knowledge that a proposed rule springs in substantial part from
considerations or processes of this sort. For this reason, when communications from other governments have fundamentally or importantly influenced the tenor of a proposed rule, it seems highly desirable that that fact
be acknowledged, and that the substance of those foreign government communications be included in the rulemaking file and identified as such.
It is difficult to identify with certainty the exact materials that agencies
are required under the APA to include in an informal rulemaking file.
The Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel was unable to advise
the OMB precisely about agency obligations in this regard. 82 But it did
suggest that agencies "generally include substantive oral or written communications in the adminiistrative file for public comment and criticism, at
least when these communications occur before the close of public comment," on the theory that the statutorily required opportunity for the public to participate in rulemaking implies the opportunity for public com2 83
ment on all substantive communications from outside the agency.
Notwithstanding the uncertainty, it seems reasonable to suppose that
when a proposed rule reflects an agency's determination to reach regulatory accord on a given matter with foreign counterpart agencies, that fact
should be made known. At the least under circumstances of this kind, both
the substance and the fact of an agency's international consultations would
seem deserving of inclusion in the administrative file.2 84 As a practical

matter, since an agency cannot always confidently predict when a court
will find that foreign consultation played a significant enough role in the
rulemaking process to mandate disclosure, it would do well in cases of
doubt to make such disclosure.
FAA policy and practice appear to reflect these precepts. As a general
principle, the FAA maintains that "the public interest is best served when
282. See 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 107, 108-13 (1981).
283. Id. at 112. The Office of Legal Counsel interpreted APA Section 553 as guaranteeing
judicial review "on the 'whole record,' " and concluded that the latter could be said to include the
substance of communications received. Id. at 111 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706).
284. Agency communications with foreign counterparts might be claimed to fall within a "deliberative process" exception to the APA's disclosure requirements. See United Steelworkers of America
v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1218 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub. nom. Lead Industries Ass'n v.
Donovan, 453 U.S. 913 (1981). However, the Office of Legal Counsel has opined that "the deliberative process does not extend to the legal or policy views of persons outside of executive or independent
agencies." See 5 Op. Off. Legal Counsel, supra note 282, at 114. Such persons, the Office concluded,
"are not within the overall decision process of the rulemaking agency .... Their views not being
protected by a deliberative process exception, the rulemaking agency would be well advised to place
these views in the administrative file and the record for judicial review if the views might affect the
agency's decision." Id.
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regulatory affairs are open to the public to the fullest extent possible." ' 8
In fact, FAA procedures expressly address the problem of pre-NPRM
comments and properly suggest the circumstances in which they should be
made public:
(a) If the substance of the contact [made before the NPRM is
issued] forms one of the bases for issuing the NPRM, [the agency
should] discuss the substance of the contact in the preamble. For
example, if an outside group met with FAA officials to urge certain regulatory changes and the FAA proceeded to an NPRM, the
meeting and interest of the outside group should be described in
the preamble even if "no petition for rulemaking" was submitted.
(b) If there is a legitimate reason not to discuss the contact in the
preamble, [the agency should] prepare a report for the docket
when the NPRM is issued." 6
The FAA appears to observe these principles in practice. In the rotorcraft rulemaking disciissed earlier, the NPRM issued by the FAA made it
perfectly clear that the proposals had been influenced by the thinking of
the European authorities and that they were designed to enable the
Europeans to accept certification standards that in other respects would
parallel the existing FAA standards on rotorcraft 87 The NPRM itself
expanded upon the JAA's role in the genesis and evolution of the
proposals:
Rotorcraft Regulatory Changes Based on European Joint Airworthiness Requirements Proposals
SUMMARY: This notice proposes changes to the type certification requirqments for both normal and transport category rotorcraft. The changes would revise airworthiness standards for systems, propulsion, and airframes, and would introduce safety
improvements, clarify existing regulations, and standardize terminology. The changes are based on some of the proposals that were
submitted to the FAA by the European Joint Airworthiness Requirements (JAR) 29 group. These proposals are intended to encourage the European Community's acceptance of the Federal
Aviation Regulations' rotorcraft type certification requirements
and to obviate the development of a new and different European
285. FAA REGULATORY HANDBOOK, supra note 6, § 1-6(a).
286. Id. at § 11-4(b)(1).
287. 54 Fed. Reg. 17,936 (1989) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 27, 29).
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standard. Adoption of these changes will achieve increased commonality of airworthiness standards among the respective
countries.'"
FAA practice provides additional support for the view that significant
pre-NPRM contracts with the JAA should ultimately be recorded in a
rulemaking file. The agency's procedures contemplate a special rulemaking variant called an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(ANPRM), which recognizes the existence of a problem requiring
rulemaking, but acknowledges the need for additional information before
a notice of proposed rulemaking can be formulated.2" 9 An ANPRM "invites the public to respond to specific questions" or otherwise furnish information helpful to the agency in developing an NPRM or indeed in
deciding that rulemaking is not necessary. 9"
The ANPRM is conducted along basically the same procedural lines as
the conventional NPRM, with a rulemaking docket of information and
comments available to the public. Since pre-NPRM exchanges between
the FAA and JAA produce information of the general sort contemplated
by an ANPRM, a functional view would suggest that such exchanges
should be treated, for publicity and comment purposes, as if conducted in
connection with the FAA's ANPRM procedures, including its requirements of transparency.
Assuming an agency does not at an early stage disclose, at least in general terms, the fact and substance of prior foreign consultations, there is
good statutory reason to suppose that in some cases it would have to do so
anyway at a later date. Section 553(c) of the APA requires agencies to
incorporate in the rules they adopt "a concise general statement of [the
rules'] basis and purpose.12 1 This requirement is supposed to help ensure
that the agency can articulate a rational basis for its rules, and, eventually, to facilitate the task of a reviewing court in examining both the
agency's reasoning and its rules' rationality and conformity to statutory
purpose. 9 2
Determining how extensive and detailed an agency's reference to joint
technical data, foreign consultations or harmonization has to be to satisfy
288. Id.
289. FAA REGULATORY HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at § 9-2.

290. Id.
291. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1988).
292. Lloyd Noland Hosp. & Clinic v. Heckler, 762 F.2d 1561, 1566 (11 th Cir. 1985); Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Chemical Leaman Tank
Lines, Inc. v. United States, 368 F. Supp. 925, 941 (D. Del. 1973); see generally PETER L. STRAUSS,
AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 176 (1989).
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Section 553(c) is not a simple matter. Courts have on occasion upheld
published regulations containing virtually no statement of basis and purpose. 9 3 At other times, they have imposed a level of detail and specificity
dictated by the exigencies of subsequent judicial review,29 4 as well as a
requirement that the statement identify and respond to the principal adverse comments received.2 95 It is easy to see how a court taking the latter
view might regard a statement of basis and purpose as inadequate if it
failed to signal the agency's conscious desire to align its standards with
those of other countries, its fundamental reliance on data jointly collected
with those other countries or its conduct of international consultations,
when one of these events was outcome determinative. Should these factors
surface for the first time on judicial review, and be deemed sufficiently
influential in the process or outcome, a court could well consider the statement of basis and purpose deficient and possibly the notice of proposed
rulemaking as well.
Ultimately, disclosure of international consultations should not be predicated on Section 553(c) alone. That provision comes into play only when
and if a final rule is adopted, and it presumably would require reference
to the foreign consultative process or the harmonization objective only if
the final rule relies on one of these as its basis or purpose. Postponing
notice until that event would be inadequate from the point of view of
promoting public participation in the rulemaking process itself. Outside
groups have a manifestly greater opportunity to contribute to the shaping
of agency policy if they have some sense of how an agency's preliminary
views have been shaped by foreign government-supplied information, foreign government consultations or the conscious pursuit of internationally
common criteria. Accordingly, I would recommend viewing Section 553(c)
as merely a supporting reason for a requirement of disclosure of essential
foreign consultations in appropriate cases, and not as the requirement's
raison d'Etre.
Thus far, the discussion has been cast in terms of an agency's obligation
to place in the rulemaking file information about prior international consultations that shaped the proposed rule. Most of the considerations I have
raised in that context apply equally to consultations taking place during
293. Alabama Ass'n of Insurance Agents v. Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 533 F.2d
224, 236 (5th Cir. 1976).
294. Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The Section 553(c) statement
under this view "must be sufficiently detailed and informative to allow a searching judicial scrutiny of
how and why the regulations were actually adopted." Id.; see also Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA,
462 F.2d 846, 850-51 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
295. See Western Coal Traffic League v. United States, 677 F.2d 915, 927 (D.C. Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1110-11 (1983).
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the comment period itself. It is difficult to imagine that discussions that
would have to be mentioned as essential background if they occurred on a
pre-NPRM basis should not receive mention in the rulemaking file if they
occur during the comment period. FAA procedures suggest that they
should.29

The alleged necessity of recording comment period consultations in informal rulemaking has occasionally arisen in terms of an agency's socalled ex parte contacts. The APA specifically bars contacts between
agency decisionmakers and interested outside parties during formal adjudications and formal rulemaking proceedings, 297 but no such statutory bar
applies to rulemaking of an informal variety. 298 Although the D.C. Circuit inferred a bar on ex parte contacts in informal rulemaking, 29 9 subsequent decisions have confined any such restriction to the unusual situation
in which discrete private interests find themselves in competition for a
specific valuable privilege.3 0 0 Thus, ex parte contacts are ordinarily permitted in rulemaking, particularly if they can be viewed as part of the
agency's information-gathering and deliberative processes.30 Neither the
standard-setting nor the design type certification activities conducted by
the FAA in the airworthiness setting approaches the rare species of
rulemaking that implies a bar on ex parte contacts. Interestingly, the remedy for an impermissible ex parte contact, should one occur, would ordinarily be its recording in the rulemaking file so that the occurrence becomes a matter of public record and its substance the subject of public
comment. Thus, were an agency, as a matter of course, to include a record
296. The FAA requires that for every rulemaking action a public rules docket be maintained
containing summaries of all public contacts (including informal meetings and telephone calls) occurring during the comment period, and that these summaries be made available for public examination.
FAA REGULATORY HANDBOOK, supra note 6, § 1-6(e); see also id. at § 11-3(b) (rulemaking docket
should contain documents filed in connection with an FAA rulemaking proposal, including comments,
reply comments, and correspondence).
297. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(d), 557(d)(1)(A)-(B).
298. SCHWARTZ, supra note 267, at 169. The bill that eventually became the APA originally
contained a similar prohibition against ex parte contacts in informal rulemaking. See 5 0p Off. Legal
Counsel, supra note 282, at 109-10.
299. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 57 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829
(1977).
300. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
301. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 400 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United Steelworkers of America
v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub. nom. Lead Industries Ass'n v.
Donovan, 453 U.S. 913 (1981). In this case, the court sought particularly to shield from any ban on
ex parte contacts communications within agencies, as distinct from those with outside private interests.
Id. at 1218-20. The JAA bears much functional similarity, in its relations with the FAA, to other
federal agencies.
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of its consultations with foreign agencies in the file pertaining to that
rulemaking, it would in effect fulfil the conditions of cure for impermissible ex parte contacts.3 0 2
Courts have on occasion been tempted to hold that even if an agency's
recordkeeping of post-NPRM communications with outside parties is not
mandated by the APA or other procedural statutes, it may be mandated as
a matter of procedural fairness and in the interest of effective judicial review. 0 3 The Supreme Court's Vermont Yankee opinion8 " effectively
sought to put an end to the judicial imposition on agencies of procedures
not as such required by general procedural enactments or by the specific
enactments under which a given agency operates.3 0 5 That opinion has left
open the prospect that courts still might justify the imposition of additional procedures where and to the extent effective judicial review so
requires.
The fact remains that agencies would be well advised to disclose their
consultations with foreign authorities even when no judicially enforceable
principle requires them to do so, provided those consultations are apt to
play a significant role in the shaping of agency policy. Among those reasons certainly figures the concern for procedural fairness which, in preVermont Yankee days, might have led a court to impose such a requirement as a matter of law. Effective participation by private groups in public rulemaking proceedings would seem unquestionably to be enhanced
when those groups know not only the joint technical data that underlie a
proposed rule but also the commitment to international regulatory consensus that may have caused the agency to favor one particular set of standards over another.
A word should be said about the propriety of consultation with the
JAA after closure of the public comment period. Based on my observations, both the FAA and JAA appear to conduct themselves on the belief
that JAA influence should be exerted, if at all, during and not after the
comment period. JAA requests for an extension of the comment period,
and FAA actions upon those requests, suggest that post-comment period
influence should not occur. FAA policy toward ex parte contacts after the
closing date for comments offers a useful if imperfect analogy. According
302. FAA procedures in fact require agency officials to prepare promptly a report of all ex parte
contacts made during the rulemaking comment period and to include it in the rulemaking docket.
FAA REGULATORY HANDBOOK, supra note 6, § 11-4(b)(2).
303. See, e.g., Moss v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 430 F.2d 891, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
304. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S.
519 (1978).
305. Id. at 543, 548.
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to that policy, post-comment period comments are to be discouraged"', on
the ground that other interested parties would not have reason to expect
such comments or to attempt to reply to them. Should they nonetheless
3 01
occur, a report should be filed promptly in the rulemaking docket.
Whether or not effective judicial review requires an agency to make
appropriate references in a rulemaking file to its collaboration with foreign authorities, or the agency chooses to make disclosure voluntarily, judicial review is likely to bring such collaboration to the surface. An agency
may well be called upon by a court to explain why it ultimately overrode
expressions of fact or opinion made by private interests during the comment period, and that alone may require reference to the joint technical
data arrived at in collaboration with foreign authorities or to the agency's
desire to act in standard-setting concert with counterpart agencies abroad.
If there is reason to believe that a final rule would have been different but
for the agency's preference for harmonized standards, the factual and policy bases of harmonization may have to appear in the record. A court
might conceivably allow an agency to explain and support its rule through
judicial testimony or affidavits that effectively supplement the rulemaking
record, 0 " but more often will remand the rule to the agency for further
consideration. 0 9 In either event, the agency would have found itself in a
stronger position upon review, both substantively and procedurally, if it
could have pointed to substantial evidence in the rulemaking record of the
relevant joint technical data and international considerations.
c.

The APA Foreign Affairs Function Exemption

The discussion thus far has presupposed application of the Administrative Procedure Act to the FAA's international rulemaking activities. In
fact, the question might well be raised whether those activities fall within
the APA's exception for "a military or foreign affairs function of the
United States,"3' 0 and therefore escape APA strictures. Since I conclude
that recording of both pre- and post-NPRM consultations, where substantially decisive of outcome, is in any event procedurally advisable, this
306. See FAA REGULATORY HANDBOOK, supra note 6, § 11 -4(b)(3)(b) (stating that such comments should be minimized).
307. Id. § I l-4(b)(3)(a).
308. National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688, 701 (2d Cir. 1975).
309. Id.; see also Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 143 (1973); Burlington Truck Lines v. United
States, 371 U.S. 156, 168-70 (1962).
310. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (a)(1). For an argument in favor of the exemption's repeal, see Arthur E.
Bonfield, Military and Foreign Affairs Functions Rule-Making Under the APA, 71 MIcH. L. REV.
221, 314-15 (1972).
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question could well be bypassed. But it seems of sufficient interest to warrant some discussion.
A first view of the exemption, supported by its legislative history, would
consider a rulemaking exempt from APA procedures whenever the arena
so affects relations with other governments that their observance "would
provoke definitely undesirable international consequences." ' In a leading
case, the decision of an international trade body312 to impose stricter textile import quotas pending consultations was thought to create an incentive for sudden and artificial short-run increases in imports; such increases, it was argued, might only exacerbate the conditions requiring
agency action in the first place."' 3 The court found these to be the sort of
"undesirable international consequences" the APA exemption sought to
avert, especially as the timing of the agency's action "may be linked intimately with the Government's overall political agenda concerning relations with another country."314 Against the background of these and still
more pointed examples of regulatory action with genuine foreign affairs
implications-such as INS regulatory changes in response to the Iranian
hostage crisis,' rulemaking about a foreign aid program31 8 or strategic
foreign policy formulation 3 1 -the FAA/JAA consultations on airworthiness standards would seem poor candidates for exemption from APA
rulemaking procedures on this rationale.
At least one court has adopted a much broader, and indeed quite expansive, view of the exemption. In its view, the exemption applies to all
proposed regulations that "clearly and directly" involve a foreign affairs
311. American Ass'n of Exporters & Importers v. United States, 751 F.2d 1239, 1249 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1980, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1946)). An example cited in the legislative history of the APA, and pertinent to this case, is the issuance of a notice of proposed rulemaking
during negotiation of bilateral agreements on import quotas, resulting in immediate dumping of foreign inventories onto the American market. Id. For criticism of the exemption's application in this
domain, see William D. Araiza, Notice-and-Comment Rights for Administrative Decisions Affecting
International Trade: Heightened Need, No Response, 99 YALE L.J. 669 (1989).
312. The body in question was the Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements
(CITA). American Ass'n of Exporters & Importers v. United States, 751 F.2d at 1242.
313. Id. at 1249.
314. Id. The court emphasized that CITA's authority stemmed in part from the President's
foreign affairs power and that the APA's procedural constraints would inappropriately hamper the
exercise of that power. Id.
315. Malek-Marzban v. INS, 653 F.2d 113, 116 (4th Cir. 1981); Yassini v. Crosland, 618 F.2d
1356, 1361 (9th Cir. 1980).
316. See Bonfield, supra note 310, at 261.
317. Id.
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function. 18 In Mast Industries, Inc. v. Regan, the Court of International
Trade held that whether the exemption applies depends on "the function
of the regulations themselves," rather than either the adverse international
consequences of imposing APA procedures upon them or the source of the
agency authority invoked." 9 The court concluded that regulatory action
by which the President defines, modifies or possibly violates an international agreement, or directs his subordinates to do so, of necessity "clearly
and directly" implicates foreign affairs.32 0 Under this interpretation, an
agency's consultation with foreign government counterparts, even on otherwise domestic regulatory policy, might fall outside the APA as a foreign
affairs function purely on account of the fact that foreign governments
have been brought into the picture. The court was careful to point out,
however, that the foreign affairs exception cannot be applied to functions
"merely because they have impact beyond the borders of the United
States."32'

In some instances, the international involvement will be direct and central to the regulatory purpose. Take, for example, the case of WBEN, Inc.
v. United States,32 which involved the FCC's consultation with its Canadian counterparts to discuss a new bilateral agreement on the allocation of
pre-dawn broadcasting rights. In exempting the FCC from having to provide advance notice of the consultations or an opportunity for comment,
the court emphasized the fact that the consultations in question contemplated a formal bilateral agreement on the subject with Canada and there823
fore had a distinctly direct and central international dimension.
The FAA's collaboration in standard-setting with the JAA differs discernibly from the FCC activity at issue in the WBEN case. FAA/JAA
consultations do not yield legally effective international instruments, such
318. Mast Industries v. Regan, 8 Ct. Int'l Trade 214, 231 (1984) (quoting Administrative Procedure Act: Legislative History, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 191, 275 (1947) (House Report)). The court rejected any limitation of the exemption to purely "diplomatic activities," relying on
legislative history. Id. at 229-230; see also Bonfield, supra note 310, at 259; Consumers Union of
United States, Inc. v. CITA, Civ. Act. No. 74-968, J.A. 73 (D.D.C. 1975), rev'd on other grounds,
561 F.2d. 872 (D.C. Cir. 1977), ceit. denied, 435 U.S. 933 (1978) (exempting executive action in
connection with the negotiation of import restriction agreements with other countries).
319. Mast Industries v. Regan, 8 Ct. Int'l Trade at 229.
320. Id. at 230.
321. Id. at 229. Legislative history likewise suggests that rulemaking should not be exempt
under § 553(a) unless it "directly" or "clearly and directly" relates to the excluded subject matter. See
Bonfield, supra note 310, at 236 n.46, 237 (citing legislative history). Bonfield concludes "that rulemaking only indirectly or tangentially related to the exempted functions is not to be treated as within
the exemptions, and that close cases should be treated as outside the exemption." Id. at 237.
322. 396 F.2d 601 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 914 (1968).
323. Id. at 615-16.
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as bilateral agreements on wavelength allocation, import restrictions, 24
airworthiness certification or any other subject, and are not intended to do
so. Neither do they take place pursuant to a formally binding international agreement of any kind. 25 On the other hand, this Article has attempted to show that civil aviation lends itself especially well to international cooperation and that such cooperation is distinctly advantageous.
Under those circumstances, only if compliance with the APA could be
shown to burden severely the consultation process would an exemption be
justified.
In determining whether compliance with the APA would bring a sufficiently undesirable measure of exposure to the FAA's international consultations to justify the exemption, we should not suppose that an exemption would shelter the FAA's entire rulemaking process. Presumably, in a
case like the FAA's, only those steps of the rulemaking process that themselves involve international discussions would be exempt. Thus, an FAA
airworthiness standard or type certification would otherwise be adopted
according to usual APA rulemaking procedures. It could not sensibly be
otherwise. If an agency's rulemaking, start to finish, were to fall outside
the APA whenever it chose to incorporate international consultations in
the process, the scope of application of the APA would be drastically curtailed. Agencies could almost always claim to see value in discussing prospective regulatory initiatives with foreign counterpart agencies, however
"inherently" domestic the activity under regulation appears to be. Although it would seem generally desirable for American agencies to make
pertinent international discussions a component of their regulatory process, it would not seem desirable for that practice in effect to clothe their
rulemakings with immunity from the APA. 2 6
324. See Consumers Union v. CITA, Civ. Act. No. 74-968, J.A. 73 (D.D.C. 1975).
325. Most of the international trade cases raising the foreign affairs exemption entail proposed
regulatory change affecting trade subject to bilateral trade agreements. See, e.g., Mast Industries v.
Regan, 8 Ct. Int'l Trade at 214, 216 (1984).
326. Bonfield appears to favor the same view:
Since rule-making is exempted from section 553 only "to the extent that" it "clearly and
directly" involves such a function . . . this exemption may apply only to agency rulemaking under authority granted it specially forforeign affairs purposes. If that is the case,
an agency would not be entitled to an exemption ... for rule-making undertaken pursuant
to some general nonforeign affairs authority, even though it in fact acted with such foreign
affairs considerations in mind.
Bonfield, supra note 310, at 260-61. The Administrative Conference of the United States has recommended that Congress eliminate the APA's categorical foreign affairs function exemption and clarify
that agencies may by rule prescribe more limited categories of rulemaking exempt from public procedures as cases in which such procedures would be "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the
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Even in its necessarily reduced form, the foreign affairs exemption
should not, in my judgment, be applied to FAA airworthiness activities of
the sort described in this Article. As noted, APA requirements for informal rulemaking will otherwise be applicable to the rulemakings in which
the FAA engages and their burdensomeness will not be substantially
heightened by the inclusion of JAA contacts within their ambit. More
important, the requirements associated with notice and comment rulemaking, even when supplemented by appropriate references in the record to
the FAA's international discussions, would not seem significantly to hobble the process of consultation or to embarrass its other participants.1 17 As
far as I know, the FAA does not claim that the foreign affairs function
exemption shields its airworthiness rulemakings-either in their entirety
or with respect to JAA communications alone-from application of the
APA, and such a claim would not seem warranted. This conclusion seems
all the more compelling in light of the role that JAA contacts now play in
the process. Consultations with the JAA do not occur only randomly or
sporadically; they tend increasingly and regularly to influence the substance of FAA regulations and are infended to.
d.

The Government in the Sunshine Act

The openness provisions of the Government in the Sunshine Act 328 do
not appear to have application to the FAA activities described in this Article. This statute, which requires agencies to give advance notice of their
meetings in the Federal Register3 29 and to open them to public observation3 . (or in some cases simply to record proceedings and make the
records publicly available),33 ' is limited to agencies "headed by a collegial
body composed of two or more individual members, a majority of whom
are appointed to such position by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, and any subdivision thereof. ' 32 Thus, even without
reference to its exceptions, the Sunshine Act has no bearing on the FAA, a
single-headed body that is itself a component of a single-headed cabinet
public interest" under section 553(b)(B). ACUS Recommendation No. 73-5, Elimination of the "Military or Foreign Affairs Function" Exemption from APA Rulemaking Requirements, 1 C.F.R. §
305.73-5(b) (1992) (proposed Feb. 2, 1974).
327. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)-(d) (1988). Sections 553(b)(3)(B) and d(3) independently
exclude from APA procedures even rulemaking non-exempt under Section 553(a) where those procedures would be contrary to the public interest.
328. 5 U.S.C. § 552b.
329. Id. § 552b(e)(3).
330. Id. § 552b(b).
331. Id. § 552b(f)(1)-(2).
332. Id. § 552b(a)(1).
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agency, the Department of Transportation. Although the 1976 statute declares it to be policy that the public have the "fullest practicable information regarding the decisionmaking processes of the Federal Government,"3 83 the statutory coverage is accordingly severely limited.
Even if the Sunshine Act contemplated activity by single-headed agencies, it is unclear whether it would cover the concerted rulemaking activities examined in this Article. Such activities were present in the case of
Federal Communications Commission v. ITT World Communications,
Inc."3 4 There, three of the FCC's seven commissioners 3 5 participated in
so-called "consultative process" sessions with European and Canadian
counterparts for purposes of the joint planning of telecommunications facilities.3 3 6 They constituted a quorum of the FCC's Telecommunications
Committee and were -authorized to act on behalf of the FCC.3 Although
for a five-year period from their inception such meetings were open to all
interested parties, in 1979 private parties were excluded. 38 The Supreme
Court nevertheless held the Sunshine Act inapplicable. 9
According to the Court, the crucial issue was whether the FCC Telecommunications Committee was at the time engaged in deliberations that
"determine or result in the joint conduct or disposition of official agency
business. '"340 The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit had found that
the FCC was so engaged:
The CP [consultative process] discussions are not "chance meetings," "social gatherings," or "informal discussions" among members, but prearranged conferences held to effectuate public business of the greatest import. .

.

.They are

. . .

an integral part of

the Commission's policymaking processes, and as such they constitute the "conduct . . .of official agency business." 41
333. Id. § 552b (Declaration of Policy and Statement of Purpose).

334. 466 U.S. 463 (1984).
335.
336.
337.
338.

Id. at 470.
Id. at 465.
Id. at 470.
ITT World Communications v. FCC, 699 F.2d 1219, 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1983), rev'd., 466

U.S. 463 (1984).
339. See FCC v. ITT World Communications, 466 U.S. at 469.
340. Id. at 465-66 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552b(a)(2)).
341. ITT World Communications v. FCC, 699 F.2d at 1244. The court also rejected the Commission's policy-based arguments that application of the Sunshine Act to international consultations
would have "adverse practical consequences." Id. It also concluded that the commission bore the burden of demonstrating the need for such an exemption, and that Congress does not "permit the closure
of agency meetings simply because foreign representatives are present." Id.
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The Supreme Court reversed, essentially on the ground that the Committee at the sessions in question only sought to reach informal policy understandings and did not take final action or indeed any action at all falling
within the sphere of its delegated power, which in that case was limited to
ruling upon applications for common carrier certification. 34 2 The Court's
opinion cites legislative history to the effect that "informal background
discussions [that] clarify issues and expose varying views""s" should not
necessarily have to be conducted in public, lest agency operations unnecessarily be impaired.3 4 According to the Court, the Commissioners were
engaged in preliminary discussion that did not "determine or result in
• . . official agency business. '34 ' The Court also observed that when engaged in international consultative processes, the FCC neither convenes
nor controls the conduct of the proceedings, and that the session may not
even be considered an agency meeting within the meaning of the Sunshine
Act.34 6 Under the Supreme Court's analysis, FAA/JAA consultations,
which likewise do not eventuate in final action, would not be subject to
Sunshine Act constraints, even if the FAA were an agency within the
meaning of that statute.
e.

The Federal Advisory Committee Act

The Federal Advisory Committee Act of 1972 (FACA), 4 7 which provides for the establishment of federal advisory committees, requires that
all advisory committee meetings in principle be open to the public, that
notice of each meeting be published in advance in the Federal Register
342. FCC v. ITT World Communications, 466 U.S. at 473.
343. Id. at 469-70 (citing S. R'EP. No. 354, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1976)).
344. Id. at 470.
345. Id. at 470 n.7 (emphasis deleted). The Administrative Conference of the United States has
urged that the Sunshine Act be amended, in the interest of a freer and fuller deliberative process, to
provide that "agency members be permitted some opportunity to discuss the broad outlines of agency
policies and priorities . . . in closed meetings, when the discussions are preliminary in nature or
pertain to matters, such as budget or legislative proposals, which are to be considered in a public
forum prior to final action." ACUS Recommendation No. 84-3, Improvements in the Administration
of the Government in the Sunshine Act, I C.F.R. § 305.84-3 (1992) (proposed 1984).
346. FCC v. ITT World Communications, 466 U.S. at 473.
The Act prescribes procedures for the agency to follow when it holds meetings and particularly when it chooses to close a meeting. These provisions presuppose that the Act applies
only to meetings that the agency has the power to conduct according to those procedures.
And application of the Act to meetings not under agency control would restrict the types of
meetings that agency members could attend.
Id. (citations omitted).
347. 5 U.S.C. app. § 1-15 (1988).

(Vol. 24

AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION COOPERATION

and that interested persons be permitted, subject to reasonable regulation,
to attend, appear before and file statements in connection with those meetings.- 48 In addition, "the records, reports, transcripts, minutes, appendixes, working papers, drafts, studies, agenda, or other documents which
were made available" to the advisory committee must be made available
for public inspection and copying, subject to the exemptions of the Freedom of Information Act, as must be the minutes of the advisory committee
meeting itself. 49 Other requirements of the Act are dealt with below.
However, FACA does not apply to any advisory committee declared by
the President or relevant agency head to be concerned with matters ex350
empt from the requirements of the Government in the Sunshine Act.
The FAA has proposed the creation of an Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee. 51 This action, which had been recommended by the Secretary of Transportation's Task Force on FAA Reform, is described as "a
means of improving communications with the public and allowing the
public a better opportunity to participate in agency rulemaking.

'3 5 2

Ac-

cording to its charter, the Committee's fifty members should reflect a fair
balance of views representative of the aviation community "including air
carriers, manufacturers, labor groups, environmental groups, universities,
corporations, associations, consumers, and government agencies other than
the FAA.

333
5

The agency conceived the Committee as an instrument for

tapping the resources of a wide range of interested outside persons. However, the agency also views a formal advisory committee as a means of
ensuring that these interests are heard and felt to be heard, particularly in
a regulatory setting in which outcomes appear increasingly to be the product of joint FAA/JAA discussions.
The fact that the agency is about to establish a formal advisory committee, and that FAA/JAA collaboration appeared to strengthen the case for
such a committee, does not entirely put to rest the question whether
348. Id. § 10(a).
349. Id. § 10(b).
350. Id. § 10(d).
351. FAA Order 1110 Establishing an Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee (March 14,
1990). ARAC will be integrated into the process through the FAA's rulemaking, when the idea (as a
proposed rule) will be considered by an ARAC subcommittee. See Final Notes of Ninth Meeting,
supra note 198, at IV-5.
352. Id. Remarks accompanying the Order, and constituting the Committee's charter, state that
the Committee "will afford the FAA with the opportunity, which it now lacks, of obtaining direct,
firsthand information and insight from the substantially affected interests with respect to proposed
rules and existing rules that should be revised or eliminated; this advice will result in the development
of better rules in less overall time while requiring fewer FAA resources than under the current practice." Id.
353. Id.
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FACA still has application to FAA/JAA meetings as such and whether
all or certain of its provisions should be observed when the FAA and JAA
meet. Even after creation of an Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee, FACA may remain relevant to the kind of international consultations
exemplified by the FAA/JAA relationship. The statute has been applied
in other settings to meetings that an agency deliberately holds with outside
groups in advance of the issuance of a notice of proposed rulemaking.3 5'
Moreover, the courts have held FACA applicable to groups that have not
been formally established as advisory committees pursuant to the Act, 5 5
and this would allow the statute to embrace agency gatherings with representatives of foreign government regulatory authorities.
An "advisory committee," under the Act, signifies "any committee,
board, commission, council, conference, panel, task force, or other similar
group,"3'5 whether formally established by statute, or either established or
simply utilized by the agency itself, for purposes of rendering advice or
recommendations."" In the case of the FAA, the consultations do not involve a group that can be said to have been created by statute358 or even
by deliberate action of the agency,3 59 but at most a group that is utilized
by the agency.
Whether an agency utilizes a body as an advisory committee within the
meaning of the Act depends essentially on functional criteria. Thus, even
an advisory body that predates an agency, s ° or has an existence entirely
independent of the agency,3"' may be considered an advisory committee to
the agency if utilized as such. GSA regulations state that a body is "utilized" as an advisory committee when it constitutes
354. See, e.g., Food Chemical News v. Davis, 378 F. Supp. 1048, 1050 (D.D.C. 1974).
355. Id. at 1051. The court held that failure of an agency to charter and establish a committee in
accordance with FACA "cannot be employed as a subterfuge for avoiding the Act's public access
requirements." Id.
356. 5 U.S.C. app. § 3(2) (1988).
357. Id.
358. In order for an advisory committee to be established by statute, Congress must have more or
less directly contemplated the creation of such a committee. See Lombardo v. Handler, 397 F. Supp.
792, 796 (D.D.C. 1975).
359. Only committees "directly established" by an agency would fall in this category. Id. at 797
(citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1403, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3508, 3509).
360. Id. at 798-99 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1017, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1972), reprinted in
1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3491, 3494).
361. See Center for Auto Safety v. Cox, 580 F.2d 689, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The case confirms
that FACA may apply to a pre-existing organization. See id. at 693-94.
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a committee or other group composed in whole or in part of other
than full-time officers or employees of the Federal Government
with an established existence outside the agency seeking its advice
which . . . [an] agency official(s) adopts, such as through institu-

tional arrangements, as a preferred source from which to obtain
advice or recommendations on a specific issue or policy within the
scope of his or her responsibilities in the same manner as that
individual would obtain advice or recommendations from an es2

36
tablished advisory committee.

Other GSA regulations suggest that the Act's chief concern is an agency's
recurrent use of a particular group as a preferred source of advice or
recommendations.3 6
The Supreme Court has determined that the term "utilized" should not
necessarily be given its plain meaning when used in the FACA context. 6 '
Faced with the claim that the ABA's Standing Committee on the Federal
Judiciary constitutes an advisory committee when advising the President
through the Justice Department on the qualifications of potential federal
65
judicial nominees, the Court in Public Citizen v. Department ofJustice
ruled that a body is not in all cases utilized as an advisory committee
simply because the President or an agency seeks its advice:
A nodding acquaintance with FACA's purposes, as manifested by
its legislative history and as recited in § 2 of the Act, reveals that
it cannot have been Congress' intention, for example, to require
the filing of a charter, the presence of a controlling federal official,
and detailed minutes any time the President seeks the views of the
[NAACP] before nominating Commissioners to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, or asks the leaders of an
American Legion Post he is visiting for the organization's opinion
on some aspect of military policy.3 6
In order for an organization to constitute an advisory committee it must
provide an agency with "advice or recommendations." 6 ' One court, declining to identify any single factor as conclusive of this question, held that
362. 41 C.F.R. § 101-6.1003 (1992).
363. Id. § 101-6.1004(j).
364. See Public Citizen v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 452-55 (1988).
365. Id. at 440.
366. Id. at 452-53. The Court likewise rejected the notion that the President utilized an advisory committee when he consulted with his political party before selecting his Cabinet. Id. at 453.
367. 5 U.S.C app. § 3(2).
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when an agency in the course of developing regulations discloses them in
draft to select groups in order to obtain their advice and recommendations,
it utilizes these groups as advisory committees.36 On the other hand, the
court made it plain that not all contacts between an agency and an outside
group necessarily constitute utilization of an advisory committee, even if
some of them do, and insisted that committees be held subject to FACA
only when and to the extent they actually function as advisory committees
as described above, that is, render advice or recommendations on proposed
regulations. 6 9 Under this general analysis, the JAA conceivably constitutes an advisory committee whenever it renders "specific" advice on
pending draft regulations,3"' but not when it simply exchanges information with the FAA, thus serving an informational purpose that FACA
does not cover. GSA regulations implementing FACA confirm Congress'
purpose to exclude bodies whose services to an agency are "for the purpose of exchanging facts or information."371 Case law has also excluded
from FACA discussions with private groups about the latter's own initiatives and proposals, even though agency comments and reactions were
solicited."'
Although the JAA meets the functional criteria of an advisory committee when it acts in certain of the capacities observed in this Article, I am
not inclined to consider the JAA an advisory committee within the meaning of the Act.
First, there remains a remarkable degree of doubt, nearly two decades
after passage of the Act, whether FACA applies to bodies that are not
acknowledged by the agency in establishing or utilizing them to constitute
advisory committees. The case law is confused and the commentators divided,37 3 and the Act's application to the JAA is correspondingly uncertain. On the one hand, FAA/JAA contacts cannot be described as the ad
368. See Center for Auto Safety v. Cox, 580 F.2d 689, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (citing Nader v.
Baroody, 396 F. Supp. 1231, 1234 (D.D.C. 1975)).
369. See id. at 694.
370. See Center for Auto Safety v. Tiemann, 414 F. Supp. 215, 224 (D.D.C. 1976).
371. 41 C.F.R. § 101-6.1004(1) (1992). Under the GSA interpretation, FACA's chief target are
bodies that serve as an agency's "preferred" source of advice. See ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOvRCEmOOK 494 (1985).
372. See Consumers Union of United States v. Department of Health, Education & Welfare,
409 F. Supp. 473, 476-77 (D.D.C. 1976), affid mem., 551 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
373. See Michael H. Cardozo, The Federal Advisory Committee in Operation, 33 AD. L. REV.
1, 28 (1981). One court has suggested that, in the case of committees not actually established or
organized by agencies, FACA would be satisfied by a policy of open meetings and accurate recordkeeping, and little else would be needed. See Center for Auto Safety v. Cox, 580 F.2d 689, 694 (D.C.
Cir. 1978). It is not firmly established, however, that the various requirements of FACA are legally
severable.
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hoc, casual and random sort-lacking in continuity and follow-up-that
have been said to escape FACA;3"4 they may well constitute "institutional
arrangements which amount to the adoption of the group as a preferred
source of advice,""" for they are deliberate and systematic, increasingly
so, and obviously carried out at the government's instance and with public
funds. Compared to the ABA judicial selection committee at issue in the
Public Citizen case, the JAA is a much better example of the group
targeted by FACA, one "organized by or closely tied to the Federal Government, and thus enjoying quasi-public status. "376 On the other hand, it
does not seem quite accurate to describe the JAA as a source of "expert,
technical and scholarly advice from experienced and representative individuals who are not regularly available as officers and employees of the
government."77

The Supreme Court's Public Citizen decision, while not clearly demarcating the line between outside groups "utilized" and "not utilized" by
374. See Nader v. Baroody, 396 F. Supp. 1231, 1233-34 (D.D.C. 1975); see also Consumers
Union of United States v. Department of Health, Education & Welfare, 409 F. Supp. at 476-77. In
Consumers Union the court pointed out that absent the continuity associated with advisory committees, the meetings of the Cosmetics, Toiletry and Fragrance Association would constitute "valid private meetings similar to numerous agency-industry or agency-consumer gatherings taking place daily
at FDA." Id. at 474.
The Administrative Conference has taken the view that FACA should not be applied "to ad hoc,
unstructured and noncontinuing" agency contacts with outside groups. ACUS Recommendation 80-3
("Interpretation and Implementation of the Federal Advisory Committee Act"), 1 C.F.R. § 305.803(2)(a) (1992) [hereinafter ACUS Recommendation 80-3].
375. ACUS Recommendation 80-3, supra note 374, § 305.80-3(2)(b).
376. Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 461 (1988). The opinion suggests
that only groups actually formed "at the behest of the Executive or by quasi-public organizations" or
that "the Federal Government helped bring into being" should be considered as "utilized" by the
executive. See id. at 462-63. In other words, the statutory language "established or utilized" by the
agencies connotes groups "established by or for such agencies." Id. (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No.
1403, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3508, 3509).
It was not obvious to the Court that the ABA judicial selection committee fell outside the scope of
FACA. See id. at 463-65. The Court found this "a close question," though it was ultimately "fairly
confident" that it was not covered. Id. at 465. The JAA's escape from FACA is probably not a great
deal more obvious.
Three justices concurring in Public Citizen found that the ABA Committee fell squarely within the
statutory definition of advisory committees "utilized" by the government, especially as clarified by
GSA interpretive regulations. See id. at 469-72, 477 (Kennedy, J. concurring). The Committee consisted at least in part of persons other than full-time federal employees. Id. at 477. It had "'an
established existence outside of the agency seeking its advice.' " Id. It represented a preferred source
of advice to the government. Id. at 477-78. Its relation to the government had become fairly institutionalized. Id. at 478. And its views were used by the government in much the same way as views of
established advisory committees. Id. at 478. The JAA generally satisfies these same criteria.
377. See Cardozo, supra note 373, at 51.
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agencies as advisory committees, makes it plain that FACA cannot be understood "to cover every formal and informal consultation between the
President or an Executive agency and a group rendering advice. ' 878 And
it strongly suggests that advisory committees established by the agencies as
such were the Act's principal target.3 7 9 The JAA does not comfortably
meet that description.
The federal court decision in Centerfor Auto Safety v. Federal Highway Administration3 80 confirms this reading of the Public Citizen opinion
and the improbability of the meetings between the FAA and JAA constituting advisory committee meetings within the meaning of FACA. There,
the FHWA had made use of a task force of the American Association of
State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) (and indeed an
updated version of AASHTO's Green Book on Geometric Design) in developing national standards for highway and street design. 81 Turning
back plaintiff's FACA challenge to the agency's reliance on the AASHTO
task force, the court.emphasized that, under Public Citizen, a group is not
"utilized" under FACA unless it is formed by the Executive Branch or by
quasi-public organizations. 8 2 It found this not to be the case of
AASHTO:
It is evident, and conceded by both parties, that the AASHTO
was not established by the FHWA. FHWA does not fund
AASHTO, does not set its agenda, or appoint its members. Nor is
the AASHTO an offspring of a quasi-public entity subject to
FACA. In light of Public Citizen, these uncontested facts dictate a
finding that AASHTO is not subject to FACA. 83
To the same effect is Food Chemical News v. Young,3 84 in which the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reaffirmed that FACA applies only to groups organized by or closely tied to the federal government,
and thus enjoying quasi-public status.3 8 5 It found, in keeping with the
378. Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. at 453.
379. "FACA's principal purpose was to enhance the public accountability of advisory committees established by the Executive Branch and to reduce wasteful expenditures on them." Id. at 459.
380. Center for Auto Safety v. Fed. Highway Admin., No. 89-1045, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13733 (D.D.C. Oct. 12, 1990).
381. "AASHTO is a non-profit privately incorporated association of state government transportation agencies." Id. at *2.
382. Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. at 460.
383. Center for Auto Safety v. Fed. Highway Admin., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13733 at *6.
384. 900 F.2d 328 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
385. Id. at 332.
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Supreme Court opinion in Public Citizen, that the term "utilized" was
not to be understood in the ordinary or literal sense of the word (as in
"made use of"), but rather as denoting a group that, while not organized
as such by an agency, is so closely tied to it as to be amenable to strict
management by agency officials. The court declined to subject to FACA a
panel of experts selected and managed by a private scientific organization
pursuant to the organization's contract with the FDA to provide advice on
food and cosmetics safety issues.3 88
The Center for Auto Safety case also raises squarely the question
whether a task force that is not otherwise an advisory committee, within
the meaning of FACA, becomes one on account of the fact that agency
officials figure among its members. In the case, FHWA employees participated actively in the AASHTO proceedings in question. The court acknowledged that this element "does raise the specter of secret advice chan' 387
nels to the agency and of agency capture by an outside consultant."
Nevertheless, it found that the "potential abuses created by intergroup
388
The
membership" were not alone enough to require a different result.
court relied in part on the agency's observance of public rulemaking procedures. "[P]rocedural safeguards such as public rulemaking proceedings
prior to federal adoption of AASHTO findings ensure that AASHTO
' 3 89
findings are not simply rubberstamped."
More important, FACA's legislative history suggests that Congress
chiefly feared abuse by special interests of their representation on advisory
committees "to promote their private concerns." 9 ° As the Supreme Court
observed, "FACA was enacted to cure specific ills, above all the wasteful
expenditure of public funds for worthless committee meetings and biased
proposals." '' This helps explain why FACA only addresses advisory
committees at least some of whose members are not full-time federal government employees,39 2 and perhaps also why the Act specifically exempts
Id. at 330.
Center for Auto Safety v. Fed. Highway Admin., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13733 at *6.
Id. at *7.
Id.
390. Food Chemical News v. Davis, 378 F. Supp. 1048, 1051 (D.D.C. 1974). In Davis, the
court held FACA inapplicable to two informal meetings held by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms with consumer and distilled spirits industry representatives on ingredient labelling of distilled spirits. The Director of the Bureau scheduled those meetings to obtain the groups' comments or
suggestions on proposed regulatory amendments and intended to use them. Id.
391. Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of justice, 491 U.S. at 453.
392. See Cardozo, supra note 373, at 3. Cardozo writes that "a committee containing any number of officers of government is not covered by the Act unless its membership includes outsiders,
representatives of the 'private sector.' " Id.
386.
387.
388.
389.
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the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations from its coverage. 93 It may also help explain why the AASHTO task force at issue in
Center for Auto Safety v. Federal Highway Administration was considered so poor a candidate for FACA treatment.39 Admittedly, foreign government officials cannot properly be considered federal or state government employees for these or any other purposes. Nevertheless, there is
virtually no evidence to suggest that the JAA approaches its dealings with
the FAA with the promotion of "private concerns" or "special interests"
in mind or that the JAA can be said to embody those concerns or interests."9 5 The question, as one court put it, is whether outside groups consulted by the government are "self-serving.

' 396

The JAA gives few signs

of that.
Finally, although it arises in the Sunshine Act context, the Supreme
Court opinion in FCC v. ITT World Communications" counsels against
considering consultations with foreign government agencies activities to
which a statute such as FACA should be applied. The Court held that the
393. Id. at 19.
394. Center for Auto Safety v. Fed. Highway Admin., 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13733 at *6.
395. In Center for Auto Safety v. Tiemann, 414 F. Supp. 215 (D.D.C. 1976), the agency sought
to defend its noncompliance with FACA on the ground that the outside organization in question did
not consist of representatives of private interests, but rather of public servants (in the event, state
highway and transportation officials). The court emphasized that the organization was not as "public" as it appeared, since it represented recipients of grants under the federal-aid highway program,
hence special interests within the context of the agency and program in question. "AASHTO is made
up of public servants. But those state employees also represent the 'regulated' in the federal-aid highway program before the 'regulators,' the federal government." Id. at 225. The JAA would not seem to
be even remotely as specially interested in the outcome of airworthiness regulations as state officials-prospective beneficiaries of federal highway aid-would be in that regulatory program.
This is not to suggest that so-called representatives of the public interest cannot be considered
"special interest groups." In Food Chemical News v. Davis, 378 F. Supp. 1048, 1048-49 (1974),
FACA was held applicable to agency meetings with industry and consumer groups alike, even though
the latter purported to represent the public rather than any particular private interest.
396. Consumer Union of United States v. Department of Health, Education & Welfare, 409 F.
Supp. 473, 475 (D.D.C. 1976), affd. mem., 551 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Cardozo identifies as the
target of FACA the regular holding of closed-door meetings between government and big business
"turning out reports and recommendations that were influencing government action against the interest of consumers, small business and other outsiders." Cardozo, supra note 373, at 48-49.
The view that FACA contemplates special interest groups in particular probably underlay another
Administrative Conference recommendation, Recommendation 78-4, para. l(e), that urged FACA's
amendment to exempt technical committees and standard-setting organizations. 44 Fed. Reg. 1357
(1979). In support of this recommendation, see Robert W. Hamilton, The Role of Nongovernmental
Standardsin the Development of Mandatory FederalStandards Affecting Safety or Health, 56 TEX.
L. REv. 1329, 1477 (1978), arguing that application of most FACA provisions to technical committees would be "unfortunate."
397. FCC v. ITT World Communications, 466 U.S. 463 (1983).
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Sunshine Act applies "only to meetings that the agency has the power to
conduct according to these procedures" 3 98 and concluded that the FCC's
consultation sessions with foreign counterpart agencies did not constitute
such meetings, if only because the FCC could neither convene them nor
unilaterally control their conduct. 9 Although FACA, unlike the Sunshine Act, does address meetings of bodies other than agencies-namely
advisory committees-its application to consultation sessions with foreign
agencies would raise similar concerns about undue inhibition of agency
activity. Because FAA/JAA meetings are not wholly within the FAA's
capacity to control, FACA's application, to quote the Court, "would restrict the types of meetings that agency members could attend. ' 400 If the
Court regarded application of the Sunshine Act to the FCC's international
consultations as working unduly broad restraints upon agency process,40 1
particularly in the international sphere, it is difficult to imagine that it
would favor inhibiting such consultations by application to them of the
Federal Advisory Committee Act.
It is useful, in this last regard, to remember that FACA entails more
than the advance notice, openness and recordkeeping of meetings with
which it is commonly associated. A finding that a body constitutes an advisory committee under FACA brings in its wake a host of other requirements that fit poorly with the realities of the international working relations that bind the FAA and JAA. FACA was enacted in large part to
stem the tide of advisory bodies specially created for the purpose of advising federal agencies, 4 0 2 and accordingly contains numerous rules limiting
the creation of such bodies.403 In theory, an agency should not establish
advisory committees unless their creation is formally found by the agency
head-after consultation with the director of OMB and upon publication
of notice in the Federal Register-to be necessary and in the public interest. Once established, committees are subject in their operation and duration to uniform standards and procedures. They are required to have
"fairly balanced" memberships "in terms of the points of view represented
and the functions to be performed." 4° The agency must also protect its
advisory committees against undue influence by any special interest and
provide for their duration, finances, staffing, housing and reports.40 5 A
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
.403.
404.
405.
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5 U.S.C. app. § 2(a)-(b) (1988).
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committee may not act at all until it files a detailed charter with GSA,
with the agency to which it reports, with the pertinent congressional committees and with the Library of Congress.40 6 Its existence and activities
must be known to the public. 4 7 Committees automatically expire after

two years unless renewed or specifically exempted by the agency establishing them.4 8
FACA goes still further in regulating the internal structure and external relations of advisory committees. A federal official is required to chair
or attend every committee meeting, and no meeting may be held, and no
agenda followed, without the advance approval of a designated officer. 4 0 9
That official is authorized to adjourn any meeting when he or she deems
its adjournment to be in the public interest.'1 0 Meetings must be held at
reasonable times and in places (of sufficient capacity) reasonably accessible to the public, and minutes of all meetings must be kept."" For each
committee that reports to it, an agency must appoint a Committee Management Officer responsible for monitoring the committee's performance,
for maintaining its records and for making the findings needed to justify a
decision to close a meeting to the public."1 " A Committee Management
Secretariat, lodged in the GSA, has general oversight and recordkeeping
responsibility for all established advisory committees, and authority to recommend their continuation, discontinuation or reorganization.""3 Decisions on the latter subject are ultimately made by standing committees of
the House and Senate having jurisdiction over the agencies to which advi4 14
sory committees report.

Extension of these myriad requirements to preexisting private sector
groups is obviously problematic. According to one view, they sensibly apply only to advisory committees formally and expressly established as such
by Congress, the President, or the agencies, and not to independent groups
whose services are simply utilized by the agencies. As to the latter, advance notice, openness and recordkeeping of meetings (perhaps along with
representativeness of membership) would be the essential points. However, whether such a distinction is consistent with statutory language and
406. Id.
detail. Id.
407. To
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. ld.
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. Id.

§ 9(c). The charter must recite a good deal of organizational, operational, and financial
this end, meetings are required to be open to the public. See id. § 10(a)(1).
§ 14.
§§ 10(e)-(f).
§ 10(e).
§ 10(c).
§ 8(b).
§ 7(b).
§ 5(a).
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purpose remains an open question.41 6 Application of FACA would obviously be all the more problematic in connection with bodies-such as the
JAA-that have been independently created by one or more foreign governments, that consist in whole or in part of foreign government officials,
and that would likely resent and reject efforts to bring them within the
reach of FACA, in whole or in part.4 16
There is, in sum, scant evidence that Congress intended or would have
wanted FACA to be applied to intergovernmental relationships such as
have developed between the FAA and JAA. Congress, it is true, specifically exempted certain committees from coverage by FACA, and organizations composed of foreign government officials was not among them.41 On
the other hand, Congress did create an exemption for the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, ostensibly because bodies advising public officials "on problems affecting more than one level of government" present special difficulties and have what the Act calls a "unique
character." 4 1 8 Intergovernmental bodies addressing problems affecting two
or more countries or groupings of countries would seem to present at least
as special a situation and therefore likewise call for special treatment.
A previous Administrative Conference recommendation on the subject
of FACA suggests that a degree of public access may be desirable even if
an outside group is not considered to have the status of an advisory committee under the Act.41 9 The FAA's relationship with the JAA, and the
significance of that relationship, are such that a policy of openness and
public availability is highly desirable even though FACA may not mandate it. My impression is that the FAA and JAA-short of holding all
their consultations in public with advance notice-do nevertheless seek to
make their conclusions and the data underlying them fully open to interested groups and to afford them reasonable opportunity for comment and
influence.
415. See Cardozo, supra note 373, at 13.
416. The Administrative Conference similarly recognized that technical standard-setting committees on which agencies rely would refuse to cooperate with the agencies if FACA were fully applied to
them. See supra note 374 and accompanying text.
417. Among exempted committees are the Committee on Government Procurement, Committees
on the Federal Reserve System and committees established to advise Congress or the courts. 5 U.S.C.
app. § 4 (1988).
418. See Cardozo, supra note 373, at 19.
419. ACUS Recommendation 80-3, supra note 374, para. 2c ("Agencies should be sensitive to
the desirability of making available to the public advice or information obtained from private or ad
hoc groups not covered by FACA when the agency is considering action based on such advice or
information.").

19931

LAW & POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS

f.

General Procedural Concerns

Even if the FAA/JAA consultation process passes muster under the
various federal procedural enactments that plausibly bear upon it, or if all
the suggested precautions are observed, lingering procedural doubts about
the legitimacy of the system may persist. The very spirit of compromise
and mutual consideration that gives the FAA/JAA relationship its visibly
special character also raises general questions about the integrity of the
rulemaking process that it affects. One way to put the question is to ask
whether the Aircraft Certification Service engages in such close collaboration with its European counterparts as to risk compromising its independence of judgment. The question acquires a special reality if we suspect,
as perhaps in the helicopter and other episodes, that the rules the FAA
actually adopts differ in not insignificant ways from those it most likely
would have adopted in the absence of JAA influence, and it accordingly
has both procedural and substantive dimensions. Our procedural concern
would be that once negotiations with foreign counterpart agencies yield a
regulatory compromise, an agency will be hard-pressed to entertain seriously proposals from domestic quarters that would result in departures
from the international understandings reached,42 0 departures that might in
fact be preferable in terms of the agency's statutory mandate. To put the
question in more squarely substantive terms, do FAA/JAA consultations-whether pre- or post-NPRM-impermissibly predetermine the
outcome of FAA airworthiness rulemakings, and do they lead aviation officials to make excessive compromises in the interest of commonality ?421
These fears are not entirely baseless. However, even in situations where
courts have acknowledged the distinct possibility that "private" arrangements may have effectively predetermined the regulatory outcome, they
have neither declared those arrangements illegitimate nor forbidden the
communications of which they consist. Appropriate recording of the fact
and substance of the communications, and their timely exposure to public
comment, have been deemed an adequate procedural solution. 42 , At all
420. At their San Francisco annual meeting, the authorities agreed in closed session that they
would announce to industry in open session that the FAA and JAA had each resolved to go forward
with a proposed rule on "rejected takeoff safety enhancements" ("RTO"), upon which the two sets of
authorities had previously reached agreement. The authorities correctly perceived that, while industry
might feel that the agencies had by that time effectively taken the decision, industry also basically
supported the proposal and saw considerable advantage in the existence of common standards. NOTES
OF SEVENTH FAA-JAA MEETING, supra note 189, at 20-21.
421. The FAA Administrator has remarked that the objective of FAA/JAA collaboration is
"easy" to state: "We want our regulations to mirror each other." Remarks by Admiral Busey, supra
note 198, at 3.
422. See Moss v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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events, it bears remembering that the JAA and like bodies are not perfectly assimilable to private regulated interests whose ex parte contacts
with agencies, even in a rulemaking context, have caused alarm among
those who have felt themselves left outside of the process. They are themselves "public" bodies. Unless they can realistically be considered little
more than conduits for influence by their domestic industries, or their objectivity can otherwise be called into question, their collaboration with
American agency counterparts should not be thought to introduce a dangerous or impermissible bias. Nevertheless, an agency-whether procedurally required to do so or not-should be alert to the possibility that in
being influenced by the data or policy positions advanced by counterpart
agencies abroad, it may be indirectly coming under the influence of private interests with a stake in the regulatory outcome or of divergent "foreign" public interests, or otherwise be led astray from the purposes that
the agency is statutorily called upon to serve. Thus, if international regulatory consensus is a legitimate agency objective, and regular international
consultation a legitimate instrument to that end, steps should be taken to
avert the reality or the perception that regulated or other affected interests
are excluded by the process. A first remedy, alluded to throughout the
immediately preceding sections of this Article, would be to ensure a reasonable degree of transparency in the FAA/JAA collaboration. This
means making the fact and tenor of that collaboration reasonably conspicuous in the notice of proposed rulemaking, in the rulemaking file, and in
the rule's statement of basis and purpose.
A second and distinct remedy would be to ensure that regulatory accords informally reached between the FAA and JAA are genuinely subject
to reexamination and reconsideration by the agency in the course of the
comment period. Agencies can legitimately be required to "consider" all
expressions of view (and impliedly to enable all expressions of view to be
heard).4 23 Courts, on judicial review, may well demand that agencies
demonstrate that they have considered and possibly even responded to all
such expressions before finally adopting a rule. The genuineness of this
attitude, it must readily be acknowledged, cannot ever be adequately policed. Agencies ultimately will have to be trusted to keep open minds, or at
least be willing to reopen matters with their foreign government counterparts, even after informal agreement with them appears to have been
reached.
Perhaps the most promising remedy for the real or perceived exclusion
of private interests from intergovernmental arrangements would be the deliberate inclusion of those interests in the arrangements themselves. FAA/
423. SCHWARTZ, supra note 267, § 4.10, at 171.
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JAA collaboration in fact has not only been made increasingly transparent
to the outside, but has actually enlisted representatives of regulated interests as active participants. The information and views of manufacturers,
airlines and, to a lesser extent, other affected interests are considered well
before the authorities arrive at joint positions on any given issue. In a
more or less systematic fashion, they are included in the study teams and
working groups that help prepare those positions. Private interests understandably express less discomfort with the fact that FAA rules tend to
mirror FAA/JAA understandings when they believe themselves to have
been a part of the process by which the initial understandings were
reached.
As the FAA moves toward a model of rulemaking in which private
participation takes place at the earlier international consultation stage, as
well as at the later and more conventional NPRM and comment stage,
then the selection of interests becomes correspondingly important. An
agency that enlists or accepts the aid of private interests in its international collaboration should first of all ensure that those interests are reasonably inclusive. In the airworthiness setting, for example, depending on
the issue at hand, airlines, manufacturers, pilots, and repair stations,
among others, all may have a contribution to make or an interest to
protect.
A second and related concern is the representativeness of the interests
that are included. To take only the most prominent examples in the FAA
setting, aircraft manufacturers and operators alike are a diverse lot, as
gauged by any number of indicators, and their stakes in regulatory issues
may diverge accordingly. Although I have concluded that FACA does not
apply to FAA/JAA consultations as such-largely because of their public
and intergovernmental character-its concern that private advisory groups
display balance and representativeness becomes relevant as inclusion of
private interests in those consultations progresses.
More problematic is the question whether and, if so how, an agency
should seek to enlist the participation in its intergovernmental efforts of
interested groups other than the interests actually regulated, for example,
various consumer, worker, or environmental interests. Ideally, those interests will be fully considered in the pre- as well as in the post-NPRM
period. However, in order to be effective, FAA/JAA collaboration must
be workable, and there may simply be no workable way to involve all
such groups in an organized fashion in the international collaborative process. If they cannot participate systematically and integrally in the preparatory intergovernmental arrangements, then they will have to intervene at,
one or more junctures at the national level, for example by shaping the
national positions at their very formative stages or by participating con[Vol. 24
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ventionally in the national notice and comment procedures that separately
follow the adoption of a common intergovernmental position.
It is desirable, as a general matter and within the limits of feasibility,
that all affected interests-regulated and nonregulated alike-be heard in
some fashion, however indirect, before joint national authorities arrive at a
common proposed position. To the extent they are heard, that position has
an improved chance of adoption by the c6mpetent national authorities
without controversy, change or challenge at the conclusion of their respective domestic rulemaking procedures, and the goal of international regulatory harmonization will have a correspondingly greater chance of being
met. Nevertheless, the feasibility of an all-inclusive international deliberative process will have its limits and cannot help but vary with the agencies
involved and the subject matter at issue. The FAA's experience of including private and public interest representatives in both the meetings and
study groups under the FAA/JAA umbrella, though perhaps not yielding
a fully balanced and effective representation, does demonstrate, however,
that it would be wrong to assume that such representatives cannot be actual participants in an agency's international regulatory cooperation
efforts.
These general procedural observations would be incomplete if they did
not at least raise the squarely substantive problem of regulatory compromise that attends an agency's decision to collaborate systematically with
overseas counterparts. Even while following all the procedural precautions
suggested in this Article, an agency must face the question of how many
and how great are the concessions it should make to its counterpart agencies in the interest of commonality and cooperation. The question defies a
clear or all-purpose answer. However, an agency's search for agreement
certainly should not be one that holds it hostage to the views of foreign
governments. Nor should it be one that regularly causes the agency to
adopt standards that fall decidedly above or below those the agency independently deems appropriate or that run afoul of the mandated policy
analyses. As in any venture presupposing a degree of mutual give-andtake and a readiness to compromise, there must be limits, as for example
when one or the other side finds that public welfare will be severely endangered by proposed regulatory action, or that such action will impose
unacceptable burdens of one sort or another. Situations will arise in which
it may be preferable to tolerate regulatory discrepancies than to demand a
common accord that leaves one or both sides with the conviction that a
very serious regulatory mistake has been made. Finally, it would be unwise and undesirable in any event for an agency to commit itself in advance to compromise on any issue at all costs.
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The concern understandably arises that when authorities of different
nations cooperate in search of consensus over regulatory standards, the
final product will represent the least common denominator of the interests
represented and a diminution of the level of protection existing in the
more protection-minded countries. Though entirely plausible, this concern
does not appear to have a basis in fact in the FAA/JAA experience. This
is due in part to a mutual commitment to produce what are in fact the
highest practicable safety standards, and in part to the understanding that
each state remains free to set its own standards if unsatisfied by those
achievable through consensus. Should American agencies undertake joint
rulemaking in other settings, they should be alert to this potential "least
common denominator" problem.
In short, it will not do, either in reality or in appearance, for the regulatory standards an agency ultimately adopts to be the product, pure and
simple, of intergovernmental negotiations. The FAA, like fellow American
agencies, and like its own foreign counterparts, works under a statutory
mandate which must remain its touchstone so far as the substance of regulatory action is concerned. The zone of compromise within which it may
then operate in the interest of commonality with decisionmakers of other
nations is necessarily uncertain but necessarily limited. Within that zone,
however, harmonization has a significant, possibly even a leading, role to
play.
VIII.

CONCLUSIONS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

The convergence of national airworthiness standards and borrowing of
certification services is regarded in practically all quarters as a highly useful development and one to be encouraged. American aircraft manufacturers, who have traditionally dominated the international aviation market,
are accustomed to meeting the requirements set by the national aviation
authorities in the countries where their products are to be registered.
They are understandably wary of any regulatory movement in Europe
toward standards that would diverge significantly from those that the
FAA imposes on the American aeronautical products market, particularly
when the divergences are needless or capable of being bridged. The recent
development of an energetic European aircraft industry, itself capable of
serving the European market and, in fact, of invading other markets that
American industry long had taken for granted, has not lessened the trend.
While European manufacturers might benefit in the short run from regulatory barriers restricting American access to the European market, they
have need in the long run for uninhibited access to the American and
other world markets. Discrepancies between European and American air[Vol. 24
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worthiness standards thus do not serve their interests particularly well
either.
This Article has also sought to show that a commonality of standards
has spillover advantages with respect to administration and enforcement.
The greater the resemblance among national airworthiness standards, the
wider the room for play of the bilateral airworthiness agreements that
allow one state essentially to borrow conditionally the certification services
performed by another. The repair station episode demonstrates that the
possibilities for sharing such services are not at present being fully exploited. To the extent that such services can be responsibly and confidently shared, savings to government and the private sector alike may be
anticipated.
Unless international collaboration in regulation is viewed as merely a
disguised means for exportation of the American system of airworthiness
certification, the undertaking implies a willingness to consider seriously
the procedures and policies upon which foreign regulatory practice is
based. Although it may be reasonably clear in advance that certain national participants will carry greater weight than others in international
regulatory efforts, the process presupposes on all sides an attitude of cooperation and mutual benefit. It is essential that each participating authority
realize and accept at the outset that its own system will be subject in the
process to reexamination and comparison with others, and in the end to
some measure of modification.
It is one thing to describe and in most respects applaud the program of
cooperative regulation that has been put in place between the FAA and
JAA, and another thing to recommend its extension to other regulatory
spheres. Any judgment about the utility of this approach to a given sphere
requires consideration of the extent to which nations perceive a common
interest in joint regulation and are likly to pursue compatible objectives
within the framework of such regulation. The case for cooperative regulation in airworthiness has been a very powerful one. As an active supporter
of the FAA/JAA venture has expressed it, "the laws of physics and aerodynamics are universal." ' The case for cooperation in other spheres may
be strong but not as strong, and the intensity and regularity of cooperation
therefore vary.
In order for any cooperative program to succeed, it must also enlist the
political support of regulated interests. Those interests, and indeed all affected interests, must find the resulting regime to be at least as substantively and procedurally advantageous, possibly even more so, as the purely
domestic regulatory regime that would otherwise apply. As in the aviation
424.
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safety field, so in virtually any other regulatory domain, American regulators will not find their legal or political responsibility diminished on account of their cooperation with or reliance on the findings of counterpart
agencies abroad. Before an American agency embarks on any such international program, it must therefore assure itself of having an adequate
basis for recognizing foreign determinations on matters, such as design or
performance, for which the agency will itself ultimately bear responsibility. It also must observe all the otherwise applicable procedural requirements of American administrative law, except to the extent that the element of intergovernmental cooperation may genuinely be said to take the
procedure beyond the reach of those requirements.
As far as specific recommendations are concerned, one should begin
with the obvious one that international regulatory cooperation cannot satisfactorily proceed in a climate of regulatory or technological parochialism. The point is too basic to require elaboration. Beyond attitudinal generalities, however, it is possible to identify both the features of FAA/JAA
collaboration that have contributed to its apparent success and the precautions that have helped make that collaboration politically acceptable.
These observations form the basis of the following recommendations:
1. International regulatory cooperation best succeeds when it has support at the highest domestic regulatory echelons of the agencies involved.
It will proceed only haltingly and inconsistently unless it is considered a
basically appropriate and "mainstream" approach by those most broadly
in charge of the regulatory activity in question. Both process and results
will vary according to whether internationalism is the disposition of regulatory leadership as a whole or simply the inclination of a handful of
individuals within the regulatory apparatus. An agency's so-called "international specialist" - even an agency unit labelled "foreign liaison" or
"international" - easily can remain marginal to the agency's actual mode
of operation unless agency leadership shares its outlook and is reasonably
committed to it. In the case of the FAA, the program of joint activity with
the European authorities has had the support of a succession of FAA
administrators .425

In determining whether international cooperation deserves genuine priority, an agency should consider the importance or value of regulatory
harmonization in its field, the opportunities for international cooperation
in enforcement and administration and the extent to which foreign government expertise justifies reliance on its regulatory and enforcement resources. The same considerations should determine the extent of an
425. See, e.g., Remarks by Admiral Busey, supra note 198, at 5.

[Vol. 24

AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION COOPERATION

agency's international cooperation and the selection of foreign governments with which to cooperate.
2. American and European participants alike in the joint airworthiness
activities described in this Article emphasize the importance of enlisting
the support of the FAA's legal department. We have seen that neither the
general procedural framework of American administrative regulation nor
the particular legal regime governing United States aviation regulation
specifically contemplated the conduct of extensive joint certification activities. It would have been entirely understandable for FAA legal counsel to
regard that program as on doubtful legal footing and to seek in a variety
of formal or informal ways to restrain its development. In fact, FAA lawyers in Washington have chosen to support the process and actually foster
it. As a result, the process and its results have not been subjected to afterthe-fact misgivings on the part of agency legal officers.
3. Important as the commitment of agency leaders and counsel to international cooperation may be to an agency's program of concerted action, it
is essential to recognize that regulators do not operate in a bureaucratic
vacuum. The successful conduct and implementation of concerted
rulemaking and enforcement require that the regulated interests and the
affected public believe that such concerted activity is in principle a useful
and legitimate way for the agency to proceed and that the process has
actually gone forward with adequate consultation and opportunity for private and public interest participation. It is not possible to describe completely, or in detail, how each agency should seek to ensure such participation within the framework in which it operates. However, it would
seem advisable for all potentially affected public and private interests to be
advised of the existence of the agency's intergovernmental cooperative arrangements, of the meetings held, working groups established and the like,
and also to have an opportunity to participate in these activities to the
fullest extent feasible. This will promote the transparency and representativeness of these international efforts, and thereby not only enhance them
but also enhance the legitimacy of their products. The FAA experience
demonstrates that one should not assume that the private sector must necessarily be excluded from intergovernmental efforts of this kind.
Agencies may need to assume more affirmative responsibilities when it
comes to integrating public interest representatives in the process. Passenger, pilot and environmental groups, for example, do not have as great a
presence in the joint workings of the FAA and JAA and, though there are
limits on the extent to which they can feasibly be integrated, additional
efforts in that direction could be made.
Depending on the regulatory sphere, other agencies will also have an
interest in the nature and extent of intergovernmental consultations that
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an agency conducts. The State Department always will, and the Commerce Department and U.S.T.R. almost always will as well. An interagency group should be assembled for any substantial program of intergovernmentalism contemplated by an agency.
4. One way for an internationalized regulatory process and product to
win the support of regulated interests is to encourage the latter to operate
in parallel fashion and to enjoy the corresponding benefits. Although they
function as competitors in the aeronautical products or aviation services
markets, manufacturers and operators within different countries have discovered that they face similar burdens and challenges from the national
regulators in the markets they serve. Just as the FAA and JAA have
found that collaboration enhances their effectiveness qua regulators, so
similarly situated national interests have drawn strength in facing those
regulators from jointly articulating their needs and presenting their views
to the extent commonalities exist. The point is that possibilities for joint
action by different national aeronautical products manufacturers and aviation operators - particularly when closely associated with the concerted
activities of the governmental authorities - have increased their willingness to accept both the principles that drive international regulatory cooperation and the regulatory and enforcement results. That in turn has enabled national regulators to cooperate more extensively than would
otherwise have been politically possible.
5. As suggested, the strength and intensity of joint rulemaking efforts
that can properly occur necessarily depend on the degree of congruence
among the regulatory objectives of the participating agencies. The greater
the divergence of regulatory objectives, the greater the likelihood that the
resulting rule will depart from a given agency's statutory mandate.
Even where the authorities of different countries share similar regulatory objectives at the general level, there is a risk of divergence on any
given specific issue and agencies should be alert to that possibility. They
should in any event be alert to the possibility that the positions of counterpart agencies abroad will be influenced by domestic economic interests
and possibly even reflect protectionist purposes. This is especially so in
the regulation of enterprises that in other countries are state-owned or
state-controlled. This is not to condemn such influences, much less suggest
that they never obtain in the American administrative context, but simply
to urge that American agencies engaged in international regulatory cooperation recognize the risk.
6. Although the FAA/JAA experience does not raise the slightest concern on this score, agencies interested in international regulatory cooperation should as a general matter seek to ensure mutuality in the openness
of agency rulemaking processes to foreign government and foreign private
[Vol. 24
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sector participation. American agencies should not give foreign interests
access to their rulemaking where American interests are denied parallel
access to foreign government processes. Such imbalance might give an unjustified competitive advantage to foreign industry and other foreign
groups, and it would diminish the incentive of foreign authorities to open
up their regulatory processes to American participation and influence.
7. International consultations of the sort described in this study do not
appear to necessitate any radical departure from an agency's ordinary
practices in compliance with applicable procedural statutes. Except where
an agency's consultations bear clearly and directly upon the nation's foreign affairs, the APA exception for such functions should not apply to
shelter regulatory action simply because an. agency has chosen to internationalize its horizons. Depending on the significance of a regulatory
agency's reliance on those consultations, both their fact and substance
should figure in the agency's notices of proposed rulemaking, rulemaking
records and statements of basis and purposes under the Administrative
Procedure Act, and they should be subject both in principle and in practice to meaningful public comment.
By virtue of their more focused insistence on transparency, the Government in the Sunshine and Federal Advisory Committee Acts bear more
specifically on interagency consultations on the international level. However, neither of these statutes should as a general matter inhibit consultations of this sort. Even putting aside its very limited scope of application
(namely, meetings of collegial agencies), the Sunshine Act only reaches
agency gatherings that result in final action within the agency's scope of
competence. If they are properly timed as background policy-shaping
meetings, and if their conclusions are fully subject to reexamination during the comment period, an agency's prior consultation with foreign counterparts should rarely constitute a gathering subject to the Sunshine Act's
advance notice, openness and recordkeeping requirements.
Although their interactions with foreign counterparts closely resemble
at times the utilization of advisory committees within the meaning of the
Federal Advisory Committee Act, agencies should ordinarily not be held
to conform to FACA requirements when engaging in them. Apart from
enduring doubts over the government's entitlement to control the structure
and operations of advisory groups that it itself has not established, intergovernmental consultations will rarely present the "special" or "private
interest" dangers that FACA principally addresses; at the very least the
burden of establishing those dangers should fall on those claiming that
foreign government agencies should be treated as advisory committees for
purposes of FACA. Besides being presumptively unnecessary, efforts to
bring an agency's cooperative dealings with counterparts in foreign gov1993]
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ernments under the extensive and sometimes demanding requirements of a
purely domestic statute like FACA would be resented abroad and possibly
undermine the cooperative enterprise itself.
The conclusion that the Sunshine Act and FACA do not strictly apply
to most agency-level, intergovernmental consultations does not mean that
agencies should avoid making the fact and tenor of those consultations
known to interested groups and to the public in a timely fashion. In fact,
their effectiveness and acceptability appear to increase dramatically as
regulated interests are more directly enlisted in the authorities' joint study
and consultation process itself. To the extent feasible, agencies should seek
to ensure that the groups thus enlisted are inclusive of all interests affected
and also reasonably representative of them.
8. It stands to reason, and has proved to be the case for the FAA, that
international collaboration on any particular matter generally proceeds
more satisfactorily when undertaken in the context of concrete and relatively limited problems and when commenced at the outset of that undertaking rather than after national practices have formed and national positions hardened. Modification of existing systems, particularly when
originally arrived at on a strictly national basis, has proved more resistant
to international consensus than consensual adoption of. a common position
initially. A related suggestion, therefore, is that agencies committed to an
effective program of common study, deliberation or action with foreign
counterparts strive at an early date to develop a common agenda that responds to the current interests of both parties, rather than merely one of
them. Regulators have found that if they jointly address topics that are not
at the time of concurrent mutual interest, the process will not fully engage
both and may yield policies or practices that ultimately prove unsatisfactory to the party that did not initially participate fully in addressing them.
9. The FAA's experience has been that if regulatory cooperation with
foreign counterpart agencies is approached in an open and respectful
manner, then it produces a climate in which further cooperation can
flourish.
As the FAA works with the authorities of other countries . . . a

mutual respect and understanding develops. We come to understand the nuances of each others [sic] regulations, why they differ,
and the technical foundations for those differences. We learn the
strengths and weaknesses of each others [sic] certification systems
and what can be done to reciprocally support each other. We communicate with an increasing efficiency-a particularly important
ability when either country's product encounters a serious service
difficulty. Finally, each party understands the other's system, reg[Vol. 24
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ulations, and products well enough to stand behind them and their
product when that fortunately rare catastrophic event occurs, and
to seek a solution to what created that event.42 6
European participants agree that the FAA/JAA partnership has taken
time and personal effort to develop. This suggests that while all agencies
would do well to consider in comprehensive fashion all the respects in
which international cooperation would enhance the performance of their
regulatory, administrative and enforcement functions-and at the same
time help produce a more orderly international regulatory environment-they should proceed to the establishment of intergovernmental
mechanisms on a limited and gradual basis with an eye to what is technologically and politically feasible at any given time. Concrete success in the
accomplishment of carefully targeted programs of regulatory or administrative cooperation provides a sounder basis for broader-based intergovernmentalism than an a priori commitment to intergovernmentalism
on a grand and ambitious scale.
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